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This thesis consists of a general introduction and three independent es-
says. The summaries are as follows:
1. In the first chapter I give a general overview. Standard concepts and
methods are briefly classified. Moreover, I illustrate the meaning and
implications of volatility uncertainty. The concrete results are discussed
in each essay’s respective introduction.
2. The first essay considers a class of general equilibrium economies when
the primitive uncertainty model features uncertainty about continuous-
time volatility. This requires a set of mutually singular priors, which
do not share the same null sets. For this setting we introduce an ap-
propriate commodity space and the dual of linear and continuous price
systems.
All agents in the economy are heterogeneous in their preference for un-
certainty. Each utility functional is of variational type. The existence
of equilibrium is approached by a generalized excess utility fixed point
argument.
Such Arrow-Debreu allocations can be implemented into a Radner
economy with continuous-time trading. Effective completeness of the
market spaces alters to an endogenous property. Only mean unambigu-
ous claims equivalently satisfying the classical martingale representa-
tion property build the marketed space.
3. I consider fundamental questions of arbitrage pricing arising when the
uncertainty model incorporates volatility uncertainty. The resulting
ambiguity motivates a new principle of preference-free valuation.
By establishing a microeconomic foundation of sublinear price systems,
the principle of ambiguity-neutral valuation imposes the novel concept
of equivalent symmetric martingale measures. Such systems of mea-
sures exist when the asset price with uncertain volatility is driven by
Peng’s G-Brownian motion.
4. This chapter establishes, in the setting of Brownian information, a
general equilibrium existence result in a heterogeneous agent economy.
The existence is generic among income distributions. Agents differ
moreover in their stochastic differential formulation of intertemporal
recursive utility. The present class of utility functionals is generated
by a recursive integral equation, and incorporates preferences for the
local risk of the stochastic utility process.
The setting contains models in which Knightian uncertainty is rep-
resented in terms of maxmin preferences as described by Chen and
Epstein (2002). Alternatively, Knightian decision making in terms of
an inertia formulation from Bewley (2002) can be modeled as well.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
“The last century’s research affirmatively claimed the probabilistic
behavior of our universe: God does play dice! Nowadays people
believe that everything has its own probability distribution. But
a deep research of human behavior shows that for everything in-
volved human or life such, as finance, this may not be true: a
person or a community may prepare many different probability
distributions for her selection. She changes them, also purposely
or randomly, time by time.”
-Shige Peng
“It is difficult to argue that economists should have the same faith
in a fundamental and reductionist program for a description of
financial markets (although such faith does persist in some, a
manifestation of physics envy). Markets are tools developed by
humans for accomplishing certain tasks -not immutable laws of
Nature- and are therefore subject to all the vicissitudes and frail-
ties of human behavior. While behavioral regularities do exist,
and can be captured to some degree by quantitative methods, they
do not exhibit the same level of certainty and predictability as
physical laws.”
-Andrew W. Lo and Mark T. Mueller
“On the other hand, perhaps the best case for behavioral finance
is that it is nibbling at fundamental neoclassical conundrums and
associated phenomena [...], it is hinting at a sort of quantum
theory of finance. I hope this will be successful, but, until it is, for
now we have developed the Newtonian version of our science.”
-Stephen A. Ross
Modern finance has undergone an amazing expansion over the past four
decades. As a “crown jewel” of neoclassical economics it was largely re-
sponsible for granting legitimacy to the foundation of a derivative exchange.
1
2Things may have changed with the financial crisis of the late 2000s. Never-
theless, the intrinsic property of finance is the indispensable dependence of
future events. For an underlying economic model, this implies that it is not
certain which state of nature will occur in the future. As a starting point,
this approach is based on the formulation of uncertainty by Arrow (1953)
through the concept of “states of the environment”.
The very recent financial meltdown as a central event in the globalized finan-
cial market created new duties for academics. Economics as a social science
has been forced to recast its dominant paradigms. On the one hand, new
models were to be formulated to explain the emergence of such events. Such
considerations in fact had a positive nature. On the other hand, a second
class of models seems necessary. This latent normative approach focuses on
the prevention of repetitions of former mispricings due to inappropriate mod-
els. In this class, the design of (pricing) rules and related institutions are the
main objects.
The special nature of economics as a social science is its dialectic role. On
the one hand a main, goal is the correct description of an external system
- the economy. But an economic theory is also able to bring a part of the
economy into being. Here, an insight from economic sociology refers to the
assertion by Callon (1998) on the performativity of economics. As worked
out by MacKenzie and Millo (2003), the development of the Chicago Board
Options Exchange and the theory of option pricing developed by Black and
Scholes (1973), is a specific case for the creation of a market (see also the
introduction of Ross (2002)).
From this concrete insight, a financial economist should be aware of the re-
sponsibility that comes from the ability to influence reality. At the starting
point of a model in finance, the representation of uncertainty determines the
model. At this stage, the shape of the internal consistency receive its foun-
dation. Here, a more complex uncertainty model increases the scarcity of
certainty and the degree of possible internal consistency relations. Conse-
quently, any eschatological ideal in finance depends on the acceptance and
propagation of its central paradigm, the uncertainty model.
A very informal outline of the thesis
Financial economics has evolved into many directions. By now, it is consid-
ered as an independent field of research. Nevertheless a leading question is
always present:
What is today’s fair value of a payoff in the future?
Dominant paradigms emerged and their relations were studied. The uni-
fied theoretical core of modern finance may be summarized in the three P ’s
probability, preferences and prices, see Lo (1999). Clearly, there is a nat-
ural hierarchy for such model ingredients. The fundamental component is
the manifestation of uncertainty. Here, the implicit assumption of a known
probability law is hidden. One base of the associated probability space is the
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axiomatization of Kolmogoroff (1933) and the continuous success in math-
ematics. With this, one may define a space of future consumption plans.
From this point on, the preference structure of a decision maker is faced with
the given uncertainty. Depending on the context, this space is associated
with the (conceptually different) spaces of net trades. A price system for
the underlying economy and equilibrium concept can be formulated on this
primitive structure. Otherwise, one has to suppose that prices are given and
parametrized by observables.
From this perspective, the main goal of this thesis is to establish a fourth P .
This letter corresponds to possibility. Possibility refers to the awareness of an
imprecise knowledge. The true probability which is a perfect statistical de-
scription of observables is removed by a set of probability measures (priors),
representing the possibility of different probabilistic scenarios.1 Moreover, I
aim to analyze the relations to the other P ’s. The effect of possibility changes
the underlying concepts and hence the notion of (fair) value.
1.1 Foundation of Modern Finance
Fisher Black and Myron Scholes developed a formula to price financial op-
tions like calls or puts in their seminal paper Black and Scholes (1973). The
central arguments for observing the explicit pricing formula as a solution
to a transformed partial differential equation2 are based on the principle of
replication and an arbitrage-free financial market, modeled by a so called
geometric Brownian motion. Shortly thereafter, Ross (1976) formulated this
general principle in the arbitrage pricing theory (APT).
In the spirit of Debreu (1954), the notion of a valuation functional receives
its economic foundation by the corresponding equilibrium price system, lin-
ear and continuous with respect to the topology on the space of contingent
claims. Moreover, it is desirable to have a convenient representation of the
pertinent pricing operators. Representation in terms of a state price density
is proportional to the marginal utility of an agent.
These twin pillars are culminated and formalized by Harrison and Kreps
(1979) to deliver a microeconomic foundation of arbitrage-free pricing. The
idea of risk-neutral valuation is connected with the concept of equivalent
martingale measures. Nowadays these relations are known as the fundamen-
tal theorem of asset pricing.
1Metaphorically speaking “with a bit of hyperbole”, the neoclassic foundation of fi-
nance, focusing on the certainty about what is probable and possible, would correspond to
the Greek atomic model, (see Sharpe (1993) for the term “nuclear financial economics”).
In this allegory, the uncertainty about what is probable and possible would then corre-
spond to a sort of atomic model, where the position of the electron is uncertain, see Pusey,
Barrett, and Rudolph (2012).
2The solution of the relevant heat equation comes from Physics and is related to the
terminal heat distribution of an idealized thin tube, which is given by the payoff structure
of the option.
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Nevertheless, the principle calculation of the premium for a contract of future
cash flow is also an actuarial method. Here, the main idea is to determine
the value of a derivative by the self-financed3 replication of traded assets.
The logic is that of a fair game against uncertain nature. In the language
of mathematics this concept is called martingale. The risky price process
satisfies this property under the risk neutral measure, a virtual probability
measure. The relationship to the original probability measure is determined
by the mentioned state price density.
Following these lines of arguments, the dogma of probability spaces as the
formal uncertainty model affects almost all concepts of modern finance.
Tools from Stochastic and Functional Analysis
Applications of continuous-time stochastic processes to economic modeling is
largely focused on financial markets. The mainstream view is to consider the
price fluctuation of a liquid asset as an adapted stochastic process (Xt)t∈[0,T ]
on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,F). The most widely studied evolution
of a state variable is the Brownian motion. Explorations of the interconnec-
tion between the heat equation and diffusion processes resulted in a fruitful
field of research in stochastic analysis. Although the main motivation was
to develop a mathematical model for the statistical law of a particle, the
available techniques seem to be taylormade for applications in finance.
Another aspect involves the underlying space of contingent claims, which is
strongly connected to the commodity space of an associated economy. Unless
the states of the world and the points in times are represented by finite sets,
the underlying space of contingent claims or consumption profile is an infi-
nite dimensional vector space. Existence of an equilibrium for an exchange
economy is one major question in economic modeling. In the language of
convex analysis, this problem is related to the existence of a supporting
continuous linear price system. In this thesis, the models are based on com-
modity spaces, which are infinite-dimensional, and the cone of non-negative
consumption profiles has an empty interior.4
1.2 Uncertainty: Probability and Possibility
The conceptional equalization of risk and uncertainty has a long tradition in
modern finance. The opportunity to rely only on probabilities as a represen-
tation of uncertainty, opened the door to well developed methods from the
mathematical theory of probability. The postulational concept posited by
3Again, the idea is based on basic principles from Physics. In this case, the metaphor
of an energy preserving operation is used.
4In order to guarantee supporting prices, a condition on well-behaved preferences is
required. The interpretation is the existence of a desirable bundle which generates an
open cone, such that there is no intersection with the preferred set (or the open cone is
contained in the preferred set). See Mas-Colell and Zame (1991) for an overview.
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Kolmogoroff axiomatization relies on measure theory. This is an analytical
approach to a probability theory and allows the application of powerful re-
sults from functional analysis. This has a direct influence on the emergence
of stochastic calculus. The success of Kolmogoroffs theory can be traced back
to the availability of meaningful objects such as the conditional expectation,
(continuous-time) stochastic processes and its stochastic calculus.5
On the other hand, by possibility we refer to the point of view that many
probability priors P within a set P are equally possible and it is uncertain
which one is the true prior. This generalization of a probability space, de-
noted by (Ω,F ,P), is defined as a possibility space, where P is a set of priors
on the measurable space (Ω,F). The expression can be regarded as a formal-
ism for the principle of “Spielra¨ume” motivated by Von Kries (1886) within
the rejection of the “orthodox philosophy of Laplace”.
The awareness of the difference between risk and uncertainty is not a new idea
in economics. This was already marked by Knight (1921), as the following
citation indicates:
“To preserve the distinction [...] between the measurable un-
certainty and an unmeasurable one we may use the term risk to
designate the former and the term uncertainty for the latter. [...]
The practical difference between the two categories, risk and un-
certainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome
in a group of instances is known (either through calculation a
priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of
uncertainty this is not true.”
In a similar way and directly inspired by Von Kries, Keynes (1937) empha-
sized the difference between risk and (fundamental) uncertainty:
“By uncertain knowledge [...] I do not mean merely to distinguish
what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game
of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty [...]. The
sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect
of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the
rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new
invention [...]. About these matters there is no scientific basis on
which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do
not know!”
In this thesis, I use this distinction for the concept of volatility uncertainty.
Here, the uncertainty refers to the natural situation in which the available
data might be fragmentary or be considered as a thing of the past, whose
connection to volatility in the future is unsettled.
5 Here I have not touched on the different classification schemes of alternative proba-
bility theories. See for instance Weatherford (1982) for such an attempt.
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1.2.1 Volatility Uncertainty
The volatility of an underlying asset price process is a fundamental observ-
able or measurant in finance, but not directly observable. The estimation
of this parameter, including stochastic volatility structures, contains an in-
trinsic form of model risk. In a continuous-time setting, the volatility is a
function of the quadratic variation of the underlying state process. For in-
stance, in the last two decades a whole branch of stochastic volatility models
appeared. The choice of the correct volatility model has a direct and deep
influence on the valuation of an involved derivative security. In particular,
the parameter sensitivity in two different stochastic volatility models may
have a high magnitude effect on the valuation.
One way out is to allow for a time-dependent and non-deterministic confi-
dence interval as a primitive for the volatility. This provision for model risk
has direct implications for the underlying uncertainty model. An intrinsic
consequence is that the uncertainty model must consist of a set of (possibly)
mutually singular probabilistic measures, i.e. the measures do not share the
same null sets.6
In order to clarify the disparity between the coin tossing view of finance7 and
volatility uncertainty, I illustrate the latter concept in terms of a (trinomial)
tree:
Let a sequence of n ∈ N urns describe the uncertainty, where each
urn exists independently from the others, and each consists of 50
balls with three types D (down), C (constant) and U (up). We
know the number of balls from type D and U are equal in each
urn, but we only know that there are less than 10 balls of type
C. The time between two draws is given by ∆. The dynamics of
the state variable W = {Wt}t∈T , with T = {0,∆, 2∆, . . . , (n −
1)∆, n∆ = T} and W0 = 0, is given by
Wt∆ −W(t−1)∆ =

+
√
∆, if, Ut
0, if, Ct
−√∆, if, Dt.
The variance σ2 of this increment depends on the number of
balls of type C and therefore the possibility of ranges between
σ2 = 40
50
∆ ≤ σ2 ≤ ∆ = σ2. This trinomial model converges in
a specific sense8 to a continuous-time limit on the time interval
[0, T ], again denoted by W . In this context, the volatility refers
6This is an important difference compared to the concept of drift uncertainty, where
the priors are equivalent and hence share the sets of measure zero.
7See Cassidy (2009) for a survey.
8In the present setting, weak convergence is shown in Dolinsky, Nutz, and Soner (2012).
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to the quadratic variation process of W , given by
〈W 〉t = lim
∆→0
∑
r≤t
|Wr∆ −W(r−1)∆|2.
By construction, the volatility uncertainty persists and can be ex-
pressed by means of the volatility constraint σ2t ≤ 〈W 〉t ≤ σ2t.
The formulation of such a process forecloses the existence of
an underlying probability space. The volatility uncertainty is
described in terms of the volatility interval [σ, σ], where each
(adapted) volatility process σ taking values in [σ, σ] constitutes a
possible prior Pσ and corresponds to the shape of t 7→ 〈W 〉t un-
der this prior Pσ. Figure 1 gives a schematic illustration. Events
Figure 1: Mutually Singular Priors
related to the quadratic variation 〈W 〉 reveal that the underly-
ing uncertainty model consists of mutually singular probability
measures. The process W is a G-Brownian motion, with a given
volatility interval [σ, σ].
The above illustration follows the same lines of a binomial tree without am-
biguity in the urns, whose continuous-time limit is the classical Brownian
motion.
When presuming uncertainty about volatility, the modeler is forced to give an
objective description of the real world in terms of different statistical descrip-
tions with a different event domain of for what is possible or impossible. In
Lo and Mueller (2010), a finer taxonomy of uncertainty is proposed. Herein,
the classification of volatility uncertainty refers to “partially reducible uncer-
tainty” and can be distinguished with irreducible or ontic uncertainty.
1.2.2 Decision under Uncertainty
A rigorous analysis of preferences under uncertainty is often approached by a
consistent set of axioms for its representation on a given set of uncertain out-
comes or lotteries. The axiomatization of choice under uncertainty goes back
to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Later, Savage (1954) extended
the expected utility to the case of a subjective probability under whose ex-
pectation the utility is evaluated.
The preferences for the uncertainty of probabilities, also known as preferences
for ambiguity is a classical topic in decision theory, see Ellsberg (1961). In the
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seminal paper Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) relax the independence axioms,
which is crucial to the representation of expected utility. In a static setting,
it was shown that an axiomatic theory of choice with ambiguity aversion is
available. This suggests a whole set of probability measures, and consid-
ers the minimal expected utility due to ambiguity aversion. A behavioral
explanation of ambiguity aversion based on behavioral aspects is discussed
in Heath and Tversky (1991). As such, ambiguity (aversion) can also be
regarded as a subcategory of behavioral finance, see the survey of Barberis
and Thaler (2003). From this perspective, ambiguity about volatility may
be directly linked to the notion of excess volatility.9
Recently, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) characterize prefer-
ence in the Anscombe-Aumann setting by extending the worst case evaluation
in terms of a penalty term. This increases the flexibility to model ambiguity
aversion by giving each probability scenario a different weight of importance.
This setting allows for modeling anchored preferences from prospect theory,
as well.
Embedding preferences for ambiguity into a dynamic set up, the recursive
structure of backward induction emerges. The related concept of dynamic
consistency plays a central role in rational decisions. See Epstein and Schnei-
der (2003) for an axiomatization in this setup. Time consistency refers to a
rational updating principle, see Riedel (2004) in the case of a dynamic risk
measure, which is a risk-neutral version of dynamic multiple-prior prefer-
ences.10
1.3 Asset Pricing under Volatility Uncertainty
The notion of expectation is a central concept for valuation in financial eco-
nomics. The rational expectation hypothesis (REH) as a collection of assump-
tions for how agents exploit available information is often modeled in terms
of the conditional expectation under a given probability measure. Such an
object can be considered as the best predictor with minimal error. In this
thesis, the formulation of the REH is affected by the ambiguity about the
true probability measure. The magnitude of priors makes it possible to con-
sider a range of reasonable linear conditional expectations. Here, the rational
updating of new information is given by a conditional nonlinear expectation.
With this modification, an asset pricing principle based on marginal utility
changes and depends heavily on the preferences for ambiguity. For instance,
Epstein and Wang (1994) introduce and analyze the Lucas model in terms
of an ambiguity averse representative agent.
In the presence of volatility uncertainty, I motivate a notion of uncertainty-
neutral valuation. This is a canonical generalization of risk-neutral valuation.
9This is a phenomena which is often used to claim that the efficient market hypothesis
is falsified. In subsection 1.3, I discuss this in more detail.
10From a technical point of view, (dynamic) risk measures correspond to (conditional)
sublinear expectations.
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In essence, I describe a conditional nonlinear expectation under which the
uncertain security price process becomes a fair game against a risky and am-
biguous nature. Again, this valuation principle is based on a preference-free
approach. In the standard case, asset returns are not supposed to be a fair
game if agents are risk averse.11 Similarly, if agents are ambiguity averse
(and risk averse) asset returns are risky and uncertain. But, in the mul-
tiple prior framework, the notion of a martingale as a representation of a
fair game has different degrees of fairness. My notion of fairness refers to
the situation where correctly deflated asset prices are fair games under every
relevant prior. This principle corresponds to the idea of unambiguous events
as introduced in Epstein and Zhang (2001). In this regard the conception
of fairness corresponds to the uncertainty-neutral valuation under volatility
uncertainty.
For the microeconomic foundation of risk-neutral pricing, continuous and lin-
ear price systems are required. In my setting, the uncertainty model induces
a nonlinear expectation. The new deflated martingale notion and the REH
are now connected in a modified manner. In this regard, a main goal of this
thesis is to motivate a new martingale concept, representing the notion of a
fair game under volatility uncertainty. Under a nonlinear expectation, the
idea of a martingale changes as well and the concept of a fair game should
be related to the correct martingale concept. In comparison to the risk neu-
tral pricing, it is questionable whether continuous and linear price systems
remain natural types.
As already mentioned, the uncertainty model induces a nonlinear expecta-
tion. The new deflated martingale notion may be used to reinterpret the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). To illustrate this, I reconsider the rela-
tionships between the involved concepts. The nonlinear valuation principle
sheds a new light on the EMH. First, I recall the interplay between the fal-
sification of the EMH and the necessity of an asset pricing principle. This is
known as the Joint Hypothesis problem. The following quotation in Camp-
bell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) indicates this tension:
“First, any test of efficiency must assume an equilibrium model
that defines normal security returns. If efficiency is rejected, this
could be because the market is truly inefficient or because an in-
correct equilibrium model has been assumed.”
The importance of the equilibrium concept is directly related to the involved
equilibrium price system. But if the price system is based on the probability
space via commonly used commodity spaces, then the equilibrium concept
also depends on the probability space as well. Under volatility uncertainty,
the choice of the implied uncertainty adjusted martingale notion as a conve-
nient representation of the pricing operator has to be modified by taking the
given uncertainty model into account.
11See Section VI in LeRoy (1989) for a discussion.
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Second, the modification of the uncertainty model has implications for a re-
consideration of the excess volatility puzzle. The observed excess volatility
contradicts the EMH within the standard paradigm of modeling uncertainty
via a single probability measure. Here, the notion of present value equals
the (linear) conditionally deflated expectation. The variance of this random
variable depends on the relevant probability law. As in Shiller (1981) and
Shiller (1992), this law is assumed to be known, and induces a linear condi-
tional expectation. The suggested nonlinear valuation principle in Chapter 3
puts this puzzle in a different light, at least from a theoretical point of view.
In other words, the claimed falsification of the EMH refers to the case when
the uncertainty model is given by a probability space. Hence no disproof
affects the present multiple prior asset pricing model for the EMH.12
New Tools from Stochastic and Functional Analysis
As mentioned in subsection 1.2.1, when volatility uncertainty is considered,
an uncertainty model without an underlying probability space is necessary.
However, this circumstance creates several technical difficulties for a mathe-
matical language with powerful tools. In the last six years Shige Peng13 has,
in a series of papers, developed a nonlinear mathematical theory of probabil-
ity along the same axiomatic lines as in Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath
(1999). Here the degree of nonlinearity is directly connected to the structure
of priors, which represents such a risk measure or sublinear expectation. The
conditional expectation changes, as an elementary object in the REH. Based
on a conditional nonlinear expectation, one may introduce and analyze the
concept of a martingale.
In this situation, there is an analogue to the standard Brownian motion,
see the example of the trinomial tree in subsection 1.2.1. A fully nonlin-
ear partial differential equation comes into play. The first considerations
of Avellaneda, Levy, and Paras (1995) call this object the Black-Scholes-
Barrenblatt (BSB) equation. Similarly to the analogy between the Brownian
motion and the Laplace operator, as a component of the heat equation, the
BSB equation can be associated with G-Brownian motion. As a special case,
the related (conditional) G-expectation allows for a stochastic calculus, in-
cluding stochastic differential equations driven by G-Brownian motion. New
types of martingale representation theorems and even a Girsanov type result
for G-Brownian motion are available.
The standard pair of the commodity and price space are given by the dual
pairing of classical Lebesgue spaces, where the basis is a given measure space.
Due to the new uncertainty model, the commodity-price pair is based on a
mutually singular set of priors. I suggest a setting which allows the applica-
12Suppose a nonlinear expectation operator is considered to compute present discounted
value of real dividends. Then small (big) changes of dividends or small (big) arrival of
new information may cause big (small) changes of its value, i.e. an overreaction (under-
reaction).
13Several results are used, which are directly or indirectly influenced by Shige Peng.
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tion of an abstract result from the theory of ordered vector spaces. My notion
of sublinear prices is built upon the topological dual of continuous and linear
price systems. However the explicit representation of the new dual space
allows to construct sublinear and continuous price systems in terms of linear
functionals from the topological dual space. Here, the book of Aliprantis and
Tourky (2007) describes new concepts of lattices for nonlinear functionals.
Chapter 2
Radner Equilibria under
Volatility Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
Ever since the pioneering general theory of competitive markets, the exten-
sion to a dynamic equilibrium has served as an initial position for a neoclas-
sical intertemporal asset pricing theory.
Most models of an Arrow-Debreu economy in continuous time assume an
underlying and a priori given probabilistic structure. We replace this all-
encompassing and basic assumption with a set of pairwise mutually singular
probability measures (priors) P . Our main focus is concerned with models
where the volatility of the state variable is uncertain or ambiguous. This can
only be accomplished through one such set. Furthermore, we aim to analyze
the interrelation between volatility uncertainty and incomplete markets. In
contrast to the situation of mutually equivalent priors,1 a new feature emerges
about the states of the world:
Certainty about the true prior automatically determines states which can-
not occur. A different situation arises when certainty is limited to the knowl-
edge that the true prior is contained in P . This shrinks the set of impossible
states and reasonable contingent claims.
The existing literature, when dealing with potentially complete markets, has
established a standard way to construct a financial market equilibrium. Here
Duffie and Huang (1985) may be regarded as the seminal paper that explores
the idea in Kreps (1982), about implementing an Arrow-Debreu allocation
into a so called Radner (1972) economy. This is achieved via continuous trad-
ing of long-lived securities. A major tool for spanning the complete market
1Ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty in continuous time is often modeled by the so
called drift uncertainty. Here, the probabilities must be equivalent to each other. Such
a description is not appropriate when the volatility is the object which carries the uncer-
tainty. See Chen and Epstein (2002) for a formulation of such preferences via a backward
stochastic differential equation (Backward-SDE) and Chapter 4 for the related existence
of general equilibrium.
12
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of Arrow-Debreu securities is the concept of a martingale generator, which
reduces in a Brownian setting to the classical martingale representation the-
orem.2 However, in the present setup the concept of martingale multiplicity
as an integer valued measure for the dimension of uncertainty is imprecise.
An additional component in the martingale representation suggests, instead,
a measure with fraction number values.
This paper establishes the existence of a Radner equilibrium with an endoge-
nously incomplete financial market. The starting point is a heterogeneous
agent Arrow-Debreu economy with ambiguity averse agents, where the ob-
jective uncertainty is given by the set of priors P . Similarly to representative
agent economy in Epstein and Wang (1994) we observe the indeterminacy
in the effective equilibrium priors of the price system, as output data of this
intermediate economy. As a result, only special Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
allocation can be implemented into a Radner economy, and we observe the
an incomplete market equilibrium. The endogenous indeterminacy of the
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium price system determines the degree and structure
of the incompleteness of the implementing financial market.
In the present Radner economy, each agent has to find trading strategies
of buying and selling traded claims in order to maximize her utility on net
trades when volatility uncertainty of the state variable is present. This is
achieved in terms of a suitable dynamic conditional sublinear expectation
X 7→ EQEt [X].3 The set QE refers to all equilibrium price measures, given
an equilibrium allocation. In the classical uncertainty model with only one
prior, the linear risk-adjusted expectation operator is related to the unique
equilibrium price measure.
As demonstrated in the finite state case, Mukerji and Tallon (2001) discuss
ambiguity aversion as a source for incompleteness in financial markets. Be-
yond the related marketed space, a kind of collective portfolio inertia results.
In essence, the market-clearing condition in the Radner equilibrium is in ac-
tion. The role of the financial market as a mechanism to change the shape of
income streams is accomplished only partially. Nevertheless, this fits into the
arguments by Dow and da Costa Werlang (1992), where inertia for a single
agent in a partial equilibrium is detected. In a different setting, De Castro
and Chateauneuf (2011) observe similar results on unambiguous trade with
unambiguous aggregate endowment.
As argued in Anderson and Raimondo (2008), the candidate equilibrium
price process is often assumed to be dynamically complete. Quite frequently
2The notion of martingale multiplicity works in a separable framework, so that an
orthogonalization procedure counts the dimension of uncertainty.
3At this point the assumed weak compactness and stability under pasting of P play an
essential role for the construction of a universal random variable being under each prior
simultaneously the conditional expectation. When the set of priors is mutually equivalent,
this property is nothing else as the dynamic consistency of conditional expectation. In the
volatility uncertainty framework stability under pasting is a stronger condition, see Nutz
and Soner (2012). A key feature of this conditional expectation is the semigroup property
Es ◦ Et = Es for s ≤ t, which implies the Law of Iterated Expectation.
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this assumption is encoded in the exogenous volatility model of the candidate
equilibrium price process.4 In this regard, our model differs in terms of an
intrinsic incompleteness due to the volatility uncertainty and the appearance
of ambiguous net trades. As such, the size and structure of the marketed
space is the result of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
Martingales and Dynamic Spanning
The relationship between martingale multiplicity and dynamical spanning of
the commodity space is an economically meaningful corollary of the mar-
tingale representation. In the case of Brownian noise a square integrable
random variable X can be represented in terms of a stochastic integral:
X = EP [X] +
∫ T
0
θsdBs
This result is strongly related to the completeness of the financial market.
Loosely speaking, in our mutually singular prior framework, a number rep-
resenting the dimensions of uncertainty does not exist. In essence, this is
caused by the more evolved martingale representation theorem. Similarly
to the classical Doob-Meyer decomposition for a submartingale, the repre-
sentation of martingales under a sublinear expectation sustain an additional
monotone compensation term:
X = EP [X] +
∫ T
0
θsdBs −KT
Only a closed subspace of the present commodity space L1(P) allows for the
classical replication of a possible consumption profile X : Ω → R. In this
case the compensation term (Kt) equals zero. Such random variables are
mean unambiguous, i.e. the expectation value of the claim is the same under
each prior. At this abstract stage, we can already presume some implications
for incompleteness in the involved market structure, see Remark 3.1.
The uncertainty model and the economy
We consider a measurable space (Ω,F) and fix a set of the probability mea-
sures P . In general, three cases of relationships between priors in P are pos-
sible. As described at the beginning of the introduction, two priors maybe
mutually singular. This implies a disjoint support of these measures. The
second possibility is a mixture. In this case, two priors may be equivalent
on a sub σ-field and mutually singular on a complementary sub σ-field. The
last case, which does not appear, is mutual equivalence of measures.
In principle, this modeling can describe a set of different probability assess-
ments related to the states of the world ω ∈ Ω, so that different possible
shapes of the intrinsic volatility may appear. Sure statements concerning
random variables in this uncertainty setting cannot be reflected as almost
sure events under only one prior P ∈ P . In this context, arguments are
4See for instance Duffie and Zame (1989) and Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve (1990).
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based on P-quasi sure analysis, which takes every prior into account simul-
taneously. Here, a reasonable consumption profile X : Ω → R should have
a finite first moment. Thus, our commodity space L1(P) consists of random
variables with a finite expectation for all P ∈ P .5 Based on this sublinear
expectation, we can define a norm c1,P such that the space of consumption
profiles becomes a Banach space. The positive cone of L1(P), given by ran-
dom variables satisfying X ≥ 0 P-quasi surely, induces an appropriate order
structure.
Having the commodity space fixed, we introduce the corresponding topo-
logical dual space. This space consists of continuous and linear functionals,
which are the candidate price systems. Similarly to the single prior case a
generalized Radon-Nikodym density result, representing these price function-
als, becomes available. In essence, we can represent every linear and c1,P-
continuous functional by a measure µ such that dµ = ψdP , where P ∈ P
and ψ ∈ L∞(P ). This allows us to approach the existence of equilibria via a
modified excess utility mapping.
With the given commodity-price duality, we introduce a class of preference
relations for the agents in the economy. In the seminal paper by Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), the well-known maxmin preferences are axiomatized, and
account for ambiguity aversion. Later Hansen and Sargent (2001) generalize
this concept by introducing an entropy based penalty term for the priors
under consideration.6 In our economy, agents are described by variational
preferences. Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) introduce and ax-
iomatize variational preferences, a robust version of the expected utility in
the form
U(X) = min
P∈P
EP [u(X)] + c(P ),
where the minimum is taken by a whole class of possible probabilistic views
of conceivable scenarios. The functional c : P → R penalizes each prior with
a different weight. We show that natural properties, such as concavity and
upper semicontinuity are imposed when natural conditions on the primitives.
When the penalty term is linear even c1,P-continuity can be shown. More-
over, we fully describe the superdifferential of such a utility functional, as in
Rigotti and Shannon (2012) for the finite state case.
The economy consists of I ∈ N agents, equipped with variational preferences
on the positive cone of the commodity space L1(P). The existence of equi-
librium is achieved by a modified Negishi method. In the first step we prove
the existence of Pareto optimal allocations.7 The modification of the excess
utility relies on multiple priors, which are now explicit arguments of the ex-
cess utility map.8
5For instance, for each P ∈ P, the commodity space satisfies L1(P) ⊂ L1(Ω,F , P ).
6Note that in their model the set of priors are mutually equivalent.
7Here, the topological lattice properties of the commodity space ease the proof for the
existence of an optimal allocation.
8Several technical difficulties motivate this change. A particular problem is that the
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In the last part, we implement the net trades of the equilibrium allocation
into a Radner type economy. This is achieved via the previously mentioned
martingale representation. The implementability of the Arrow-Debreu Equi-
librium is limited by the linear price system. An equilibrium with a certain
sublinear equilibrium price system can be implemented without further con-
ditions (see Theorem 4).
Related Literature
In the standard single prior Arrow-Debreu setting with expected utility, mar-
ket prices are directly affected via individual marginal rates of substitution
for state contingent commodity bundles (See Martins-da Rocha and Riedel
(2010) for a general overview of issues concerning issues the existence of
equilibria.) In the simplest version of this model, equilibrium price systems
are given by marginal utility weights that can result into risk-neutral prob-
abilities. Continuous-time models and dynamic Arrow-Radner equilibria are
treated in Duffie and Huang (1985) and Dana and Pontier (1992). A unique
Radner equilibrium is observed in Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve (1990).
This approach is based on a representative agent, see Huang (1987). We also
refer to Hugonnier, Malamud, and Trubowitz (2012) and Herzberg and Riedel
(2013) for a recent discussion of endogenous completeness in continuous-time
finance models.
Existence of equilibria in incomplete markets for a finite state space is well
developed, starting with the seminal paper by Duffie and Shafer (1985). For
an overview we refer the reader to Magill and Quinzii (2002). In Basak and
Cuoco (1998), restricted market participation is modeled as a source of mar-
ket incompleteness. As a consequence, Pareto weights are stochastic.
When the uncertainty is given by an undominated multiple prior setting,
considerations of heterogeneous agent economies are treated only for a finite
state space, see for instance Dana (2004) and Dana (2002). In Dana and
Le Van (2010) no-arbitrage conditions are associated with a risk adjusted set
of priors. Rigotti and Shannon (2012) discuss market implications of ambi-
guity and feature generic determinacy of general equilibrium.
Ravanelli and Svindland (2013) consider efficient allocation with variational
preference when the uncertainty is given by a set of equivalent probability
measures. In this case, it is possible to start with a reference probability
space.
Representative agent economies for the infinite state and discrete time case
can be found in Epstein and Wang (1994), where a modification of Lucas’
asset pricing model is established in terms of a Choquet expected utility
introduced in Chateauneuf (1991). Very recent research by Epstein and Ji
(2013a) provide a discussion of the continuous-time case and the notion of
sequential trade equilibria with a single agent.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the implications
price space is not directly related to a state price density as in the traditional Lebesgue
space setting when there is only one prior P .
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of the uncertainty model in the case of finitely many states or priors. In
Section 3 we introduce the commodity space and the price space. Moreover,
we introduce the variational utility functional and discuss its properties. In
Section 4, we show the existence of Pareto optimal allocations. Afterwards
we establish the existence of equilibrium and the Radner implementation.
The appendix collects the details and proofs.
2.2 Simple Economies under Singular Priors
For perspective, we give an outline about the implication of maxmin pref-
erences when there are finitely many states of world Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωn}. As
we will see, the worst case expected utility with a partially disjoint support
of possible priors emerges in the form of a Leontief-type utility. In the first
subsection, we illustrate the implication in a concrete two agent economy
with two priors P = {P1, P2} on Ω that are neither singular nor equivalent.
Then, we move to the setting with the state space found in Sections 3 and 4
and foreclose some results formulated therein. Two priors P1, P2 ∈ ∆˚n, the
interior of the simplex of probability measures, are always equivalent. Two
priors are singular if their supports are disjoint.
2.2.1 The Finite State Case
In order to illustrate the main point with a concrete example, consider an
economy with two agents i = 1, 2 and n = 6 states of the world at time T > 0.
The uncertainty is given by two measures represented by P1 = (0, 0,
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
)
and P2 = (
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 0, 0), see Figure 1.9 It is unknown which prior is the cor-
Figure 1: Non-Equivalent and Non-Singular Priors
rect, although each prior determines different states of the world. Each agent
is ambiguity averse on P = {P1, P2} with maxmin preferences represented in
9In the volatility uncertainty setting, such priors occur when the volatility is in agree-
ment up to some time t > 0 and then differs.
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terms of U i : R6+ → R given by
U i(X) = min
P∈P
EP [ai ln(X)]
=
ai
4
(
ln (Xω3 ·Xω4) + min
(
ln (Xω1 ·Xω2) , ln (Xω5 ·Xω6)
))
.
The endowments are given by e1 = (1, 1, 2, 1, 3, 3) and e2 = (2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1),
where the prior-dependent endowment is denoted by ei(P ), for instance we
have e1(P1) = (1, 1, 2, 1). Due to the singularity in the events {ω1, ω2} and
{ω5, ω6}, the utility structure has a Leontief flavor in these states. This
means for instance, the indifference curve with respect to payoffs in the events
{ω1, ω2} and {ω5, ω6} are L-shaped. This is illustrated in the Edgeworth
boxes of Figure 2.
After some calculations, we have an equilibrium price system Π(·) = 〈·, p〉,
with p ∈ R6+ such that (p5, p6) = 0 must hold. This follows from the L-shaped
indifference curve and (eω1 , eω2) > (eω5 , eω6). The price system has the same
support as P2. This can be infered from the first order conditions, since
each agent has P2 as the minimizing (effective) prior of her maxmin utilities.
The non-unique equilibrium allocation (X¯1, X¯2) ∈ [X,X] lies on the orange
line segment of Figure 2 (b). Arrow securities of state ω5 and ω6 are for
free, so that a feasible retrade on the order interval
[
X,X
]
leaves the utility
unaffected. On the other hand, consumption in state ω3 and ω4 behaves as
Figure 2: Edgeworth boxes via Leontief-type utility
in the expected utility setting with one prior. Specifically, the consumption
is prior independent. This can be seen in the explicit description of U i(X)
above and Figure 2 (a). In Subection 3.1.2 we consider the analog space of
unambiguous contingent claims denoted by M[P ]. However, trade outside of
M[P ] is possible.
The Modified Negishi-Approach
Continuing with the setting of the last paragraph, we illustrate how the
existence of an equilibrium can be shown. To do so, we consider the first
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order condition
αi∇U i(X¯ i) = αi
(
ai · P2({ω1})
X¯ iω1
, . . . ,
ai · P2({ω4})
X¯ iω4
, 0, 0
)
= 〈p, ·〉, i = 1, 2.
From this characterization of the Pareto optimal (PO) allocation, we de-
note the set of common effective priors under the efficient allocation by
P(α). The restriction to concentrate on linear prices leads to a price sys-
tem 〈p, ·〉 = EP2 [ψ·] having an endogenous support {ω1, . . . , ω4}. As such the
representation as a sole random variable fails.
We illustrate how the Negishi method applies to show the P2 almost sure
unique equilibrium, so that the indeterminacy of the equilibrium allocation
is outside the support of P2. Let us consider the utility possibility set in Fig-
ure 3. The utility possibility set (UPS) for the economy EP with expected
Figure 3: Utility possibility set under {P1, P2} = P
log utility agents under P ∈ P is denoted by UP . Clearly, each EP induces a
unique equilibrium weight denoted by α = GE(P ). On the other hand each
α ∈ ∆2 induces a representative agent Uα, whose effective prior is denoted
by P ∈ P(α). The UPS of the original economy with multiple priors is then
given by U = UP1 ∩ UP2 . Moreover, we have P2 ∈ P(α2). While P1 /∈ P(α1)
is not an effective prior for UP1 and therefore contradicts the first order con-
ditions with respect to the α1-efficient allocation. This illustrates how the
Negishi approach with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility still applies under
the correct prior of the maxmin preferences, as explained in the following.
An equilibrium has to satisfy two conditions. On the one hand, the prior
P2 = P
∗ as a component of the price system must be effective for the rep-
resentative agent, i.e. P ∗ ∈ P(α∗). On the other hand the weighting α∗ of
the representative agent under P ∗ must be the correct equilibrium weight
denoted by GE(P ∗) = α∗. These two conditions can be condensed in a fixed
point of a composited correspondence, i.e. P ∗ ∈ P ◦ GE(P ∗). This obser-
vation will lead to a proof method for the existence of an equilibrium, also
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in the volatility uncertainty setting. Moreover, as a byproduct, we observe
structural properties more directly.
2.2.2 The Infinite State Case
One special property of every finite dimensional commodity space L is the
equivalence of every two arbitrary norms ‖ · ‖i : L→ R+, i = 1, 2, with this
in mind, we move to the infinite (and uncountable) state space Ω, consisting
of continuous paths ω : [0, T ]→ R, equipped with the usual Borel σ-algebra
B(Ω) = F . Let us consider two mutually singular priors P = {P1, P2} on
(Ω,F) as the uncertainty model. In Section 3 we describe this in more detail.
Let the endowment ei of each agent i = 1, 2 depend on the prior. So that
we have ei = (e
P1
i , e
P2
i ) ∈ L2(P1)×L2(P2), where L2(P ) = L2(Ω,F , P ) is the
usual Lebesgue space of integrable random variables equipped with a stan-
dard norm ‖x‖L2(P ) =EP[|x|2]1/2. Since both priors are possible, it is reasona-
ble to consider endowments satisfying c2,P(ei) = max
{‖ePi ‖L2(P ),P ∈ P}<∞.
The finiteness condition under the c2,P-norm corresponds to the space L2(P),
being with each P ∈ P a strict sub space of L2(P ).
A standard price system Π : L2(P)→ R for equilibria in infinite dimensional
commodity space is linear and continuous in the topology of the underlying
commodity space. As we will present in Section 3.1 the related price dual
space of L2(P), denoted by L2(P)∗, is strictly larger than L2(P )∗, P ∈ P ,
due to the stronger c2,P-norm. We have the following sequence of inclusions:
L2(P) ⊂ L2(P ) ∼= L2(P )∗ ⊂ L2(P)∗, P ∈ P
Again, each agent has maxmin utility Ui(X) =ai min(E
P1 [ln(X)],EP2 [ln(X)]),
defined on the positive cone L2(P)+. Let (X¯1, X¯2) be an equilibrium alloca-
tion of the economy E = {L2(P), Ui, ei}i=1,2 such that X¯P1 + X¯P2 = eP and
X¯P1 = X¯1 P -a.s. holds under every P ∈ P .
Now, consider the situation when Ui(X¯i) = aiE
P2 [ln(X¯i)] 6= aiEP1 [ln(X¯i)] for
each i = 1, 2. The supergradients of Ui at a consumption bundle in L
2(P)+
lie in the dual L2(P)∗. The first order condition to characterize a Pareto
optimal allocation gives us
α1 · ∇U1(X¯1) = µ1 = µ2 = (1− α1) · ∇U2(X¯2), where dµi = αi · u′i(X¯i)dP2.
In comparison to the traditional general equilibrium theory the equilibrium
pricing measure Q = µ|µ| cannot contain all the information about the uncer-
tainty model. Although Q completely represents the linear and continuous
price system Π(·) = EQ[·], it is decoupled from the non-effective prior (rela-
tively to the equilibrium allocation) P1. Note, that this conceptual observa-
tion is consistent with the finite state case in Subsection 2.1. These informal
computations are condensed in the following observation:
Let (p, (X¯i)) be an equilibrium in {L2(P2), Ui, ei}2i=1 then an equilibrium for
{L2(P1)× L2(P2), Ui, ei}2i=1 is given by ((0, p), (X¯P11 , X¯P21 ), (X¯P12 , X¯P22 )).
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In contrast to a standard finance model with an underlying probability space
(Ω,F , P ), the equilibrium price system Π ∈ L2(P)∗ no longer carries the
information of all null sets. This has direct implications for the related con-
cepts of asset pricing, such as arbitrage, equivalent martingale measures and
stochastic discount factors.
2.3 The Primitives of the Economy
Let us start with the underlying uncertainty model. We consider scenarios,
represented by probabilistic priors, which do not share the same null sets. As
such, it is not appropriate to assume the existence of a given reference prob-
ability measure. Concerning the construction of priors, our method needs
some structure on the state space.
Let Ω be the set of all possible states of the world. A state is an exogenous
sequence of circumstances from time 0 to time T which are relevant to the
economy. We assume Ω = {ω ∈ C([0, T ];R) : ω0 = 0} to be the canonical
space of continuous sample paths starting in zero and endowed with the uni-
form topology.10 The σ-field of events is given by the Borel σ-field of Ω,
called F = B(Ω). LetM1(Ω) be the set of all probability measure on (Ω,F).
Now, we construct a set of priors on the measurable space (Ω,F). The canon-
ical process Bt(ω) = ωt is a Brownian motion under the Wiener measure P0.
11
We denote by Fo = {Fot }t∈[0,T ], with Fot = σ(Bs, s ∈ [0, t]) the raw filtration
of the canonical process B. The strong formulation of volatility uncertainty
is based upon martingale laws in terms of stochastic integrals:
P a := P0 ◦ (Xa)−1, where Xat =
∫ t
0
√
asdBs, t ∈ [0, T ].
The stochastic integral Xa is the classical Itoˆ integral under P0. The pro-
cess a = (at)t∈[0,T ] is Fo-adapted and has a finite first moment. Probability
measures generated in this way are denoted by PS, referring to the strong
formulation of volatility uncertainty.
Assumption 1 The uncertainty of each agent is generated by a convex set
D of processes, such that the set of priors is weakly compact12 and given by
P = {P a ∈ PS : a ∈ D}.
10This topology is generated by the supremum norm ‖ω‖∞ = supt∈[0,T ] |ωt|, ω ∈ Ω.
11Note that P0 is not a reference measure and its technical purpose is linked to the
construction of the uncertainty model. The case P0 /∈ P is possible and refers to 1 /∈ D in
Assumption 1.
12The set of measures is relatively compact if and only if for each sequence of closed sets
Fn ↘ ∅ implies supP∈P P (Fn)↘ 0. Regularity in terms of monotonic continuity of EP [·]
is equivalent to weak relative compactness for P. We refer to Huber and Strassen (1973)
and Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011).
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Recall that, the volatility of a stochastic integral Xa =
∫ √
adB is given
by the quadratic variation 〈Xa〉t =
∫ t
0
asds. As such, by construction the
volatility uncertainty is encoded in the quadratic variation. The mutual
singularity of priors is an intrinsic and natural property in the continuous-
time setting. For instance, P a(〈BT 〉 = T ) = 0 6= 1 = P0(〈BT 〉 = T ) may
appear, for a some constant a 6= 1.
In order to address this fact, we need to modify the notion of a sure event.
To do so, we say a property holds P-quasi surely (P-q.s.) if it holds outside a
P-polar set. Such sets have zero probability under every prior P ∈ P . Next,
we illustrate this construction method of priors for Peng’s G-expectation.13
Example 1 Let the uncertainty be given by a G-expectation. The volatility
is associated with the volatility bounds 0 < σ < σ. The associated nonlinear
expectation EG[X] can be represented by maxP∈P EP [X] = EG[X], P is in-
duced by D = {a ∈ L2(P ⊗ dt) and Fo-adapted : at(ω) ∈ [σ, σ]P0-a.s.}. This
is a weakly compact set of probability measure on (Ω,F).14 The quadratic
variation process is no longer deterministic. All the volatility uncertainty for
B is concentrated in the quadratic variation 〈B〉. Under every prior P a in
P, the volatility process is given by 〈B〉Pat =
∫ t
0
asds. This bracket process is
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ] and its
density satisfies σ2t≤〈B〉t≤σ2t, t ∈ [0, T ], P0-a.s.
2.3.1 The Commodity Space and the Price Dual
We aim to consider contingent claims having a finite expectation for ev-
ery possible prior P ∈ P . In the tradition of Debreu (1959), we present
an axiomatic analysis of economic equilibrium, when Assumption 1 defines
the uncertainty model. We introduce the underlying space of consumption
bundles (c, C) consisting of consumption at time 0 and time T . The com-
prehensive set of priors prevents the consideration of a classical Lebesgue
space. Nevertheless, we repeat similar steps and begin with a rather small
set of reasonable random variable. Then we introduce a reasonable norm
with which we accomplish the (topological) completion.
We begin to describe the state-dependent consumption good at time T , where
we consider only claims on consumption with a finite expectation for each
prior P ∈ P . As in Huber and Strassen (1973), for each F -measurable real
functions X : Ω → R such that the expectation EP [X] exists under every
P ∈ P , we define the upper expectation operator15
EP [X] = max
P∈P
EP [X].
13We refer to Peng (2010) for the analytic construction of G-expectations.
14See Proposition 5 in Denis and Kervarec (2013) for the weak compactness and con-
vexity. Alternatively, by Theorem 2.1.20 in
15EP [·] satisfies the property of a sublinear expectation (see Peng (2006)), i.e. mono-
tonicity, positive homogeneity, constant preserving, sub-additivity. This object builds the
basis of our model.
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For a general treatment, see Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011) and the refer-
ences therein. Let Cb(Ω) denote the set of all bounded, continuous and F -
measurable real functions. The concrete description of our uncertainty model
allows us to define an appropriate commodity space which considers every
prior in P as relevant. Consequently, we suggest a norm taking every prior
into account, so that we consider the capacity-type norm c1,P on Cb(Ω) by
c1,P(X) = EP [|X|].
The Commodity Space
Let the closure of Cb(Ω) under c1,P be denoted by L1(P) = L1(Ω,F ,P).16
Moreover let L1(P) = L1(P)/N be the quotient space of L1(P) given by the
c1,P null elements denoted by N .17 We do not distinguish between classes
and their representatives. Two random variables X, Y ∈ L1(P) can be dis-
tinguished if there is a prior in P ∈ P such that P (X 6= Y ) > 0.18 For
the given commodity space we may introduce an order structure X ≤ Y if
P (X ≤ Y ) = 1 for every prior P ∈ P . We obtain the following result.19
Proposition 1 The given triplet (L1(P), c1,P(·),≤) is a Banach lattice with
an σ-order continuous norm, that is Xn ↘ 0, with Xn ∈ L1(P) implies
c1,P(Xn)↘ 0.
As usual, we define by L1(P)+ = {X ∈ L1(P) : X ≥ 0 P-q.s.} the positive
cone of L1(P). In Subsection 3.2, the fine quasi sure order structure causes
a more involved notion of strict monotonicity.
Cone Order Monotonicity Arbitrage
L1(P)+ X ≥ Y q.s. standard –
L1(P)+\{0} X ≥ Y q.s. & X 6= Y strict weak
L1(P)⊕ X ≥ Y & X 6= YP -a.s. ∀P ∈ P semi-strict semi weak
L1(P)++ X > Y q.s. weakly strict strong
Table 1: Order Structures in the Commodity Space L1(P)
Loosely speaking, a strictly desirable consumption bundle must be nonzero
under every possible prior. In preparation, let us introduce the cone of semi-
strictly positive random variables
L1(P)⊕ =
{
X ∈ L1(P)+ : P (X > 0) > 0 ∀P ∈ P
}
.
16It is easily verified that Cb(Ω) ⊂ dom(EP [·]) = {X ∈ L(Ω) : EP [X] <∞} holds, where
L(Ω) denotes the set of Borel measurable function X : Ω→ R.
17One can show that these null elements are P-quasi surely zero.
18In a setting with equivalent priors, i.e. priors sharing the same sets of mass zero, this
implies that P (X 6= Y ) > 0 for all P ∈ P.
19This is important for the application of an abstract existence result for quasi equilibria.
However, we take a different approach to prove existence, see also Remark 2.
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Note that this intermediate cone contains L1(P)++ = {L1(P)+ :X > 0 q.s.},
the quasi interior of L1(P)+.20 Accordingly, we have the following strict
inclusions L1(P)++ $ L1(P)⊕ $ L1(P)+ \ {0}. Table 1 summarizes the
different cones and their interrelation to monotonicity and possible arbitrage
notions.
Unambiguous Contingent Claims
As illustrated in Figure 2, there are contingent claims which can be per-
fectly replicated. Such random variables are not affected by the volatility
uncertainty. As we will discuss later, especially in Subsection 4.1, there is
a subspace of L1(P) which becomes a natural candidate for the marketed
space of perfectly replicable contingent claims, as given by
M[P ] = {ξ ∈ L1(P) : EP [ξ] = −EP [−ξ]}
=
{
ξ ∈ L1(P) : EP [ξ] = EP ′ [ξ] for all P, P ′ ∈ P
}
.
Random variables in M[P ] are called P-unambiguous. For another set of
priors Q, the notion of Q-unambiguity (in L1(P)) is still meaningful and
well-defined. Mean unambiguity is strongly related to ambiguity neutral-
ity. For instance, we may take the viewpoint of Epstein and Zhang (2001)
and consider the Dynkin system of unambiguous events U(P) = {A ∈ F :
P (A) is constant for all P ∈ P}.
The Price Space
We turn now to the space of price systems on R × L1(P). A model which
aims to observe the existence of a general equilibrium should first of all clarify
what price system decentralizes an allocation. As it is common, we suppose
a linear price system Ψ : R × L1(P) → R. Moreover we require continuity
under the topology of the c1,P-norm.21 We discuss the topological dual of
L1(P). For our purposes we need to determine market prices via marginal
rates of the agents. For the existence proof for equilibrium, the following
result is of importance.
Proposition 2 Elements in the topological dual of (L1(P), c1,P) can be rep-
resented by an absolutely continuous measure:
L1(P)∗ ⊃
{
l(·) =
∫
·dµ = EP [ψ·] : P ∈ P and ψ ∈ L∞(P )
}
= L˜1(P)∗
20By Proposition 1, L1(P) is a Banach lattice. The representation follows then by
Lemma 4.15 in Abramovich and Aliprantis (2002).
21Later on we assume semi-strict monotonicity of preferences. This guarantees semi-
strictly positive prices. Since R×L1(P) is a Banach lattice, this implies norm continuity.
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The subspace L˜1(P) in Proposition 2 is smaller than L1(P). Same arguments,
as in Proposition 1, show that
(
L˜1(P), c1,P(·),≤
)
is an order continuous
Banach lattice.22
Remark 1 In Lemma 1 we consider a class of utility functionals on L1(P)
such that there are super-gradients even in L˜1(P)∗. In principle, the dual
of L˜1(P) seems to be more acceptable. On the other side, it is unclear how
to work within L˜1(P), when we apply results from the dynamic theory of G-
expectation, whose natural domain is L1(P). Moreover, some convergence
results are only available for L1(P) (see the beginning of the Appendix).
The representation in Proposition 2 has similarities to the duality of Lebesgue
spaces from classical measure theory, when only one prior P describes the
uncertainty. Note that the stronger capacity norm c1,P(·) in comparison to
the single prior L1(P )-norm implies a richer dual space, controlled by the set
of priors P .23 Let us introduce the space of semi-strictly positive functionals
L1(P)∗⊕ =
{
l ∈ L1(P)∗ : l(·) = EP [ψ·] with P ∈ P and ψ ∈ L∞(P )++
}
.
Suppose l ∈ L1(P)∗⊕, then l may not be strictly positive, i.e. l(Y ) = 0 if
Y ∈ L1(P)+\{0}.24 This indicates that we need a weaker notion than strict
positivity. In Table 2, we give the different dual cones and their interrelation
to the representation property. Similarly to the commodity space we have
different order structures with respect to its order dual. Specifically, we
compare the representing measure of Proposition 2, is given. Furthermore,
Dual Cone Order Positivity Repr. dµ=ψdP of l
L1(P)∗+ l ≥ 0 on L1(P)+ standard ψ ∈ L∞(P )+&P ∈ P
L˜1(P)∗+\{0} l > 0 on L˜1(P)+\{0} strict ψ∈L∞(P )++&P ∈Pcan25
L1(P)∗⊕ l > 0 on L1(P)⊕ semi-strict ψ ∈ L∞(P )++&P ∈ P
L1(P)∗++ l > 0 on L1(P)++ weakly strict ψ ∈L∞(P )+\ {0}
Table 2: Order Structures in the Dual of L1(P)
the following result shows that exactly semi-strictly positive random variables
have strictly positive values with respect to functionals in L1(P)∗⊕.
22For more details, we refer to Section 2, Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.1 in Bion-Nadal
and Kervarec (2012).
23With the explicit representation in Proposition 2, the weak topology of the dual pairing
is tractable and allows us to apply standard convergence results from measure theory.
24This can be seen as follows. Let Pˆ (Y > 0) > 0 and Y = 0 P -a.s. for every P ∈ P\{Pˆ}
and let X 7→ l(X) = EPl [ψX] such that Pl, Pˆ are mutually singular and ψ > 0 P l-a.s.,
hence l(Y ) = 0.
25Note that Pcan denotes the canonical equivalence class, which we mention in Example
3 of Subsection 3.2, below. For details we refer to section 4 in Bion-Nadal and Kervarec
(2012) and especially Definition 4.3 therein.
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Corollary 1 Let l : L1(P) → R be a linear and continuous functional, we
have: l ∈ L1(P)∗⊕ ⇔ l(X) > 0 for all X ∈ L1(P)⊕.
Now, the representing measure µ of a linear and c1,P-continuous functional
can be decomposed by P and ψ. The P -almost surely strictly positive random
variable ψ ∈ L∞(P )++ can be seen as a state price density under the cohesive
probability model P . This allows us to represent every semi-strictly positive,
normalized, continuous and linear price system on R× L1(P) as
Ψ(x,X) = pi(x) + Π(X) = pi · x+ EQ[X],
where pi > 0. The equilibrium price measure given by Q(A) =
∫
A
ψ(ω)dP (ω),
A ∈ F , describes the value of any claim in terms of an expected payoff,
where ψ is normalized to unit expectation under P ∈ P . To sum up, our
commodity-price pair is given by (R× L1(P),R× L1(P)∗).
2.3.2 Variational Preferences
A priori, each agent is faced with the same objective uncertainty model
(Ω,F ,P). In this situation the heterogeneity is induced by different am-
biguity attitudes which we describe below.
Every agent is determined by an initial endowment (e, E) ∈ R+ × L1(P)+,
and a utility functional V on R+×L1(P)+ being additively separable, so that
we can write V (x,X) = u0(x) + U(X). We describe the utility functional
U on L1(P)+ for an arbitrary agent, where the positive cone is induced by
the order relation of Section 3.1. As we consider preference relations  on
L1(P)+, convexity and continuity can be defined in a standard way. Mono-
tone preferences are directly related to the order structure and the set of
priors P . We state a weak notion of strict monotonicity on L1(P)+.26
Definition 1 A preference relation is called semi-strictly monotone at X ∈
L1(P)+, if X + Z  X for all Z ∈ L1(P)⊕.
In Remark 1 below, we discuss in more detail why this modified strict mono-
tonicity condition is more appropriate when mutually singular priors con-
stitute the uncertainty. We allow for variational preferences introduced and
axiomatized by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006):27
C  X ⇐⇒ min
P∈P
(
EP [u(C)] + c(P )
) ≥ min
P∈P
(
EP [u(X)] + c(P )
)
, (1)
where u : R+ → R is a utility index and c : PS → R is an ambiguity index.
For each C ∈ L1(P)+ define the set of effective probability scenarios
M(C) = argmin
P ′∈P
EP
′
[u(C)] + c(P ′).
26An alternative notion of weak strict monotonicity could refer to a cone L1(P)X =
{Y ∈ L1(P)+ : P (Y > 0) > 0 ∀P ∈ M(X)} depending on the effective priors M(X) at
X ∈ L1(P)+, defined below. In this situation strict utility improving consumption at X
refers to the intermediate cone L1(P)X , heavily depending on X. Another alternative is
the local monotonicity concept in Nutz and Soner (2012).
27In their setting the domain of the preference relation is the space of simple acts.
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As we show in Lemma 1, this set is proportional to the superdifferential of
the utility. Such priors minimize the variational utility at C. We assume
that variational preferences are defined on a weakly closed set of priors for
the uncertainty model P , i.e. dom(c) = {P ∈ PS : c(P ) < ∞} ⊆ P . The
case dom(c) = {P} corresponds to an expected utility under P ∈ P . The fol-
lowing lemma gives standard properties of the variational utility functional.
Lemma 1 Let u : R+ → R be monotone, strictly concave, continuous and
differentiable on R++. Let c : PS → [0,∞] be grounded28, convex, and weakly
lower semi-continuous. Define the utility functional U : L1(P)+ → R by (1).
Then we have, U : L1(P)+ → R is
1. monotone and semi-strictly monotone if u is strictly monotone.
2. concave, not strictly concave on L1(P)+ and strictly concave on M[P ].
3. c1,P-upper semi-continuous. If the penalty term is linear on dom(c),
then U : L1(P)+ → R is c1,P-continuous. In this case, the penalty term
is given by c(P ) = L1(P)〈φ, P 〉L1(P)∗ = EP [φ], for some φ ∈ L1(P).
4. The superdifferential of U : L1(P)+ → R at C is given by ∂U(C) =
{µ : F → R : dµ = u′(C)dP, P ∈M(C)}.
The lemma is an extension to the case of infinite (uncountable) states, see
Rigotti and Shannon (2012) for the finite state case. This indicates that
the present commodity price duality is tractable. For finite valued mea-
surable functions, the explicit formula of the superdifferential is proven in
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006). In the following we present
examples to illustrate the usefulness and flexibility of variational preferences.
The first example refers to the classical maxmin preferences found in Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989). The second example refers to anchored preferences
axiomatized by Faro (2009).
Example 2 1. Maxmin Preferences: An agent with maxmin preferences is
modeled by the following criterion
U(C) = −EP [−u(C)] = min
P∈P
EP [u(C)] + δP(P ),
where c = δP : PS → [0,∞] is the convex indicator function of dom(c) = P.
2. Anchored maxmin preferences: Fix an initial endowment E ∈ L1(P)+.
We can define the following anchored preference representation
U(C) = min
P∈dom(c)
EP [u(C)− u(E)], c(P ) =
{
EP [u(E)] if P ∈ dom(c)
+∞, otherwise.
28This means that its infimum value is zero.
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Here the penalty term is linear, with φ = −u(E).29
In multiple prior models based on a reference measure, i.e. all other priors
are absolutely continuous, it is possible to consider the relative entropy in
terms of c. The usage is limited and does not apply to mutually singular
priors directly, as the following example illustrates.
Example 3 λ-Relative Entropy: In this example, we concentrate on the
cone L˜1(P)+. In case of a penalty term associated to the relative entropy
we need some preparation for the construction. We introduce some synthetic
probability measure. As discussed in Bion-Nadal and Kervarec (2012), there
is a canonical equivalence class R(c1,P) = Pcan of probability measures.
This class is based on a countable dense subset {P n}n∈N of P. Taking a
sequence of real number {λn}n∈N with λn > 0 such that
∑
λn = 1 the resulting
probability measure P λ =
∑
λnP
n is in Pcan. Let a reference measure Pλ be
fixed. The λ-relative entropy Rλ(·‖P) : PS → [0,∞] is defined by Rλ(P‖P) =∫
Ω
log
(
dP
dPλ
)
dPλ. Priors closer to the dominating prior Pλ have a larger influ-
ence on the utility evaluation. Finally we can write the utility functional as
UL˜1(P)+(C) = minP∈P
EP [u(C)] + c(P ) = min
P∈P
EP [u(C)] + θRλ(P‖P),
where θ∈R is an intensity parameter. Note that this relative entropy formu-
lation heavily depends on the parameter λ for the synthetic measure P λ.
We close the section with a discussion on semi-strict monotonicity.
Remark 2 1. Strict monotonicity is usually defined by U(X + Y ) > U(X)
for some Y ∈ L1(P)+ \ {0}. The singularities of the priors do not allow for
such a notion of monotonicity. We illustrate this issue for maxmin prefer-
ences in Example 2.1. Let Y ∈ L1(P)+ has only one effective prior P Y ∈ P.
Then we may have
U(Y ) = min
P∈P
EP [u(Y )] = EP [u(Y )] = EP [u(0)] = U(0), where P 6= P Y .
This means, the commodity bundle Y may not be strictly desirable in com-
parison to zero consumption. From this point of view variational preferences
seem to be rather consistent with semi-strictly preferences. Another argument
refers to the representation property of the topological dual. As pointed out
in Lemma 1, the utility gradients can be decomposed, with the strict positivity
of the density part satisfied for semi-strict monotone and concave variational
preferences (see also Corollary 1). In this situation, semi-strict positive func-
tionals are compatible with the utility gradients. The equilibrium results in
Section 4 are strongly connected to this issue.
29In Dana and Riedel (2013) such anchored preferences are related to Bewley preferences,
see Bewley (2002). However, in their discrete time framework the uncertainty is modeled
by a set of mutually equivalent priors.
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2. The c1,P-continuity of the utility functional is a desirable property. By the
same argument as for the classical Lebesgue space, related to some probabil-
ity space, we have an empty interior of the positive cone L1(P)+. Monotone
and concave variational utility defined on the whole space are c1,P-continuous.
This follows for instance from an application of the extended Namioka-Klee
Theorem in Biagini and Frittelli (2010).
2.4 Equilibria and Implementation
This Section is divided into three parts. In a preliminary step we introduce
the martingale theory of the considered conditional sublinear expectation.
Then we establish the existence of an equilibrium allocation and discuss some
new structural properties. In the last step we achieve the implementation of
the equilibrium allocation into a Radner economy.
2.4.1 A Detour: Spanning and Martingales
In order to establish a Radner implementation, we introduce a new sublinear
expectation, generated via the supremum of the adjusted priors. Due to the
present uncertainty model P , a new well-behaved conditioning principle is
needed. We roll out the dynamics of security markets by introducing the
concept of conditional sublinear expectations. The involved implementation
via a security market accounts for such well-behaved priors.
We proceed similarly to the single prior case, where the Radner implemen-
tation in continuous time is based on a certain classical martingale represen-
tation property. In the present situation, the multiple prior model enforces
a conditional sublinear expectation which spawns an elaborated martingale
representation theorem. As we indicate at the end of this subsection an effect
on the space of unambiguous claims is apparent. A possible replication of the
claim via the security market provoke the appearance of incomplete markets.
Structure of Priors
For the purpose of a martingale representation theorem under a conditional
sublinear expectation we need the following notion of stability under pasting
for P , also called fork-convexity. In essence, this property refers to a rational
updating principle. Before, we define the set of priors with a time depending
restriction on the related sub σ-field
P(t, P )o = {P ′ ∈ P : P = P ′ on Fot }, with t ∈ [0, T ] and P ∈ P .
This set of priors consists of all extensions of P : Fot → [0, 1] from Fot to F
in P . More precisely, this is the set of all probability measures in P defined
on F that agree with P in the events up to time t.
Assumption 2 The set of priors P is stable under pasting, i.e. for every
P ∈ P, every Fo-stopping time τ , B ∈ Foτ and P1, P2 ∈ P(Foτ , P ), P contains
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again the prior Pτ given by
Pτ (A) = E
P
[
P1(A|Foτ )1B + P2(A|Foτ )1Bc
]
, A ∈ Foτ .
Note, that we use the raw filtration Fo. The stability under pasting property
is closely related to dynamic consistency or rectangularity of Epstein and
Schneider (2003). However in the present volatility uncertainty setting these
notions are not equivalent.30 For details we refer to Section 3 in Nutz and
Soner (2012). For instance, the set of priors which defines a G-expectation,
illustrated in Example 1, satisfies automatically Assumption 2.
Information Structure
The usual conditions of a rich σ-field at time 0 is widely used in Mathe-
matical Finance.31 But the economic meaning is questionable. In our un-
certainty model of mutually singular priors we can augment, similarly to the
classical case, the right continuous filtration given by F+ = {F+t }t∈[0,T ] where
F+t =
⋂
s>tFot for t ∈ [0, T ). The second step is to augment the minimal right
continuous filtration F+ by all polar sets of (P ,FoT ), i.e. Ft = F+t ∨N (P ,FoT ),
see Appendix A.1 for details. This augmentation is strictly smaller than the
universal enlargement procedure.32 Note that the augmentation does not
affect the commodity space of equivalence classes, whose elements are P-q.s.
indistinguishable. Additionally we have B(Ω) = FoT and FoT = FT P-q.s.
This choice is economically reasonable, because the initial σ-field does not
contain all 0-1 limit events, see Section 4.1 in Nutz and Soner (2012). In
nearly all continuous-time Finance models, such a rich initial σ-field is as-
sumed. This implies a rich knowledge of every decision maker about events in
the long run. In Huang (1985) one can find a detailed discussion of informa-
tion structures for asset prices and trading strategies, when the uncertainty
is given by a probability space.
Conditional sublinear expectation
We introduce the dynamics and the different notions of martingales of our
uncertainty model (Ω,F ,P). The so called strong formulation of uncertainty
in Assumption 1 guarantees the existence of a martingale concept which allow
for a martingale representation. The efficient use of information is often for-
malized by the concept of conditional expectation. Implicitly, this depends
on the uncertainty structure and the given filtration. Due to the pasting
property of P we have a universal conditional expectation being under every
prior almost surely equal to the essential supremum of relevant conditional
expectations. This concept is formulated in the following definition.
Definition 2 A set of priors P has the aggregation property in L1(P) if for
all X ∈ L1(P) and t ∈ [0, T ], there exists an Ft-measurable random variable
30Lemma 8 in Appendix B of Riedel (2009) shows the equivalence of these concepts,
when the priors are mutually equivalent.
31One reason may be, that in this case the full stochastic calculus is applicable.
32This means Ft $
⋂
P∈P σ(F+,N (P,Fot )), for t ∈ [0, T ].
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EPt [X] ∈ L1(P) such that
EPt [X] = Pess sup
P ′∈P(t,P )
EP
′
[X|Ft] P -a.s. for all P ∈ P .
Note that in the definition the random variable is defined in the quasi sure
sense. The linear conditional expectation under a probability space has
strong connections to a positive linear projection operator. In the presence
of multiple priors, the conditional updating in an ambiguous environment
involves a sublinear projection EPt : L1(P) → L1t (P), where L1t (P) ⊂ L1(P)
denotes the closed subspace of Ft measurable random variables. In this re-
gard the aggregation property just states that we can find a well-defined
sequence of conditional expectations satisfying a rational updating princi-
ple. The weak compactness and stability under pasting allows for such a
conditional sublinear expectation.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1 and 2, P satisfies the aggregation property.
Moreover, we have EPs ◦ EPt = EPs , s ≤ t.
Without a well-behaved conditional expectation, the introduction of a mar-
tingale or its representation seems unreproducible.33 Now, we introduce
martingales under the conditional expectation EPt . Fix a random variable
X ∈ L1(P). The sublinearity of the dynamic conditional expectation defines
a martingale similarly to the single prior setting,34 as being its own estimator.
Definition 3 An F-adapted process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is a P-martingale if
Xs = EPs [Xt] P-q.s. for all s ≤ t.
We call X a symmetric P-martingale if X and −X are both P-martingales.
The nonlinearity of the conditional expectation implies that if a process (Xt)
is a martingale under
(
EPt
)
t∈[0,T ], then −X is not necessarily a martingale.35
As we will discuss in detail, a fair game refers to the symmetric martingale
property. In this case, the process is equivalently a P -martingale under every
P ∈ P . In subsection 4.3 we discuss the relationship to asset prices under
the sublinear expectation generated by P .
In a dynamic trading setting, it is essential if a contingent claim X ∈ L1(P)
33Without the weak compactness of P, a construction of random variables in the quasi
sure sense involves more technical difficulties. However, in this situation one can take the
separability condition of Soner, Touzi, and Zhang (2012b), see also Example 4.14 therein.
An aggregation result, in the sense of Definition 2, can then be observed with the so called
Hahn property of Cohen (2011). Here the definition of an ess sup in the quasi sure sense
approaches the aggregation property.
34For the multiple prior case with equivalent priors we refer to Riedel (2009).
35Representations of non symmetric martingales can be formulated via a so called second
order backward stochastic differential equation (2BSDE). This concept is introduced in
Cheridito, Soner, Touzi, and Victoir (2007) and developed further in Soner, Touzi, and
Zhang (2012a).
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can be represented in terms of a stochastic integral. As mentioned in the
Introduction this corresponds to the mean unambiguity property, introduced
in Section 3.1. For the replication of a claim, the following result is central.
It can be seen as a generalized martingale representation theorem, when the
uncertainty is given by the present mutually singular uncertainty model, see
Nutz and Soner (2012) for a proof.
Martingale Representation: Under Assumption 1 and 2, we have for
every X ∈ L1(P) a unique pair (θ,K)36 of F-predictable processes with
1. θ such that
∫ T
0
|θs|2d〈B〉s <∞ P-q.s.,
2. K such that all paths of (Kt) are ca`dla`g, nondecreasing and KT ∈ L1(P),
such that EPt [X] = EP0 [X] +
∫ t
0
θsdBs −Kt for all t ∈ [0, T ], P-q.s.
The positive and increasing process K in the representation is new and can
be understood as a correction term. The sublinear conditional expectation
allows for biased martingales, i.e. we only have EP [−KXT ] = 0 if and only if
P ∈ argmaxP∈P EP [X]. Here, KX is the output of the martingale represen-
tation theorem applied with respect to X ∈ L1(P).
Remark 3 1. Already at this stage, the interplay between the existence and
the structure of a competitive equilibrium and absence of arbitrage opportu-
nities are at work. As illustrated in Vorbrink (2010) in the G-framework
(see Example 1) absence of weak arbitrage (see Table 1) does not imply
EP [−KT ] = 0 for every P ∈ P. Note that this arbitrage notion is con-
sistent with strictly monotone preferences, stated in Table 1 and refers to a
robust approach to finance.
If an exchange economy is in equilibrium, net trades should not admit for
arbitrage. But, by Proposition 2 the equilibrium price system perceives only
P ∗-a.s. events, since the representing measure µ of the equilibrium price sys-
tem can be decomposed by dµ = ψdP ∗. The value of net trades ξ ∈ L1(P)
should not differ under such equilibrium priors P ∗. Therefore, the case
P ′(KξT 6= 0) > 0 must refer to a non-equilibrium prior P ′, see Example 5
for an application of this issue.
2. In the G-framework the compensation part can be written more explicit,
when X is contained in a (uncertain) subset of L1(P):
Kt =
∫ t
0
ηrd〈BG〉r −
∫ t
0
G(ηr)dr, t ∈ [0, T ],
where BG is the so called G-Brownian motion37 and η is an endogenous
output of the martingale representation, so that K is now a function of η.
36The pair is unique up to {ds × P, P ∈ P}-polar sets. More precisely, the process K
is an aggregated object under the Continuum Hypothesis, see Remark 4.17 of Nutz and
Soner (2012) and paragraph 8 and 9 of Chapter 0 in Dellacherie and Meyer (1978).
37As already mentioned in Example 1, a G expectation can be induced by some volatility
bounds. Here, the function G is given by η 7→ G(η) = 12 supσ∈[σ,σ] σ · |η|.
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Example 5 and 6 make use of this fact.
As such it is an open problem, if every X ∈ L1(P) can be represented in
this complete form. We refer to Peng, Song, and Zhang (2013) for the latest
discussion, on the complete representation property.
The following corollary gives an alternative representation and a justification
of unambiguous random variables. It illustrates which random variables have
the replication property in terms of a stochastic integral. The space of feasible
integrands Θ(B) is given below in Subsection 4.3.
Corollary 2 The marketed space M[P ] of unambiguous contingent claims is
a c1,P-closed subspace of L1(P). More precisely, we have
M[P ] =
{
ξ ∈ L1(P) : ξ = EP [ξ] +
∫ T
0
θsdBs for some θ ∈ Θ(B)
}
.
Furthermore, the stochastic integral has continuous paths P-q.s.
The notion of perfect replication is associated to the situation when K ≡ 0.
Exactly at this step the martingale representation comes into play. This space
of random variables is strongly related to symmetric martingales. More pre-
cisely, elements in M[P ] generate symmetric martingales, via the successive
application of the conditional sublinear expectation along the augmented fil-
tration F. In the lights of Corollary 2, the analogy between unambiguous
events and unambiguous random variables becomes apparent.38 Note that
this analogy is already used and indicated in Beißner (2012), where a notion
of ambiguity and risk neutral valuation is considered.
2.4.2 Existence of Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium
With the discussion of the primitives in Section 3, we introduce now the
heterogeneous agent economy, consisting of a finite set of individuals I =
{1, . . . , I} consuming at time t = 0 and t = T . The economy is given by
E(e, E) = (R+ × L1(P)+, {Vi, (ei, Ei)}i∈I), where the initial endowment of
agent i satisfies (ei, Ei) ∈ R+ × L1(P)+. Her utility is given by Vi : R+ ×
L1(P)+ → R such that (c, C) 7→ u0i (c) +Ui(C). The utility Ui : L1(P)+ → R
is a variational functional, introduced in Section 3.2, with utility functions
u0i , u
T
i : R+ → R and ambiguity indexes ci,39 we have
Vi(c, C) = u
0
i (c) + min
P∈P
EP [uTi (C)] + ci(P ). (2)
38Under one prior or a set of mutually equivalent priors, indicator functions are elements
of the related Lebesgue space. In our setting this is not necessarily true, since ω 7→ 1A(ω),
for some A ∈ F is not continuous.
39We assume that the agents in the economy share the same set of priors, but they do
not agree via their ambiguity index. A simple generalization could be a heterogeneity in
the ambiguity via a modification of equivalent priors with a bounded density.
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The aggregate endowment of the economy is denoted by(e, E) ∈ R+×L1(P)+.
Note that we allow for a heterogeneity in the sets of priors. This can be
achieved via different domains of the penalty terms ci, see also the last part
of Assumption 3.
Efficient Allocations and Sharing Rules
We describe the optimal allocation of resources by the following problem.
A weighting α ∈ ∆I , where ∆I = {α ∈ RI+ :
∑
αi = 1} denotes the I-
dimensional simplex, induces a representative utility Vα(c, C) :=
∑
αiVi(ci, Ci).
An allocation (c¯, C¯) = ((c1, C1) . . . , (cI , CI)) is α-efficient if the functional
Vα : (R+ × L1(P)+)I → R achieves the maximum over the set of allocations
Λ(e, E) =
{
(c, C) ∈ (R+ × L1(P)+)I :
∑
(ci, Ci) ≤ (e, E) P-q.s.
}
.
Under concavity of the utility functionals, α-efficiency for some α ∈ ∆I is
equivalent to Pareto optimality, while this is related to an equilibrium with
transfer payment. As a first step we establish the existence of α-efficient
allocations.
Theorem 1 Suppose Vi : R+ × L1(P)+ → R, i ∈ I, are utility functionals
given by (2) with a concave utility index, then there exists an α-efficient
allocation. If each ci is linear, the solution correspondence
C(α, e, E) = arg max
(x,X)∈Λ(e,E)
∑
i∈I
αiVi(xi, Xi)
is nonempty, convex and weakly compact valued. Moreover, if for each (t, i) ∈
{0, T}× I, uti is twice continuously differentiable, i.e. uti ∈ C2,1(R+;R), there
is a continuous selection (c, C) ∈ C, such that α 7→ Ci(α,E) is continuously
differentiable on ∆˚I . In particular, we have a
µ ∈
⋂
i∈I
αi∂Ui (Ci(α,E)) 6= ∅, where dµ = αiuTi ′ (Ci(α,E)) dP. (3)
The result is interesting in its own right, but will play as well a central role in
the approach to the existence of an (analytic) equilibrium. From the theorem
we immediately infer that there is a fully insured efficient allocation, when
the aggregate endowment is certain, i.e E(ω) is constant P-quasi surely.
If the aggregate endowment is uncertain but unambiguous, i.e. E ∈ M[P ],
structural properties of optimal allocations depend additionally on prefer-
ences. The following example illustrates how Pareto sharing rules determine
the insurance properties and the resulting net trades.
Example 4 Let the uncertainty model be that of Example 1 and the aggre-
gate endowment of the economy be unambiguous, i.e. E ∈ M[P ] and by
Corollary 2, we have E = ET = EP [E] +
∫ T
0
θEt dB
G
t , for some adapted and
integrable process θE. Note, that the individual endowment is still allowed to
be ambiguous. Now suppose for each i ∈ I that the functional form of optimal
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consumption Ci(α, ·) ∈ C2,1(R+) is twice continuously differentiable and not
linear, which holds if each ui ∈ C3,1(R+) has a nonlinear risk tolerance, for
details see Hara, Huang, and Kuzmics (2007). This implies C ′′i (α, ·) 6= 0 and
we derive for each i ∈ I by the G-Itoˆ formula40
Ci(α,ET ) = Ci(α,EP [E]) +
∫ T
0
C ′i(α,Et)θ
E
t dB
G
t +
1
2
∫ T
0
C ′′i (α,Et)
(
θEt
)2
d〈BG〉t.
Due to the nonzero d〈BG〉-part, we have Ci(α,E) /∈ M[P ] by Corollary 2.
This means that the Pareto optimal allocation is ambiguous. In case of lin-
ear risk tolerance, i.e. C ′′i (α, ·) = 0, the same computation imply an unam-
biguous Pareto optimal allocation. From this we infer that the absence of
idiosyncratic ambiguity does not always leads to unambiguous efficient allo-
cations.
Concerning the net trades ξi = Ci(α,E)−Ei, we have, unless the “patholog-
ical” case that the d〈BG〉-part of Ei eliminates the d〈BG〉-part of Ci(α,E),
ambiguous net trades, meaning that ξi /∈ M[P ].
In the case of linear risk tolerance a sufficient condition for unambiguous
net trades is Ei ∈ M[P ], for each agent i ∈ I.
Comparing this example with De Castro and Chateauneuf (2011), we see
that an unambiguous aggregate endowment is not sufficient to observe an
unambiguous Pareto optimal allocation. The missing gap relies on the struc-
ture of the sharing rule. Note that the arguments in the present setting are
based on results from stochastic analysis under G-expectation.
The General Equilibrium
Now we introduce the classical notion of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Note
that, the feasibility holds P-quasi surely and for the price functional we re-
quire c1,P-continuity as discussed in Section 2.1. By Proposition 1, L1(P) is
a Banach lattice, hence positive and linear functionals on L1(P) are auto-
matically c1,P-continuous.
The I+1-tuple ((c¯1, C¯1), . . . , (c¯I , C¯I); (pi,Π)) ∈ (R+×L1(P)+)I×(R×L1(P)∗)
consisting of a feasible allocation and a continuous linear price functional, is
called a contingent Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, if
1. For all i, (c¯i, C¯i) maximizes Vi on R+×L1(P)+ under Ψ(c−ei, C−Ei) ≤ 0.
2. The allocation (c¯, C¯) is feasible:
∑
i∈I(c¯i, C¯i) = (e, E), P-q.s.
Next, we reconsider the utility gradient of the agent when she faces a max-
imization problem in terms of a first order condition. As in the single prior
setting, the excess utility map encodes the “universal system of equations”
of the defined equilibrium. In matters of the utility maximization, the par-
ticular form of the gradient causes a modification in the definition of the
excess utility map, see Appendix A.2 for the details of the construction
40The result can be found in Peng (2010).
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method. In general, the gradient is an element of the topological dual. The
representation of the dual space, see Proposition 2 and Lemma 1, implies
DUi(C) ∈ ∂Ui(C) ⊂ L1(P)∗, where a supergradient can be represented by
DUi(C)(h) = E
P [u′i(C)h], for some P ∈Mi(C) and direction h ∈ L1(P).
Remark 4 In infinite dimensional commodity spaces, the positive cone may
have an empty interior. In this situation, a properness condition is needed to
establish the existence of an equilibrium. Note that by Proposition 1, L1(P)
is an order continuous Banach lattice. As we aim to establish an equilibrium
allocation with an explicit dependency of the effective priors, we only mention
this whole branch of abstract existence result. We refer to Martins-da Rocha
and Riedel (2010) and the references therein.
In order to connect the gradient with the price system, in terms of Theorem 1
and the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics, we have to make
an assumption on the integrability of u′(E).
Assumption 3 Let the aggregate endowment E ∈ L1(P)+ be strictly positive
P-q.s. and let e = ∑ ei > 0. We assume41
max
α∈∆I
(
u0α
′
(e) + uTα
′
(E)
) ∈ L∞(P) and ⋂
i∈I
dom(ci) 6= ∅.
This assumption is closely related to a cone condition, which is important
for the existence of an equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces,
see also Remark 2.2 in Dana (1993). Moreover it guarantees that the price
system is an element of the semi-strict order dual L1(P)∗⊕, see Subsection
3.1 for details. The proof of the following theorem is based on the gross
substitute property of the modified excess utility map Φ : ∆I ×P → RI , see
Definition 5 in Appendix A.2. In order to guarantee this property we have
to make the following well-known assumption.
Assumption 4 For each (i, t) ∈ I×{0, T}, x 7→ x ·uti′(x) is non-decreasing.
The assumption is equivalent to the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk-
aversion being less or equal than one, when uti
′
is twice differentiable. We are
ready to state the first main result of the paper.
Theorem 2 Suppose each agent satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1, with
strictly concave and strictly monotone utility index and a linear penalty term
ci. Under Assumption 1-4 there is a Pareto optimal Arrow-Debreu equilib-
rium (c∗1, C
∗
1 , . . . , c
∗
I , C
∗
I ; (pi,Π)), with Π ∈ L1(P)∗⊕.
41Fix t ∈ {0, T} and α ∈ ∆I , utα : R++ → R is given by utα(e) = maxx∈Λ(e,0)
∑
αiu
t
i(xi).
Here L∞(P) is the closure of Cb under the norm c∞,P(X) = inf{M ≥ 0 : |X| ≤ M,P −
q.s.}. See again Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011) for more details.
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The Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation is based on an α∗-efficient weight-
ing α∗ ∈ ∆I , so that we denote the set of equilibrium priors by
PE ⊂ P(α∗) ⊂ P .
This set of common unadjusted priors P(α∗) is constructed in Appendix A.2,
see also Subsection 2.1 for an illustration of the construction idea. One
important property is that the representative agent behaves as an agent with
variational utility. In the following, we illustrate in the sense in which α-
efficient allocations are uniquely specified. Namely, under every equilibrium
prior P ∈ PE an equilibrium allocation is determined P -a.s. To illustrate
this point in more detail, we define a different allocation resulting in the same
utility. As the following example illustrates, that the reasoning is consistent
with the finite-dimensional example in Section 2.1, where the Leontief-type
utility of the agents created a similar degree of freedom, as illustrated in
Figure 2 (b) therein.
Example 5 Consider an economy with two agents i = 1, 2 under the uncer-
tainty model of Example 1 and Remark 3.2. Utilities are given by
U1(C) = min
P∈P
EP [ln(C)] = −EG [ln (C)] and U2(C) = min
P∈P
EP [C1/2].
The endowment of each agent is a function of the G-Brownian motion at
time T , i.e. Ei = ϕi(B
G
T ) ∈ L1(P)+, where ϕi : R → R+ is assumed to
be convex, so that ϕi = exp is in principle a possible choice. Moreover, let
ϕ = ϕ1 + ϕ2 so that the aggregate endowment can be written as a function
of the G-Brownian motion BG, i.e E = ϕ(BGT ). After some computation an
equilibrium consumption allocation Ci(α,E) = Υ
α
i (B
G
T ) is given by
Υα1 (B
G
T ) =
2 · ϕ(BGT )
1 +
√
1 +ϕ(BGT )α¯
2
, Υα2 (B
G
T ) =
(
α¯ · ϕ(BGT )
1 +
√
1 +ϕ(BGT )α¯
2
)2
,
where α = α1, 1− α = α2 and α¯ = α1−α . Since Υα1 (BGT ) + Υα2 (BGT ) = ϕ(BGT )
holds P-q.s., this results into a feasible allocation. Since Υαi = Ci(α, ·) ◦ ϕ
and C2(α, ·) is convex and increasing, we have that Υ2α is convex as well. In
order to observe the effective prior, note that u2(C2(α,E)) = u2(Υ
α
2 (B
G
T )) is
concave, which implies M2(C2(α,E)) = {P σ} = PE by the following compu-
tation:
We discuss the optimal allocation via tools from stochastic analysis under
the G-expectation. Suppose that each optimal consumption has the complete
representation property of Remark 3.2,42 we can write
Υα2 (B
G
T ) = EG
[
Υ2α(B
G
T )
]
+
∫ T
0
θ2t dB
G
t −
∫ T
0
G
(
η2t
)
dt+
1
2
∫ T
0
η2t d〈BG〉t, (4)
42A sufficient condition is the boundedness of ∂xΥ
α
i (x) on R+.
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where θ2t = f
2
x(t, B
G
t ), η
2
t = f
2
xx(t, B
G
t ) and f
2(T,BGT ) = Υ
2
α(B
G
T ) = C2(α,E).
As illustrated in the first part of the example Υ2α is convex and by Section 1
in Chapter II of Peng (2010) it follows that f 2(t, ·) : R → R+ is convex for
each t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence f 2xx ≥ 0 and we deduce that the last two terms of (4)
can be written as
−K2T = −
∫ T
0
G
(
f 2xx(t, B
G
t )
)
dt+
1
2
∫ T
0
f 2xx(t, B
G
t )d〈BG〉t
= −1
2
∫ T
0
sup
σ∈[σ,σ]
σf 2xx(t, B
G
t ) + aˆtf
2
xx(t, B
G
t )dt
=
1
2
∫ T
0
(aˆt − σ) f 2xx(t, BGt )dt,
The martingale representation theorem also tells us, that the process (−K2t )
is a G-martingale. Moreover, we have −K2t ≡ 0 P σ-a.s. and −K2t 6= 0 under
every other prior in P \ {P σ}.
With this observation, we construct a different allocation having the same
utility. Consider η¯ = ε·η2, ε ∈ (0, 1). We show that the allocation (C1(α,E)+
εK2T , C2(α,E) − εK2T ) is also α-efficient and satisfies C1(α,E) 6= C¯1 :=
C1(α,E) + εK
2
T P -a.s. for every P ∈ P \ {P σ}.
Since, aˆt ∈ [σ, σ], it follows that K2t ≥ 0 P-q.s. Hence, by the monotonicity
of the utility functional, this reallocation does not worsen the utility of agent
1, i.e. U1(C1(α,E) + εK
2
T ) ≥ U1(C1(α,E).
For agent 2, the positive homogeneity of G implies G(η¯) = εG(η). From
this we see that P σ is still the only effective prior with respect to C¯1, since
1+ε
2
∫ T
0
(σ − aˆt) η2t dt = −(1 + ε)K2T = −K¯2T yields
C¯2 = EG
[
Υ2α(B
G
T )
]
+
∫ T
0
Z2t dB
G
t − (1 + ε)K2T .
Specifically, under P σ the compensation term satisfies K¯2 ≡ 0 and hence the
utility of agent 2 remains unaffected, i.e. U2(C2(α,E)) = U
2(C¯2). Note that,
for ε sufficiently small, we have P σ ∈M(C¯2), since M(C2(α,E)) = {P σ}.
Finally, we state the semi-strictly positive equilibrium price system given by
X 7→ Π(X) = EPσ [u′α∗(E) ·X], where the effective prior is induced by
arg min
P∈P
EP [uα∗(E)] = {P σ} = P(α∗) = PE.
Ambiguity aversion creates the worst case prior P σ and the density part in
terms of risk attitudes is given by
u′α(E) =
α
ϕ(BGT )
(
1 +
√
1 + ϕ(BGT )α¯
2
)
.
Summing up, we have illustrated how the new martingale representation the-
orem can be applied to construct many different efficient allocations and an-
alyze their structural properties.
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Note that the convexity of Υ2α(·) induces the unique effective prior P σ, which
can be seen as an extreme case. Different effective priors corresponding to
more complex volatility specifications depend in general on the structure of
the efficient sharing rules, see again Example 4 for the most simplest case.
2.4.3 The Existence of Incomplete Security Markets
With the dynamics of the uncertainty model of Section 4.1, we are now in the
position to formulate trading processes and the Radner equilibrium. Before,
we introduce an assumption for the space of consumption profiles at time T .
This gives us a certain invariance on the space of net trades.
Assumption 5 The density part of the equilibrium utility gradients at time
T , uTα
′
(E) is bounded away from zero, i.e.
ε < max
α∈∆I
uTα
′
(E) P-q.s., for some ε > 0.
This assumption is satisfied when the aggregate endowment is bounded away
from zero and the utility functions ui satisfy the Inada condition at zero. It
guarantees the boundedness above and below away from zero of our state
price density ψ = uTα∗
′
(E), where α∗ is the equilibrium weight of Theorem 2
in Subsection 4.2. It follows that L1(Q) = L1(P), where
Q =
{
Q : dQ =
ψ
EP [ψ]
dP, for some P ∈ P
}
.
This invariance is of importance, since the density ψ is derived from the equi-
librium and is not a primitive.43 Based on the set of unadjusted equilibrium
priors PE, we denote by QE =
{
Q : dQ = ψ
EP [ψ]
dP, P ∈ PE
}
the set of equi-
librium pricing measures.
Now, we introduce a Radner equilibrium of prices, plans and price expecta-
tion related to the present mutually singular prior model. The price process
S = (St)t∈[0,T ] for our long lived security is a P-semimartingale44 on the fil-
tered sublinear expectation space (Ω, L1(P),EP ,F).
As we have seen in Example 4, we observe unambiguous net trades when
strong assumptions on endowments and utilities are imposed. By the martin-
gale representation theorem under Q applied with respect to Q-unambiguous
net trades, i.e. Ci−Ei /∈ M[Q], a disposal term KiT appears. To account for
this useless consumption, where the equilibrium price system is zero, we allow
for a gain process with a feasible possibility of free disposal of wealth under
non equilibrium priors. This is achieved in terms of a security with possibly
negative dividend under some Q ∈ Q. We consider the set of admissible
43In Section 3 of Duffie and Huang (1985) a similar assumption can be found.
44As defined in Pham and Zhang (2012), the uncertain process S is a P-semimartingale
if it is a P -semimartingale for every P ∈ P. Note that their Assumption 4.1 is in the
present setting fulfilled, since we augment the filtration with the P-polar sets.
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trading processes already mentioned in Corollary 2, with certain regularity
conditions:
1. Well defined : θ is F-predictable and EP
[∫ T
0
θ2t d〈S〉t
]
<∞.45
2. Gain process :
∫
θdS is a P-q.s. well defined stochastic integral.
3. Self-financing : The trading process satisfies the accounting identity
Xθt = θtSt = θ0S0 +
∫ t
0
θrdSr, P-q.s. for every t ∈ [0, T ].
The space of processes θ satisfying conditions 1.-3. is denoted by Θ(S).
From Corollary 2 it follows directly that the gain process must be a sym-
metric martingale in order to establish a perfect hedge. If we consider the
volatility uncertainty as a robustness constraint, the corollary just charac-
terizes a perfect hedging portfolio with some initial value if and only if the
terminal payoff is unambiguous. We come now to the formal definition of a
Radner equilibrium under volatility uncertainty.
Definition 4 A Radner equilibrium for E(e, E) is comprised of N + 1 long
lived security claiming D = (D0, . . . , DN) ∈ L1(P)N+1, with price process
S = (S0, . . . , SN), a set of trading strategies θi ∈ Θ(S), i ∈ I and a price
pi > 0 for consumption at time zero, which satisfies:
For each agent i ∈ I, the consumption (ei − Xθi0 pi−1, Ei + XθiT )
maximizes Vi : R+ × L1(P)+ → R on the budget set
B
(
ei, Ei, pi,D, S
)
=
{(
ei −Xθ0pi−1, Ei +XθT
)∈ R+×L1(P)+ :θ∈ Θ(S)},
so that the market clears,
∑
i∈I θ
i
t = 0 P-q.s., for every t ∈ [0, T ].
A priori, the functional capability of the financial market as a mechanism
is reflected by the marketed space M[Q]. In comparison to the single prior
case, market completeness is not an intrinsic property in terms of the simpler
all-encompassing martingale representation.
Theorem 3 Suppose the security-spot economy
E(e, E) =
{(
Ω,F ,F,P), D,{Vi,R+×L1(P), (ei, Ei)}i∈I}
satisfies Assumptions 1 to 5, then there is a Radner equilibrium for E(e, E),
({(θi)}i∈I, pi,D, S), which implements the given Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium({ci, Ci}i∈I; EP [ψ·]) if and only if
EP [ψ(Ci − Ei)] = EP [ψ(Ci − Ei)], for every i ∈ I. (5)
In this case, we have:
45The bracket process is given by 〈B〉 = B2 − ∫ BdB, where the stochastic integral is
defined pathwise, see Soner, Touzi, and Zhang (2012b) and the references therein.
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1. The financial market is effectively dynamically complete.
2. Trade may be ambiguous, i.e. (Ci − Ei) /∈ M[Q].
3. Under the equilibrium prior, each (ci, Ci) is perfectly hedged.
The condition in (5) states a relation about endogenous objects. More pre-
cisely, (5) can be understood as the existence of a worst case prior Q as an
element of QE. At the same time, Q must be a maximizing prior with respect
to the uncertainty-adjusted sublinear expectation EQ evaluated at each net
trade ξi = Ci − Ei, i.e.
Q ∈ Q(ξi) = arg max
Q∈Q
EQ[ξi].
Note that if the net trades are unambiguous then this condition is automat-
ically satisfied, see Example 4 and 5.
In the presence of volatility uncertainty, the proof of Theorem 3 can be
regarded as a canonically extension of Duffie and Huang (1985). In their
example with Brownian Noise only two long lived security price processes
are required to admit a complete Radner equilibrium. This follows from the
two summands in the (Brownian) martingale representation. The present
volatility uncertainty setup requires a third component in the martingale
representation. This is a compensation part of disposal under non maximiz-
ing priors Q(ξi).46 For this reason, we observe a martingale multiplicity of
three. But Theorem 3 also tells us, that in contrast to the single prior case,
the implementation of efficient Arrow-Debreu equilbria into a Radner equilib-
rium is not always possible. The Pareto efficiency of the Radner equilibrium
is quite surprising, since multiple period incomplete markets are typically
only constrained efficient. Nevertheless, the efficiency still depends on which
equilibrium allocation is considered.
Under a non-equilibrium prior P ∈ P \ PE the consumption profiles are for
some agents superhedged. However, under the priors
P ′ ∈Mi(Ci) ∩
{
P ∈ P : dP = ψ−1dQ,Q ∈ Q(ξi)
}
,
the hedge is still perfect, i.e. KP
′,i = 0 P ′ ⊗ dt-a.e. Under such priors, the
deflated gain process becomes a martingale and under every other effective
prior only a supermartingale. This is still consistent with the “no expected
gain from trade” hypothesis of Duffie (1986). The following example illus-
trates under the G-framework, how the Radner equilibrium incorporates with
the new component in the martingale representation theorem. The dynamics
of the price process of the new security, obtained from Lemma 3 in Appendix
A.2, get a more explicit specification. Again, the price process depends heav-
ily on the net trades of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
46Alternatively to this particular and novel security, we could introduce a family of
securities being contingent on the prior. However, such a prior-dependent contingency
would stand in opposition to the present quasi-sure analysis in aggregated terms.
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Example 6 Apart from the condition in Theorem 3, suppose we are in the
G-framework and every net trade ξi = Ci − Ei, i ∈ I, has the complete mar-
tingale representation property, see Remark 3.2. Denoting by aˆt =
d
dt
〈BG〉t
the time derivative of the quadratic variation of the G-Brownian motion, we
have
Kit =
∫ t
0
G(ηit)dt−
1
2
∫ t
0
ηitd〈BG〉t
=
∫ t
0
sup
σ∈[σ,σ]
σηitdt−
∫ t
0
ηitaˆtdt =
1
2
∫ t
0
σitη
i
tdt−
1
2
∫ t
0
ηitaˆtdt
=
1
2
∫ t
0
(σit − aˆt) · ηitdt,
for some ηi, as an output of the complete martingale representation. In the
derivation, each process σi corresponds to a P σ
i ∈ P with P σi ∼ Qi ∈ Q.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, let us consider the following dividend
structure
D0 ≡ 1, D1 = BGT , D2 =
∫ T
0
−1
2
∑
i∈I
(
σit − aˆt
)
dt.
The price process S2t = EQt [D2] for the asset with dividend D2 and the port-
folio processes of each agent are EQ-martingales, i.e. a Q-supermatingale
under every prior Q ∈ Q and a Q-martingale under some Q ∈ Q corre-
sponding to the no gain from trade hypothesis. Moreover, the price process
is absolutely continuous with respect to dt and given by
dS2t = −
1
2
∑
i∈I
(
σit − aˆt
)
dt, S20 = 0.
For the strategy of this bounded variation security S2, consider the following
partition of unity
∑
i∈I κ
i
t = 1 Q-q.e. so that
θi,2t =
{
κitη
i
t if
∑
i∈I σ
i
t − aˆt 6= 0
0 else
κit =
(σit − aˆt)∑
i∈I σ
i
t − aˆt
, i ∈ I \ {I}.
Note that in the uncertainty neutral world Q the asset price S2, so that
Ki =
∫
θi,2dS2, may become negative under some non equilibrium measures
Q \ {Q}, where dQ = ψdP and P ∈ PE satisfies (5).47 In essence this
depends on the net trade and the equilibrium expectation. Remember, the
compensation (or disposal) part in the martingale representation prefigures
this possibility. This can be understood as the interplay between the P-q.s.
clearing condition and the disposal parts of the net trades. For instance, this
phenomenon is not present, when net trades are unambiguous and induces
portfolio processes being symmetric Q-martingales without a disposal part.
47 In the situation of Example 5 this is possible, since σi ≡ σ > aˆ. However, the same
is true for S1. In each case, a splitting of the positive and negative parts would guarantee
positive price processes.
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Implementation of Equilibria with Sublinear Price Systems
As we have seen in Theorem 3, an implementation of the Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium is not always possible. This can be interpreted as a partially negative
result. In essence, this is caused by inconsistencies between the linear price
structure and the nonlinear expectation in the martingale representation the-
orem. In order to illustrate this tension, we show that equilibria with sub-
linear price systems are at least for implementation reasons more adequate.
Definition 5 The I + 1-tuple (C1, . . . , CI ; Ψ) ∈ L1(P)I+ × L1(P)~+48 is a
sublinear price equilibrium, if the following holds
1. We have Ui(Y ) > Ui(Ci) implies Ψ(Ci) < Ψ(Y ), for all i ∈ I and
Y ∈ L1(P)+.
2. The allocation is feasible:
∑
i∈ICi = E, P-q.s.
3. For all i ∈ I, Ψ(Ci) = Ψ(Ei).
Theorem 4 Suppose there is a sublinear price equilibrium allocation {Ci}i∈I
and Assumptions 1 to 3 and 5 are satisfied. Then there is a Radner equilib-
rium ({(θi}i∈I, D, S) which implements the sublinear price equilibrium allo-
cation {Ci}i∈I.
Note that the Radner equilibrium in the present situation does not allow for
consumption at time t = 0, the budget set is now given by B(Ei, D, S) =
{Ei +XθT ∈ L1(P)+ : θ ∈ Θ(S)}.
Remark 5 An alternative and reasonable condition could be 3′. Ψ(Ci−Ei) =
0 for each agent. In a two agent economy, the net trades become unam-
biguous. Hence the implementation has no compensation part (Kt) to con-
sider. Another alternative refers to the no arbitrage condition Ψ
(∑
i∈IEi
)
=∑
i∈I Ψ(Ci), introduced in Aliprantis, Tourky, and Yannelis (2000). In this
context see also footnote 26.
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The first part of the appendix collects the proofs of Section 2. First we review
some convergence results used, and which are relevant especially to the proof
for Lemma 1.
Convergence properties of sublinear expectations, Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011):
48The sub-order dual space L1(P)~ of L1(P) consists of certain sublinear functionals
on L1(P), see Beißner (2012) for details or Section 2.2. of Chapter 3. Here, we consider
the case Γ(P) = P. While linear prices correspond to Γ(P) = {P} for some P ∈ PE . An
alternative approach could lead to Γ(P) = PE , which induces the endogenous equivalent
symmetric martingale measure set QE .
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1. Let {Pn}n∈N ⊂ P converges weakly to P ∈ P . Then, for each X ∈
L1(P), we have EPn [X]→ EP [X].
2. Let P be weakly compact and let {Xn}n∈N ⊂ L1(P) be such that
Xn ↘ X, then EP [Xn]↘ EP [X].
3. Let (Xn)n∈N be a sequence in L1(P) which converges to X in L1(P).
Then there exists a subsequence (Xnk)k∈N which converges to X quasi-
surely in the sense that it converges to X outside a P-polar set.
We say a sequence (Xn)n∈N converges in capacity to X if for each ε > 0 we
have supP∈P P (|Xn −X| > ε) convergeing to zero.
Hierarchy of convergence, Cohen, Ji, and Peng (2011): Quasi sure conver-
gence implies convergence in capacity.
Dominated convergence for sublinear expectation, Xu (2010): Let (Xn)n∈N
be a sequence in L1(P) such that |Xn| ≤ Y ∈ L1(P), for each n ∈ N. If
Xn → X in capacity, then limn→∞ EP [Xn] = EP [X].
In our multiple prior setting quasi sure convergence does not imply conver-
gence in capacity, see the Appendix of Xu (2010) for an example. In this
case, the limit X is not necessarily an element of L1(P).
2.5.1 A 1: Details and Proofs of Section 3
As mentioned in Subsection 2.1, two random variables X, Y ∈ L1(P) can be
distinguished if there is a prior in P ∈ P such that P (X 6= Y ) > 0. Such null
elements are characterized by random variables which are P-polar. P-polar
sets which are evaluated under every prior are zero or one, although, the value
may differ between different priors. A property holds quasi-surely (q.s.) if it
holds outside a polar set. Furthermore, the space L1(P) is characterized in
Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011) via
L1(P) =
{
X ∈ L(Ω) : X has a q.c. version, lim
n→∞
EP
[|X|1{|X|>n}]= 0} . (6)
A mapping X : Ω → R is said to be quasi-continuous (q.c.) if for all ε > 0
there exists an open set O with c(O) = supP∈P P (O) < ε such that X|Oc
is continuous. We say that X : Ω → R has a q.c. version if there exists a
quasi–continuous function Y : Ω→ R with X = Y q.s.
Proof of Proposition 1 We show inf(X, Y ) = X ∧ Y ∈ L1(P) for every
X, Y ∈ L1(P) via the representation in (6). Since {|X| > n}⊃{|X∧Y | > n},
we have by the sublinearity of EP
EP
[|X ∧ Y |1{|X∧Y |>n}]≤ EP[|X|1{|X|>n}]+EP[|Y |1{|Y |>n}]−−−→
n→∞
0.
Since X and Y have a q.c. version, there are ε¯, εX , εY > 0 such that εX+εY <
ε¯ with c(OX) < εX , c(OY ) < εY and hence c(OX∪OY ) ≤ c(OX)+c(OY ) < ε¯.
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Because X|(OX∪OY )c and Y |(OX∪OY )c are both continuous, the quasi-continuity
of X ∧ Y follows. The order relation is indeed a lattice operation.
That L1(P) is a Banach space is shown in Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011).
L1(P) is a Banach lattice, since for all X, Y ∈ L1(P) with |X| ≤ |Y |, i.e.
|X| ≤ |Y | P -a.s. for all P ∈ P imply
c1,P(X) = max
P∈P
EP [|X|] = EP ′ [|X|] ≤ EP ′ [|Y |] ≤ c1,P(Y ),
for some maximizing prior P ′ for c1,P(X). Fix a sequence of positive random
variables (Xn) in L
1(P) such that Xn ↘ 0 in L1(P). Hence X1 dominates
the sequence and an application of the dominated convergence under sublinear
expectation gives us
lim
n→∞
c1,P(Xn) = lim
n→∞
EP [|Xn|] = EP [| lim
n→∞
Xn|] = 0.
Hence, L1(P) is an order continuous Banach lattice. 
Proof of Proposition 2 In our construction, the underlying sublinear ex-
pectation space is given by (Ω, Cb(Ω),EP), as given by Theorems 25 and 52
in Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011) L1(P) = L1G(Ω). Since Ω is a polish space
and P is a weakly compact by Assumption 1, c1,P is a Prokhorov capacity.
If l : L˜1(P) → R is a non-negative linear functional, then there is a non-
negative measure µ with support Ω such that
l(X) =
∫
Xdµ, for every X ∈ L1(P),
This is shown in Proposition 11 of Feyel and de La Pradelle (1989). In The-
orem 6 by Feyel and De La Pradelle (1977), it is shown that every continuous
linear functional is the difference of two non-negative linear functionals.
L˜1(P) is given by the space of c1,P-equivalence classes of Cb(Ω)c1,P, so that
the domain is modified via the so called Lebesgue prolongation. The explicit
representation of the c1,P-topological dual of L˜1(P), can be found in the first
chapter of Kervarec (2008), Theorem I.30. 
Proof of Corollary 1 ”⇒”: By Proposition 2, we have l(X) = EP [ψX],
since ψ > 0 P -a.s and P (X > 0) > 0, therefore l(X) > 0 follows.
”⇐”: l ∈ L1(P)∗ implies again by Proposition 2 that we can write l(X) =
EP [ψX]. Suppose ψ /∈ L∞(P )++ then P (ψ > 0, X > 0) = 0 for some P ∈ P
is possible. We have a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 1 1. Monotonicity follows directly from the monotonicity
of the utility index u. Let PX ∈ M(X) ⊂ P be a minimizing prior of U(X).
Semi-strict monotonicity follows from u′(X) > 0 on a set with a positive
measure with respect to PX and
U(X + Z)− U(X) ≥ EPX [u(X + Z)− u(X)] > EPX [u′(X + Z) · Z] ≥ 0,
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where the strict inequality follows from strict concavity of u and P (Z > 0) > 0
for every P ∈ P.
2. The mapping C 7→ EP [u(C)]+ c(P ) is concave for each P ∈ P and the inf
operation preserves concavity. We prove the strict concavity on M[P ]. Let
α ∈ (0, 1) and C,X ∈ L1(P)+ ∩M[P ], with C 6= X. We compute
αU(C) + (1− α)U(X) ≤ min
P∈P
EP [αu(C) + (1− α)u(X)] + c(P )
< min
P∈P
EP [u(αC + (1− α)X)] + c(P )
= U(αC + (1− α)X),
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of C 7→ U(C).
The functional U is not strictly concave on its whole domain, since C 6= X in
L1(P) does not imply C 6= X under every P ∈ P, hence one can easily pick
two elements C and X which are P -a.s. equal, where P ∈M(λC+(1−λ)X)
and deduce a contradiction, when following the proof of concavity.
3. Let the sequence (Xn)n∈N ⊂ L1(P)+ converges to X in L1(P). In order
to prove the assertion, we show that every subsequence (Ynk)k∈N of (Xn) has
in turn a subsequence (Zn)n∈N such that
lim sup
n→∞
U(Zn) ≤ U(X).
Let PX ∈ M(X) be a minimizing prior and (Ynk)k∈N be a subsequence of
(Xn)n∈N. There is a subsequence (Zn)n∈N in (Ynk)k∈N and some Z ∈ L1+(P)
satisfying
Zn(ω)→ X(ω) and 0 ≤ Zn(ω) ≤ Z(ω) for PX-a.s.
We may take Z = X+
∑
n∈N |Zn+1−Zn|, with c1,P(Zn+1−Zn) ≤ 2−n. Mono-
tonicity of u implies 0 ≤ u(Zn(ω)) ≤ u(Z(ω)) and u(Zn(ω))→ u(X(ω)) for
PX almost every ω ∈ Ω.
So, by the lim sup-version of Fatou’s lemma under PX we deduce
lim sup
n→∞
U(Zn) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
EP
X
[u(Zn)] + c(P
X)
≤ EPX [u(X)] + c(PX) = U(X).
We prove the norm continuity of U , when c is linear. To show U(Xn) →
U(X) for some norm convergent sequence (Xn)n∈N, it suffices again to show
that every subsequence of (Xn)n∈N has a subsequence (Zn)n∈N with U(Zn)→
U(X).
Let (Xnk)k∈N be a subsequence of (Xn)n∈N. We have Xnk → X in c1,P . There
is a subsequence (Zn)n∈N of (Xnk)k∈N and a Z ∈ L1(P) with 0 ≤ Zn ≤ Z
P-q.s. and Zn → X P-q.s., which implies convergence in capacity, (see the
beginning of Appendix A). We may take Z as before. By the monotonicity
and continuity of u, we have 0 ≤ u(Zn) ≤ u(Z) P-q.s. and u(Zn) → u(X)
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P-q.s. An application of dominated convergence under sublinear expectation,
as shown in the beginning of Appendix A, gives us
lim
n→∞
U(Zn) = −EP
[
φ− u
(
lim
n→∞
Zn
)]
= −EP [φ− u(X)] = min
P∈P
EP [u(X)]− 〈P, φ〉 = U(X).
This implies the c1,P-continuity of the utility functional. Note that the lower
semi-continuity and linearity of the penalty term implies continuity, hence we
can find a φ ∈ L1(P), to give a representation in terms of a bilinear form.
4. That P is also σ(L1(P), L1(P)∗)-weakly compact follows by the same
arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2.4 in Bion-Nadal and Kervarec
(2012), since it is a closed subset of the nonnegative part of the unit ball of
L1(P)∗. Effective priors exist, since P 7→ EP [X] is weakly continuous for
every X ∈ L1(P), and build a convex weakly compact subset of P.
Let P ∗ ∈M(C) be an effective prior for C and let X ∈ L1(P)+ be arbitrary.
By the concavity and differentiability of the utiltiy index u, this implies
U(X)− U(C) = min
P∈P
EP [u(X)] + c(P )−min
P∈P
EP [u(C)] + c(P )
≤ EP ∗ [u(X)] + c(P ∗)− EP ∗ [u(C)] + c(P ∗)
≤ EP ∗ [u′(C)(X − C)].
The characterization of the superdifferential follows from the fact that ∂U(X) ⊂
L1(P)∗, Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 of Theorem 2.8.2 in Clarke (1990).

2.5.2 A 2: Details and Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Lemma 2 By Assumption 1 the set of priors is convex, weakly
compact and stable under pasting. The semigroup property of the conditional
expectations can be found in Proposition 3.6 (i) of Nutz and Soner (2012).
Alternatively, when the set D is given by an explicit correspondence process,
one can also apply Theorem 2.6 form Epstein and Ji (2013b). 
Proof of Corollary 2 The alternative representation is an application of
the martingale representation theorem in Section 4.2. It can be easily verified
that M[P ] is a closed subspace of L1(P). Unambiguous random variables can
be identified as the terminal value of the stochastic integral, which is the
image of a linear operator, with preimage Θ(B). 
In order to concentrate on the essential difficulties of the proofs in Subsec-
tion 4.2, we do not consider consumption and endowments at time 0, until
the proof of Theorem 3. The product structure of the consumption pro-
files and the additive utility imply that proofs within the two period econ-
omy are slight generalizations. To do so we identify Λ(0, E) with Λ(E) ={
C ∈ L1(P)I+ :
∑
Ci ≤ E
}
.
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Proof of Theorem 1 The functional Uα : Λ(E)→ R is weakly upper semi-
continuous, by Lemma 1. By Proposition 1, L1(P) is a Banach lattice with
order continuous norm. This implies that the order interval [[0, E]] = {x ∈
L1(P) : 0 ≤ x ≤ E} is σ(L1(P), L1(P)∗)-compact, this result can be found
in Theorem 2.3.8 of Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw (1990) and Section
2 in Yannelis (1991). Hence, Λ(E) is σ(L1(P)I , (L1(P)I)∗)-compact, as a
closed subset of [[0, E]]I under the same topology. The Weierstrass Theorem
(Theorem 2.43 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)) implies the existence of a
maximizer.
The upper hemicontinuity of C(α, ·) : ∆I × L1(P)+ ⇒ L1(P)I+ follows from
Berge Maximum theorem, where each U i is continuous. We prove the ex-
istence of a continuously differentiable selection. The well defined mapping
C(α, e) : ∆I × R+ → RI+ is the unique solution of the pointwise problem
C(α, e) = argmax
xi≥0,
∑
xi≤e
∑
αiui(xi), (α, e) ∈ ∆I × R+,
which is continuously differentiable on ∆˚I × R++, the interior of dom(C).
For every α ∈ ∆I there is a P ∈ P such that the modified economy with
dom(c˜i) = {P}, i ∈ I, satisfies the same first order condition as in the
original economy
µ ∈ L1(P)∗, dµ = u′α(E)dP = αiu′i (Ci(α,E)) dP,
for every i ∈ I such that αi 6= 0. This implies the α-efficiency of {Ci(α,E)}i∈I
in the original and c˜i-modified economy. Feasibility holds by construction.
Hence, C ∈ C is a continuously differentiable selection in α. 
The proof of Theorem 2 needs some preparation and is divided into the
following four propositions, which make use of the conditions for Theorem
2. The proof strategy of Theorem 2 adapts the ideas of Section 3 in Dana
(2004). With the existence of an α-efficient allocation from Theorem 1, we
can consider the single-valued solution selection C : ∆I ×L1(P)+ → L1(P)I+
of the concave program (Uα,Λ(E)), given by
{Ci(α,E)}i∈I ∈ argmax
(Ci)∈Λ(E)
∑
i∈I
αiUi(Ci),
in the next steps. Now, we introduce our excess utility map. In compari-
son to the classical case, the mapping has to be modified, since the utility
gradient cannot be solely represented by a random variable with a conjugate
integrability order. In general for some X ∈ L1(P)+, the set of effective
priors M(X) is not unique, since it is the minimizer of a convex (and not
strictly convex) program, i.e. Gateaux differentiability is in general not true.
Hence, we propose a prior dependency in the excess utility to account for
this change in the universal system of equations.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-4 with dom(ci) = {P}, for all i ∈ I,
there is a P -a.s. unique equilibrium.
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As illustrated in Example 5, in general there is no hope for a P-q.s. unique
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3 By Theorem 1, For each α ∈ ∆I , a unique α-
efficient allocation exists. The proof now follows the lines of Dana (1993),
where the present commodity price duality is given by 〈L1(P), L∞(P )〉. Here,
the continuity of the excess utility map follows by the dominated convergence
result at the beginning of Appendix A. 
Let us denote by GE : P → ∆I , the single-valued correspondence which
asserts to every prior the unique equilibrium weight αP of the relevant vNM-
economy(P ) in Proposition 3. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 6 Let Ci(α,E) be the argmax of an α-efficient allocation with
von Neumann Morgenstern utility under P ∈ P. The excess utility map
Φ : ∆I × P → RI is given by
Φi(α, P ) = α
−1
i E
P [u′α(E) · (Ci(α,E)− Ei)] , i ∈ I.
The primitives of the economy specify this modified excess utility map. A
zero for the standard excess utility map, when only the utility weight α is
the variable, guarantees an equilibrium. The modification in the definition is
caused by the equilibrium prior, a new component in the universal system of
equations. Due to the first order conditions of individual maximization, this
object appears beacause of the given structure of the topological dual space.
A zero (α, P ) ∈ ∆I × P of Φ is not sufficient to guarantee an equilibrium,
since an arbitrary P ∈ P may not lie in the set of common effective pri-
ors
⋂
i∈IMi(Ci(α,E)), where the consumption Ci(α,E) is taken from the
α-efficient allocation. To account for this situation, we need the following
two Propositions.
First, we prove that at every Pareto optimal allocation, the intersection of
the risk adjusted effective prior is not empty. As we will see below, this en-
sures that the excess utility map can attain a zero in RI on the appropriate
set of priors. To do so, we reformulate α-efficiency in terms of a supremal
convolution from convex analysis. For E ∈ L1(P), let
i∈IαiUi(E) = max∑
Ci=E
∑
αiUi(Ci),
and denote the superdifferential of Ii=1αiUi by ∂Uα, see Laurent (1972)
for details. Note that the domain of each Ui equals L
1(P)+.
The following proposition states that for α-efficient allocations the utility
supergradients of the agents agree. We also discuss the α-dependency of
common effective priors.
Proposition 4 1. Let (C1(α,E), . . . , CI(α,E)) ∈ Λ(E) be the α-efficient
allocation of Theorem 1. We get⋂
i∈I
∂αiUi(Ci(α,E)) = ∂Uα(E) 6= ∅,
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for some α ∈ ∆I . Moreover, the set ∂Uα(E) is weakly compact and convex.
2. The set of common risk unadjusted priors P(α) = ∩i∈IMi(Ci(α,E)) sat-
isfies,
P(α) = {P ∈ P : ∃µ ∈ ∂Uα(E) with dµ = u′α(E)dP}
= arg min
P∈P
EP
[
uα(E)−
∑
i∈I
αiφi
]
,
where φi is the representation of the linear penalty term ci.
3. The correspondence P : ∆I → P is upper hemicontinuous on ∆I . More-
over, P is weakly compact and convex valued.
Proof of Proposition 4 1. The allocation (C1(α,E), . . . , CI(α,E)) ∈ Λ(E)
can be related to an α-weighted program (Uα,Λ(E)). We formulate this in
terms of supremal convolution. By construction we have
∑
iCI(α,E) = E
P-q.s. and
i∈IαiUi(E) =
∑
αiUi(Ci(α,E)).
By Lemma 1, we have ∂Ui(CI(α,E)) 6= ∅, for each i ∈ I. The first part
of the proposition follows from Proposition 6.6.4 in Laurent (1972). The
convexity of ∂Uα(E) can be found in Theorem 47A in Zeidler (1985). The
intersection of compact sets is again compact.
2. Let P¯ ∈ P(α), we derive
max
(X)∈Λ(E)
∑
i∈I
αiUi(Xi) =
∑
i∈I
αi min
P∈P
EP [ui(Ci(α,E)− φi]
= EP¯
[∑
i∈I
αi
(
ui(Ci(α,E))− φi
)]
= min
P∈P
EP
[
uα(E)−
∑
i∈I
αiφi
]
,
where the pointwise definition of uα can be found in the footnote in Assump-
tion 3. The result follows from Lemma 1.4.
3. The upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence P follows from Berge’s
maximum theorem with respect to the α-parametrized and linear problem
minP∈P EP [uα(E) −
∑
αiφi]. The values are weakly compact and convex,
due to the first part of the proposition. 
In the next step, we relate Proposition 3 with our notion of excess utility.
Proposition 5 The tuple
({Ci(α∗, E)}i∈I,EP ∗ [u′α∗(E)·]) is an Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium if and only if
Φ(α∗, P ∗) = 0 and P ∗ ∈ P(α∗),
which is equivalent to (α, P ) ∈ gr(GE−1) ∩ gr(P) or P ∈ P ◦GE(P ).
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Proof of Proposition 5 ”⇐”: Each prior P ∈ P(α) is associated to a su-
pergradient DUi(Ci)(X) = E
P [u′i(Ci)X] for each agent i ∈ I simultaneously.
A possible prior P /∈ P(α) with a zero in the excess demand is not related to at
least one agent k’s first order condition with a positive weight αk. Whereas,
if Φ is not zero, we have only an equilibrium with transfer payment.
”⇒”: By Proposition 4, Φ(α∗, P ∗) = 0 and P ∗ ∈ P(α∗) implies the ex-
istence of an equilibrium
({CP ∗i (α∗, E)}i∈I, u′α∗(E)) under vNM(P ∗) utility,
i.e. X 7→ EP ∗ [ui(X)]−ci under P ∗ ∈ P(α∗), where ci = EP ∗ [φi] and CPi (α, ·)
corresponds to the α-efficient consumption of agent i under vNM(P ) utility.
We get
EP
∗
[u′α∗(E)(C − Ei)] ≤ 0
implies EP
∗
[ui(C)]− ci ≤ EP ∗ [ui(CP ∗i (α∗, E))]− ci.
This implies Ui(C) ≤ Ui(CP ∗i (α∗, E)), due to Ui(C) ≤ EP
∗
[ui(C) − φi].
Hence, ({CP ∗i (α∗, E)}i∈I,EP
∗
[u′α∗(E)·] is an equilibrium of the original econ-
omy. 
Agent i’s set of effective priors Mi(Ci(α,E)) ⊃ P(α) at an optimal con-
sumption forms the basis for the set of equilibrium priors. The first order
condition of α-efficient allocations relies on the set of common supergradi-
ent ∂Uα. The risk adjustment via the normalized marginal utility u′α(E)
of the representative agent delivers the correct set of equilibrium priors, see
Proposition 4.2. This is consistent with the decomposition of the linear price
systems and the modified excess utility map.
Proof of Theorem 2 Define the functional ρ : ∆I × P → R by
ρ(α, P ) = min
i∈I
Φi(α, P ).
By Proposition 6.2 Φi(α, ·) is linear and weakly continuous, hence ρ(α, ·) is
weakly continuous. From an application of Proposition 6.1 we follow for each
P ∈ P the continuity of ρ(·, P ), since the pointwise infimum of continuous
functions is again continuous. Since the maximum of ρ(·, P ) over ∆I is by
construction a zero, the solution mapping GE is also given by
GE(P ) = arg max
α∈∆I
ρ(α, P ).
Therefore by Berge’s maximum theorem, GE is a single-valued and upper-
hemicontinuous correspondence and hence continuous when viewed as a func-
tion.
Now, P ◦GE : P → P is a composition of upper hemicontinuous correspon-
dences and hence again upper hemicontinuous. By Proposition 4.1., P is
convex and weakly compact valued and hence so is P ◦GE. Since the vector
space of signed measure on (Ω,F) equipped with the topology of weak con-
vergence is a locally convex topological vector space, we apply the Kakutani-
Glicksberg-Fan fixed point theorem (Theorem 17.55 in Aliprantis and Border
(2006)) with respect to P ◦GE, and the result follows by Proposition 5. 
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Proposition 6 1. For each P ∈ P, the function Φ(·, P ) is continuous in
the interior of ∆I and ‖Φ(α, P )‖RI → +∞ whenever αi → 0 for some i ∈ I.
2. For each α ∈ ∆I , the function Φ(α, ·) is weakly continuous.
The following result is used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 6 1. This follows from Proposition 3 and the con-
tinuous differentiability of each ui. Since P ∈ P is fixed, the limit behavior
follows by same argument as in the the standard single prior case.
2. Let {Pn}n∈N be a sequence in P which converges weakly to some prior P .
According to the first result at the beginning of Appendix A,
lim
n→∞
EPn [u′α(E) · (Ci(α,E)− Ei)] = EP [u′α(E) · (Ci(α,E)− Ei)]
and which proves continuity in the weak topology. 
The equilibrium weight α∗ relates the residual set of priors by PE = P(α∗).
Proofs of Subsection 4.3
By Q-q.e., we denote Q⊗ dt = {Q⊗ dt,Q ∈ Q}-quasi everywhere.
Proof of Theorem 3 We begin with the only if part of the theorem and
denote ξi = Ci−Ei. Suppose there is an agent i ∈ I, such that QE ∩Q(ξi) =
∅.49 This implies EQ[ξi] < EQ[ξi], where Q ∈ QE. In order to guarantee the
implementation of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, the portfolio process Xθ
i
with θi ∈ Θ(S) requires XθiT = Xθi0 +
∫ T
0
θitdSt and must satisfy
Xθ
i
T = ξ and X
θi
0 = pi(ei − ci).
An application of the martingale representation theorem to ξi implies X
θi
0 =
EQ[ξi], so that the only constants in the martingale representation and the
self-financing condition must be equal. On the other side, we have by the
Arrow-Debreu budget set Xθ
i
0 = pi(ei − ci) = EQ[ξi], which is a contradiction
to QE ∩Q(ξi) 6= ∅ or equivalently to (5) in the formulation Theorem 3.
To proof the other direction, fix the following elements in L1(P) as the divi-
dend of the first two securities:
D0 ≡ 1, D1 = BT , D2 = KT ,
where KT is specified in step two below by virtue of Lemma 3. We introduce
the candidates for the price of consumption at time zero and the price process
of the security. Let the price of D at time t be S1t = EQt [D1] and S0t =
EQt [D0] = 1. The positive scalar pi is the price of time zero consumption. We
49Here, Q(X) = arg maxQ∈Q EQ[X] denotes the effective (uncertainty adjusted) priors
under the sublinear equilibrium expectation.
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divide the proof into four steps. In the first step and second, we introduce the
candidate trading strategies for agent i ∈ I\ {I} and show market clearing
in the third step. The last step shows that the trading strategies are maximal
elements in the budget sets.
1. Let ξi ∈ L1(P), i ∈ I \ {I}, be some feasible net trades. The process
X it = EQt [ξi]− EQ[ξi], t ∈ [0, T ]
is an integrable Q-martingale and we have by the martingale representation
X it =
∫ t
0
θi,1r dS
1
r −Kit , (7)
Q-q.e. Fix some strategy θi := (θi,0, θi,1, θi,2) ∈ Θ(S0, S1, S2) =: Θ(S), where
θi,0 and θi,2 are specified in step two.
As a candidate Radner equilibrium allocation at time T , we consider the
allocation generated by the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation, i.e. ξi =(
C¯i − Ei
)
, for each i ∈ I.
2. Applying Lemma 3 to {Ki}i∈I\{I} in (7), there is a predictable process
of bounded variation S2 starting in zero with S2 ∈ L1(P) and predictable
S2-integrable processes {θi,2}i∈I\{I}, such that50
−Kit =
∫ t
0
θi,2r dS
2
r Q-a.e.
From this we can reformulate the bounded variation part in (5) and get
−Kit =
∫ t
0
θi,2r dS
2
r , for each i ∈ I \ {I}. Fix the following trading process
for the riskless security S0 for agent i ∈ I \ {I}:
θi,0t = E
Q[ξi] +
∫ t
0
θi,1r dS
1
r +
∫ t
0
θi,2r dS
2
t − θi,1t S1t − θi,2t S2t , Q-q.e.,
where EQ[ξi] = EQ[ξi] for some Arrow-Debreu equilibrium pricing measure
Q ∈ Q(ξi)∩QE 6= ∅. Clearly,
∫
θi,0dS0 ≡ 0 is a well defined square integrable
integral and EQ[ξi] = 〈θi0, S0〉. Predictability of θi,0 can easily be verified.
Substitution of the integral equations yields the self-financing property for θi:
〈θit, St〉 = 〈θi0, S0〉+
∫ t
0
〈θir, dSr〉 Q-q.e.
It follows that each trading strategy is admissible, i.e. θi ∈ Θ(S), for each
i = I \ {I}. We observe via the self-financing property
〈θiT , ST 〉+ Ei = (θi,0T , θi,1T , θi,2T )>(D0, D1, D2) + Ei = C¯i, Q-q.s.
〈θi0, S0〉 = EQ[ξi] = EQ[ξi] = EQ[C¯i − Ei] = pi(ei − c¯i).
50Note that the asset price S2 depends heavily on the equilibrium net trades.
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Hence, each agent i = I \ {I} consumes (c¯i, C¯i) via the portfolio strategy θi.
3. In order to meet the market clearing condition in the Radner economy,
consider the last agent I ∈ I, equipped with θI = −∑j∈I\{I} θj, which guar-
antees market clearing, by the linear structure of Θ(S). The self-financing
condition θI ∈ Θ(S) holds by construction. We derive again by the Arrow-
Debreu budget constraint, since Q ∈ QE
〈θI0, S0〉 = EQ
[
−
∑
j∈I\{I}
ξj
]
= EQ [ξI ] = pi(eI − c¯I).
By the clearing condition of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium we derive
ξI = −
∑
j∈I\{I}
ξj =
〈
−
∑
j∈I\{I}
θjT , ST
〉
= −
∑
j∈I\{I}
(
θj,0T S
0
T + θ
j,1
T S
1
T + θ
j,2
T S
2
T
)
,
which gives us the clearing condition in the Radner economy.
4. In the last step we show the individual optimality of the trading strategies.
Suppose there is an agent k ∈ I capable of achieving a strictly preferred bundle
(c, C) k (c¯k, Ek+ξk) in terms of a different trading strategy θC ∈ Θ(S). The
Arrow-Debreu price system (at time T ) in Theorem 2 satisfies Π ∈ L1(P)∗⊕,
the value of (c, C) should be strictly higher in comparison to (c¯k, C¯k), since
preferences are semi-strictly monotone.51 This means
pic+ EQ[C] > pic¯k + E
Q[Ek + ξk], for some Q ∈ QE.
Applying the Radner budget constraint for (c, C), we have
piek − 〈θC0 , S0〉+ EQ
[
Ek + 〈θC0 , S0〉+
∫ T
0
〈θCt , dSt〉
]
> pic¯k + E
Q[Ek + ξk],
for some Q ∈ QE. Since
∫
θC,0dS0 ≡ 0 and the stochastic integral ∫ t
0
θC,1r dS
1
r
is a symmetric Q-martingale, and hence a Q-martingale for every Q ∈ Q as
well. By the market clearing and Lemma 3, KCT =
∫ T
0
θC,2r dS
2
r holds Q-q.s.
and since −KC is a Q-martingale starting in zero, we conclude
piek + E
Q [Ek] = piek + E
Q
[
Ek −KQ,CT
]
> pic¯k + E
Q[Ek + ξk].
This implies 0 > pi(c¯k−ek)+EQ
[
C¯k − Ek
]
, and contradicts the given Arrow-
Debreu budget optimality of (c¯k, C¯k).
This proves the existence of the Radner equilibrium. The properties of the
equilibrium follow directly from the construction. 
51In this argument, we benefit from the semi-strict positivity of the price system.
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Proof of Theorem 4 We follow a similar proof strategy as in Theorem 3
and introduce four assets S0, . . . , S3. To each endowment and consumption
of agent i ∈ I apply the martingale representation theorem under Q:
Ci = EQ[Ci] +
∫ T
0
θCir dS
1
r −KCiT and Ei = EQ[Ei] +
∫ T
0
θEir dS
1
r −KEiT
Since EQ[Ci] = Ψ(Ci) = Ψ(Ei) = EQ[Ei], the net trades ξi = Ci − Ei can be
written as, with θi,1 = θCi − θEi,
ξi =
∫ T
0
θCir − θEir dBr −KCiT +KEiT =
∫ T
0
θi,1r dS
1
r +
∫ T
0
θi,2r dS
2
r −
∫ T
0
θi,3r dS
3
r ,
where S2 and S3 are induced by (KCi)i∈I, (KEi)i∈I, respectively via the ap-
plication of Lemma 3.
To meet the store of value condition, set S0t = 1 and
θi,0t =
∫ t
0
〈θir, dSr〉 −
∑
1≤k≤3
θi,kt S
k
t .
This gives us the self-financing condition 〈θit, St〉 =
∫ t
0
〈θir, dSr〉 = Xθit . More-
over, each agent i ∈ I \ {I} with trading strategy θi = (θi,0, θi,1, θi,2, θi,3) can
consume ξi at time T .
The last agent I is equipped with the strategy θI = −∑j∈I\{I} θj. Since
Θ(S0, S1, S2, S3) = Θ(S) is a linear space, we have θI ∈ Θ(S). The mar-
ket clearing condition holds by construction, while the Arrow-Debreu clearing
condition and the linearity of the stochastic integral and the bounded vari-
ation integrals imply that θI generates CI = EI + 〈θIT , ST 〉. This argument
follows step three in the proof of Theorem 3.
Finally we check the maximality of the strategy in the Radner budget set.
Suppose an agent j ∈ I receives a strictly better allocation C financed by
some θC ∈ Θ(S) such that Uj(C) > Uj(Cj). Then the sublinear equilibrium
price of C must be strictly higher, i.e. Ψ(C) > Ψ(Cj) = Ψ(Ej). Since C is
financed by θC we have Ej+X
θC
T = C. Applying the martingale representation
theorem with respect to Ej, with −KEj =
∫
θj,3dS3 =
∫
θC,3dS3 we derive
EQ[Ej] < Ψ(C)
= EQ
[
EQ[Ej] +
∫ T
0
θ
Ej
t dS
1
t +
∫ T
0
θ
3,Ej
t dS
3
t +
∫ t
0
〈θCr , dSr〉
]
= EQ[Ej] + EQ
[∫ T
0
(
θC,1t + θ
Ej ,1
t
)
dS1t −
∫ T
0
θ2,Ct dS
2
t
]
= EQ[Ej] + EQ
[−KCT ]
= EQ[Ej],
where we applied the symmetric martingale property of
∫
θC,1 + θEj ,1dS1 in
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terms of the additivity of the sublinear expectation and the martingale prop-
erty of −KC with −KC0 = 0. The second equality holds by∫ T
0
〈θCt , dSr〉 =
∫ T
0
θ1,Ct dS
1
t +
∫ T
0
θ2,Ct dS
2
t −
∫ T
0
θ3,Ct dS
3
t
and by the cash translatability.52 The contradiction proves the result. 
By P(F), we denote the predictable σ-algebra on Ω¯ = [0, T ]×Ω with respect
to the filtration F in Subsection 4.1. In the proof of Theorem 3, we applied
the the following result.
Lemma 3 Fix a finite set {Ki}i∈I of predictable, nondecreasing processes,
starting in zero with KiT ∈ L1(P), then there is a predictable, nondecreasing
process S, starting in zero with ST ∈ L1(P) and a set (ηi)i∈I of predictable
and S-integrable processes such that
Kit =
∫ t
0
ηirdSr P-q.e. for every i ∈ I.
Proof of Lemma 3 Set Ki,P = Ki as a process on (Ω,B(Ω), P ). By the
properties of each Ki.P , there is a positive (random) measure µi,P on (Ω¯,P(F))
satisfying
A 7→ µP (A) = EP
[∫ T
0
1AdK
i,P
t
]
, A ∈ P(F).
The space of σ-finite signed measuresMσ(Ω¯,P(F)) is a Banach lattice53 (see
section IX.2 of Jacobs and Kurzweil (1978)), and especially a lattice group.
By Proposition 5.1.12 of Constantinescu (1984), there is a finite family of
strictly positive and σ-finite measures (νPλ )λ∈L ⊂Mσ(Ω¯,P(F)) such that∑
λ∈L
νPλ = µ
P =
∨
i∈I
µi,P ∈Mσ(Ω¯,P(F))
and for every i ∈ I there exists a subset Li ⊂ L with
µi,P =
∑
λ∈Li
νPλ ∈Mσ(Ω¯,P(F)).
Absolute continuity follows, i.e. νPλ  µP for every λ ∈ L. Hence, by the
Radon-Nykodym theorem applied on (Ω¯,P(F), µP ), we have
dνPλ =
dνPλ
dµP
dµP , for every λ ∈ L.
52This follows from the constant preserving property and the sublinearity of EQ.
53 Here,Mσ(Ω¯,P(F)) is quipped with the natural ordering and the total variation norm.
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The density
dνPλ
dµP
is in L1(Ω¯,P(F), µP ) if and only if νPλ is σ-finite, and we
have
dµi,P =
∑
λ∈Li
dνPλ =
∑
λ∈Li
dνPλ
dµP
dµP = ηi,PdµP .
Similarly to the identification of Ki,P via µi,P , there is a predictable process
SP with SP0 = 0 and increasing paths and a η
i,P ∈ L1(Ω¯,P(F), µP ), such that
dKi,Pt = η
i,P
t dS
P
t for every t ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ I.
In order to guarantee aggregating objects, i.e. S = SP and ηi = ηi,P P ⊗ dt-
a.e. for every P ∈ P, we use the weak compactness of P in Assumption
1. The aggregation property holds by an application Theorem 5.1 of Soner,
Touzi, and Zhang (2012b), (see also Example 4.14 therein). The result
follows. 
Chapter 3
Ambiguity-Neutral Pricing
under Volatility Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
A fundamental assumption behind models in Finance refers to the modeling
of uncertainty via a single probability measure. Instead, we allow for a set of
probability measures P , such that we can guarantee awareness of potential
model misspecification.1 We investigate the implications of a related and
reasonable arbitrage concept. In this context, we suggest a fair pricing prin-
ciple associated with an appropriate martingale concept. The multiple prior
setting influences the price system in terms of the simultaneous control of
different null sets. This motivates a pricing theory of possible means.2
The pricing of derivatives via arbitrage arguments is fundamental. Before
stating an arbitrage concept, a probability space (Ω,F ,P) is fixed such that
marketed claims or tradeable assets with trading strategies can be defined.
The implicit assumption is that the probabilities are known exactly. The
Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (FTAP) then asserts equivalence be-
tween the absence of P-arbitrage in the market model and the existence of
a consistent linear price extension such that the market model can price all
contingent claims. The equivalent martingale measure is then an alternative
description of this extension via the Riesz representation theorem.
In contrast to this standard setup, we introduce an uncertainty model de-
scribed as a set of possibly mutually singular probability measures or priors.3
Our leading motivation is a general form of volatility uncertainty. This per-
spective deviates from models with term structures of volatilities, including
stochastic volatility models such as Heston (1993). As argued in Carr and
Lee (2009), we question this confidence and avoid formulating the volatil-
1The distinction between measurable and unmeasurable uncertainty drawn by Knight
(1921) serves as a starting point for modeling the uncertainty in the economy. Keynes
(1937) later argued that single prior models cannot represent irreducible uncertainty.
2This was originally discussed by de Finetti and Obry (1933).
3Two priors are mutually singular if they live on two disjoint supports.
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ity process of a continuous-time asset price via another process whose law
of motion is exactly known. Instead, the legitimacy of the probability law
still depends on an infinite repetition of variable observations, as highlighted
by Kolmogoroff (1933). We include this residual uncertainty by giving no
concrete model for the stochastics of the volatility process and instead fix a
confidence interval for the volatility variable.4
A coherent valuation principle changes considerably when the uncertainty
is enlarged by the possibility of different probabilistic scenarios having dif-
ferent null sets. In order to illustrate this point, we consider for a moment
the uncertainty given by one probability model, i.e. P = {P}. An arbitrage
refers to a claim X with zero cost, a P-almost surely positive and with a
positive probability a strictly positive payoff. Formally, this can be written
as pi(X) ≤ 0,
P(X ≥ 0) = 1 and P(X > 0) > 0.
The situation changes in the case of an uncertainty model described by a
set of mutually singular priors P . The second and third condition should
be carefully reformulated, because every prior P ∈ P could be the correct
market description. We rewrite an arbitrage as pi(X) ≤ 0,
for all P ∈ P P(X ≥ 0) = 1 and P′(X > 0) > 0 for some P′ ∈ P .
In accepting this new P-arbitrage notion as a weak dominance principle, we
might ask for the structure of the related objects.5 Suppose we apply the
same idea of linear and coherent extensions to the present multiple prior
uncertainty model. Coherence corresponds to a strictly positive and con-
tinuous price systems on the space of claims L which is consistent with the
given data of a possibly incomplete market. Marketed claims M ⊂ L can be
traded frictionless and are priced by a linear functional pi : M → R.
Another important aspect focuses on the order structure for contingent claims
and the underlying topology of similarity for L. This comprises the basis of
any financial model that asks for coherent pricing. The representation of lin-
ear and continuous price systems6 indicates inconsistencies between positive
linear price systems and the concept of P-arbitrage. As is usual, the easy part
of establishing an FTAP is deducing an arbitrage-free market model from the
existence of an equivalent martingale measure Q ∼ P ∈ P . When seeking
a modified FTAP, the following question (and answer) serves to clarify the
issue:
4For further motivation to consider volatility uncertainty, we refer to Subsection 1.1 of
Epstein and Ji (2013a). Very recent developments in stochastic analysis have established
a complete theory to model volatility uncertainty in continuous time. A major objective
refers to the sublinear expectation operator introduced by Peng (2006).
5See Remark 3.14 in Vorbrink (2010) for a discussion of a weaker arbitrage definition
and its implication in the G-framework.
6We discuss the precise description in Section 2.2.
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Is the existence of a measure Q equivalent to some P ∈ P such
that prices of all traded assets are Q-martingales, and therefore
a sufficient condition to prevent a P-arbitrage opportunity?
A short argument gives us a negative answer: Let X ∈ M be a marketed
claim with price 0 = pi(X). We have EQ[X] = 0 since Q is related to a
consistent price system. Suppose X ∈ M with X ≥ 0 P-a.s for every P ∈ P
and P′(X > 0) > 0 for some P′ ∈ P exists. The point is now,
with P = {P} we would observe a contradiction since Q ∼ P
implies EQ[X] > 0. But X ∈M may be such that P′(X > 0) > 0
with P′ ∈ P being mutually singular to Q ∼ P ∈ P .
This indicates that our robust arbitrage notion is, in general, not consistent
with a linear theory of valuation. In other words, a single pricing measure Q
is not able to contain all the information about what is possible under P .
Since our goal is to suggest a modified framework for a coherent pricing
principle, the concept of marketed claim is reformulated by a prior-dependent
notion of possible marketed spaces MP, P ∈ P . As discussed in Example 3
below, such a step is necessary to address the prior dependency of the asset
span MP. The likeness of marketed spaces depends on the similarity of the
priors in question. Hence, the possibility of different priors creates a friction
caused by the new uncertainty.
A New Commodity-Price Duality
The very basic principle of uncertainty is the assumption of different possible
future states of the world Ω, which is equipped with the Borel σ-algebra
F = B(Ω).7 In the most general framework, we assume a weakly compact
set of priors P .8 This encourages us to consider the sublinear expectation
operator
EP(X) = sup
P∈P
EP[X].
In our economy, the Banach space of contingent claims L2(P) consists of
all random variables with a finite variance for all P ∈ P . The primitives are
prior-dependent representative agent economies given by preference relations
in A(P), being convex, continuous, strictly monotone and rational.
In the single prior setting, the expectation under an equivalent martin-
gale measure Q refers to a normalized, linear and continuous price sys-
tem in the sense of Arrow-Debreu. The topological dual space of L2(P),
7In order to tackle the mutually singular priors, we need some structure in the state
space. See Bion-Nadal and Kervarec (2010) for a discussion of different state spaces. In
the most abstract setting, the states of the world ω ∈ Ω build a complete separable metric
space, also known as a Polish space. The state space contains all realizable paths of
security prices. For the greater part of the paper, we assume Ω = C([0, T ];R), the Banach
space of continuous functions between [0, T ] and R, equipped with the supremum norm.
8If one accepts a deterministic upper bound on the volatility, i.e. the derivative of every
possible quadratic variation, then the (relatively) weak compactness of P is a sufficient
condition.
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a first candidate for the space of price systems, does not consist of elements
which can be merely represented by a state price density ψ. Rather, in
the present volatility uncertainty framework, it is represented by the pairs
(P, ψ) ∈ ∪P∈P{P} × L2(P). As explained before, such linear valuations are
inconsistent with the fine and robust arbitrage we are interested in. Loosely
speaking, such price systems only see the null sets of a particular P and
are blind for the null sets of any mutually singular prior P′ ∈ P . However,
the present space of nonlinear price functionals L2(P)~ built upon this dual
space. Proposition 1 lists important properties and indicates a possible ax-
iomatic approach to the price systems inspired by the coherent risk measures
of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999).
Sublinear prices are constructed by the price systems of partial equilibria,
which consist of prior-dependent linear price functionals piP restricted to
the prior-dependent marketed spaces MP ⊂ L2(P), P ∈ P . These spaces
are joined to a product of marketed spaces. The consolidation operation Γ
transforms the extended product of price systems {piP}P∈P to one coherent
element in the price space L2(P)~+. Scenario-based viability can then model
a preference-free valuation concept in terms of consolidation of possibilities.
The first main result, Theorem 1, gives an equivalence between our notion of
scenario-based viable price systems, and the extension of sublinear function-
als. The present viability concept, corresponding to a no trade equilibrium,
is based on sublinear prices so that the price functional act linearly under
unambiguous contingent claims.
Risk- and Ambiguity-Neutral Valuation
In the second part, we consider the dynamic framework on a time interval
[0, T ] with an augmented filtration F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ] modeling the arrival of
new information. Its special feature is its reliance on the initial σ-algebra,
which does not contain all null sets. Built upon this information structure, we
introduce a dynamic updating principle based on a sequence of conditional
sublinear expectations Et(·) = EP [ · |Ft], t ∈ [0, T ]. These operators are well
defined under every P ∈ P and satisfy the Law of Iterated Expectation.
With the conditional sublinear expectation, a martingale theory is available
which represents a possibilistic model of a fair game against nature.9 In
this fashion, the multiple prior framework forces us to generalize the concept
of equivalent martingale measures. Instead of considering one probability
measure representing the risk-neutral world, we suggest that the appropriate
concept is a set of priors Q. The relation to the statistical set of priors P is
induced through a prior-dependent family of state price densities ψP ∈ L2(P),
P ∈ P . This creates a new sublinear expectation, EQ, generated by Q. For
this rationale, the uncertain asset price (St) becomes under EQ mean unam-
biguous, i.e. EQ[ST ] = E
Q′ [ST ], for all Q,Q′ ∈ Q.
The essential renewal is to consider Q as the appropriate uncertainty-neutral
world. At this stage, ambiguity neutrality as a part of uncertainty neutrality
9More precisely, a whole hierarchy of different fairness degrees is possible.
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comes into play. The central idea follows the same lines as in the classi-
cal risk-neutral valuation. Preferences on ambiguity become neutral when
we move to the uncertainty neutral world Q.10 And it is exactly this kind
of neutrality which corresponds to the notion of symmetric martingales, i.e
(−St) is a EQ-martingale as well. This reasoning motivates the modification
of the martingale concept, now based on the idea of a fair game under Q.
As such, the condition that the price process S is a symmetric martingale
motivates qualifying the valuation principle as uncertainty neutral.
The principal idea of our modified notion of P-arbitrage was introduced by
Vorbrink (2010) for the G-expectation framework. In Theorem 2 we show
that under no P-arbitrage there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
extensions of Theorem 1 and (special) equivalent symmetric martingale mea-
sure sets Q, called EsMM-sets. We thus establish an asset pricing theory
based on a (discounted) nonlinear expectation payoff.
Having established the relation between these concepts, we continue in the
same fashion as in the classical literature with a single prior. We consider
a special class of asset prices driven by G-Brownian motion, related to a
G-expectation EG. This is a zero-mean and stationary process with novel
N(0, [σ, σ])-normally distributed independent increments. Such a normally
distributed random variable is the outcome of a robust central limit theorem
under the sublinear G-expectation. Moreover, in this uncertainty setup, in-
dependence of random variables is no longer a symmetric property.11 This
process can be regarded as a canonical generalization of the standard Brow-
nian motion, in which the quadratic variation may move almost arbitrarily
in a positive interval. The related G-heat equation is now a fully nonlinear
PDE, see Peng (2006).
We consider a Black-Scholes like market under volatility uncertainty driven
by a G-Brownian motion BG. The uncertain asset price process (St) is mod-
eled as a stochastic differential equation12
dSt = µ(t, St)d〈BG〉t + V (t, St)dBGt , S0 = 1.
Intuitively, the increment dSt is divided into the locally certain part
13 and
the locally risky and ambiguous part V (t, St)dB
G
t . An interpretation of this
10This symmetry of priors is essential for creating a process via a conditional expectation
which satisfies the classical martingale representation property, see Appendix B.3.
11In the mathematical literature, the starting point for consideration is a sublinear ex-
pectation space, consisting of the triple (Ω;H; E), where H is a given space of random
variables. If the sublinear expectation space can be represented via the supremum of a
set of priors, see Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011), one can take (Ω,B(Ω),P) as the associ-
ated uncertainty space or Dynkin space, see Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Montrucchio (2013).
12This related stochastic calculus comprises a stochastic integral notion, a G-Itoˆ formula
and a martingale representation theorem.
13For this part one usually has a dt-drift as the inner clock of classical Brownian motion.
Since the inner clock or quadratic variation is now given by the ambiguous 〈BG〉t, we relate
it to the drift part.
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G-Itoˆ differential representation reads as follows:
d
dr
varPr (St)
∣∣∣∣
r=t
∈ V (t, St) · [σ, σ], P ∈ P ,
where varPr (St) is the (Ft,P)-conditional variance. In abuse of notation we
could write this issue as vart(dSt) = V (t, St)
2d〈BG〉t, P-quasi surely.
In this mutually singular prior setting, the (more evolved) martingale rep-
resentation property, related to a conditional sublinear expectation, is not
equivalent to the completeness of the model because the volatility uncer-
tainty is encoded in the integrator of the price process. For the state price
density process we introduce an exponential martingale (Et)t∈[0,T ]14 under G-
Brownian motion and apply a new Girsanov type theorem under EG. For
every contingent claim X ∈ L2(P), this yields following robust pricing for-
mula
Ψ(X) = EQ(X) = EG[ETX].
Related Literature
We embed the present paper into the existing literature. In Harrison and
Kreps (1979), the arbitrage pricing principle provides an economic founda-
tion by relating the notion of equivalent martingale measures with a linear
equilibrium price system.15 Risk neutral pricing, as a precursor, was discov-
ered by Cox and Ross (1976). Harrison and Pliska (1981), as well as Kreps
(1981) and Yan (1980), continued laying the foundation of arbitrage free pric-
ing. Later, Dalang, Morton, and Willinger (1990) presented a fundamental
theorem of asset pricing for finite discrete time. In a general semimartin-
gale framework, the notion of no free lunch with vanishing risk Delbaen and
Schachermayer (1994) ensured the existence of an equivalent martingale mea-
sure in the given (continuous-time) financial market. All these considerations
have in common that the uncertainty of the model is given by a single prob-
ability measure.
Moving to models with multiple probability measures, the concept of pasting
of probability measures models the intrinsic structure of dynamic convexity,
see Riedel (2004) and Delbaen (2006). This type of time consistency is re-
lated to recursive equations, see Epstein and Schneider (2003); Chen and
Epstein (2002), which can result in nonlinear expectation and generates a
rational updating principle. Moreover, the backward stochastic differential
equations can model drift-uncertainty, a dynamic sublinear expectation, see
Peng (1997). However, in these models of uncertainty, all priors are related
to a reference probability measure, i.e. all priors are equivalent or absolutely
14The precise PDE description of the G-expectation allows the definition of a universal
density. Note that in the more general case we have a prior-dependent family of densities.
15The efficient market hypothesis by Fama (1970) introduces information efficiency, a
concept closely related to Samuelson (1965), where the notion of a martingale reached neo-
classic economics for the first time. Bachelier (1900) influenced the course of Samuelson’s
work.
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continuous. Moreover, drift uncertainty does not create a significant change
for a valuation principle of contingent claims.16
The possible insufficiency of equivalent prior models for an imprecise knowl-
edge of the environment motivates the consideration of mutually singular
priors as illustrated at the beginning of this introduction. The mathematical
discussion of such frameworks can be found in Peng (2006); Nutz and Soner
(2012); Bion-Nadal and Kervarec (2012). Epstein and Ji (2013a) provide a
discussion in economic terms. Similarly to the present paper, the volatility
uncertainty is encoded in a non-deterministic quadratic variation of the un-
derlying noise process.
Recalling Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), this axiomatization of uncertainty
aversion represents a non-linear expectation via a worst case analysis. Simi-
larly to risk measures, see Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999),17 the
related set of representing priors may be not equivalent to each other. This
important change permits the application of financial markets under volatil-
ity uncertainty. We refer to Avellaneda, Levy, and Paras (1995); Denis and
Martini (2006) for a pricing principle of claims via a quasi sure stochastic
calculus.
Jouini and Kallal (1995) consider a non-linear pricing caused by bid-ask
spreads and transaction costs, where the price system is extended to a lin-
ear functional. In Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro (2012), pricing rules with
finitely many state are considered.18 A price space of sublinear functionals is
discussed in Aliprantis and Tourky (2002). We quote the following interpre-
tation of the classical equilibrium concept with linear prices and its meaning
(see Aliprantis, Tourky, and Yannelis (2001)):
A linear price system summarizes the information concerning rela-
tive scarcities and at equilibrium approximates the possibly non-linear
primitive data of the economy.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the primitives of
the economic model and establishes the connection between our notion of
viability and extensions of price systems. Section 3 introduces the security
market model associated with the marketed space. We also discuss the corre-
sponding G-Samuelson model. Section 4 concludes and discusses the results
of the chapter and lists possible extensions. The first part of the appendix
presents the details of the model and provides the theorem proofs. In the
second part, we discuss mathematical foundations such as the space of price
systems and a collection of results of stochastic analysis and G-expectations.
16Cont (2006) notes that this assumption is “actually quite restrictive: it means that all
models agree on the universe of possible scenarios and only differ on their probabilities.
For example, if P0 defines a complete market model, this hypothesis entails that there is
no uncertainty on option prices!”
17 Markowitz (1952) postulated the importance of diversification, a fundamental prin-
ciple in finance, which corresponds to sublinearity of risk measures.
18They establish a characterization of super-replication pricing rules via an identification
of the space of frictionless claims.
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3.2 Viability and Sublinear Price Systems
We begin by recapping the case where uncertainty is given by an arbitrary
probability space (Ω,F ,P) as it emphasizes sensible differences with regard
to the uncertainty model posited in this chapter. Following, we introduce the
uncertainty model as well as the related space of contingent claims. Then
we discuss the space of sublinear price functionals. The last subsection in-
troduces the economy, and Theorem 1 states an extension result.
Background: Classical Viability
Let there be two dates t = 0, T , claims at T are elements of the classical Hilbert lat-
tice L2(P) = L2(Ω,F ,P). Price systems are given by linear and L2(P)-continuous
functionals. By Riesz representation theorem, elements of the related topological
dual can be identified in terms of elements in L2(P). A strictly positive functional
Π : L2(P) → R evaluates a positive random variable X with P(X > 0) > 0, such
that Π(X) > 0.
A price system consists of a (closed) subspace M ⊂ L2(P) and a linear price func-
tional pi : M → R. The marketed space consists of contingent claims achievable in
a frictionless manner. A(P) is the set of rational, convex, strictly monotone and
L2(P)-continuous preference relations on R×L2(P). The consistency condition for
an economic equilibrium is given by the concept of viability. A price system is
viable if there exists a preference relation %∈ A(P) and a bundle (xˆ, Xˆ) ∈ R×M
with
(xˆ, Xˆ) ∈ B(0, 0, pi,M) and (xˆ, Xˆ) % (x,X) for all (x,X) ∈ B(0, 0, pi,M),
where B(x,X, pi,M) = {(y, Y ) ∈ R ×M : y + pi(Y ) ≤ x + pi(X)} denotes the
budget set. Harrison and Kreps (1979) prove the following fundamental result:
(M,pi) is viable if and only if there is a strictly positive extension Π of pi to L2(P).
Note that strict positivity implies L2(P)-continuity. The proof is achieved by a
Hahn-Banach argument and the usage of the properties of % such that Π creates
a linear utility functional and hence a preference relation in A(P).
3.2.1 The Uncertainty Model and the Space of Claims
We begin with the underlying uncertainty model by considering possible
scenarios which share neither the same probability measure nor the same
null sets. Therefore it is not possible to assume the existence of a given
reference probability measure when the null sets are not the same. For this
reason we need a topological structure to formulate the uncertainty model.
Let Ω, the states of the world, be a complete separable metric space, B(Ω) =
F the Borel σ-algebra of Ω and let Cb(Ω) denote the set of all bounded
continuous real valued functions. The uncertainty of the model is given by
a weakly compact set of Borel probability measure P ⊂M1(Ω) on (Ω,F).19
19As shown in Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011), the related capacity c(·) = supP∈P P (·) is
regular if and only if the set of priors is relatively compact. Here, regularity refers to a
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In the following example we illustrate a construction for P , applied in the
dynamic setting of Section 3.
Example 1 We consider a time interval [0, T ], the Wiener measure P0 on
the state space of continuous paths Ω = {ω : ω ∈ C([0, T ];R) : ω0 = 0} and
the canonical process Bt(ω) = ωt. Let Fo = (Fot )t∈[0,T ], Fot = σ(Bs, s ∈ [0, t])
be the raw filtration of B. The strong formulation of volatility uncertainty is
based upon martingale laws with stochastic integrals:
Pα := P0 ◦ (Xα)−1, Xαt =
∫ t
0
α1/2s dBs,
where the integral is defined P0 almost surely. The process α is Fo-adapted
and has a finite first moment. A set D of α’s builds P via the associated
prior Pα, such that {Pα : α ∈ D} = P is weakly compact.20
We describe the set of contingent claims. Following Huber and Strassen
(1973), for each F -measurable real function X such that EP[X] exists for ev-
ery P ∈ P , define the upper expectation operator by EP(X) = supP∈P EP[X].21
We suggest the following norm for the space of contingent claims, given by
the capacity norm c2,P , defined on Cb(Ω) by
c2,P(X) = EP
(|X|2) 12 .
Define the completion of Cb(Ω) under the so called “Lebesgue prolongation”
of c2,P22 by L2(P) = L2(Ω,F ,P), and let L2(P) = L2(P)/N be the quotient
space of L2(P) by the c2,P null elements N . We do not distinguish between
classes and their representatives. Two random variables X, Y ∈ L2(P) can
be distinguished if there is a prior in P ∈ P such that P(X 6= Y ) > 0.
It is possible to define an order relation ≤ on L2(P). Classical arguments
prove that (L2(P), c2,P ,≤) is a Banach lattice, see Appendix A.1 for details.
We consider the space of contingent claims L2(P) so that under every prob-
ability model P ∈ P , we can evaluate the variance of a contingent claim.
Properties of random variables are required to be true P-quasi surely, i.e.
P-a.s. for every P ∈ P . This indicates that in contrast to drift uncertainty,
a related stochastic calculus cannot be based only on one probability space.
reasonable continuity property. In Appendix B.2, we recall some related notions and we
give a criterion for the weak compactness of P when it is constructed via the quadratic
variation and a canonical process.
20In order to define universal objects, we need the pathwise construction of stochastic
integrals, (see Fo¨llmer (1981), Karandikar (1995)).
21It is easily verified that Cb(Ω) ⊂ {X F-measurable : EP(X) < ∞} holds and EP(·)
satisfies the property of a sublinear expectation. For details, see Appendix A.1.1, Peng
(2010) and Appendix B.3.
22We refer to Section 2 in Feyel and de La Pradelle (1989), see also Section 48.7-8 in
Choquet (1953) and Section A in Dellacherie (1972).
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3.2.2 Scenario-Based Viable Price Systems
This subsection is divided into three parts. First, we introduce the dual space
where linear and c2,P-continuous functionals are the elements. As discussed
in the introduction, we allow sublinear prices as well. This forces us to extend
the linear price space where we discuss two operations on the new price space
and take a leaf out of Aliprantis and Tourky (2002). We integrate over the
set of priors for the linear consolidation of functionals. In Proposition 1, we
list standard properties of coherent price functionals. The last part in this
subsection focuses on the consolidation of prior-dependent price systems.
Linear and c2,P-Continuous Price Systems on L2(P)
We present the basis for the modified concept of viable price systems. The
mutually singular uncertainty generates a different space of contingent claims.
This gives us a new topological dual space L2(P)∗. The discussion of the
dual space is only the first step to get a reasonable notion of viability which
accounts for the present type of uncertainty. In the second part of the Ap-
pendix, we give a result which asserts that the topological dual, the space of
all linear and c2,P-continuous functionals on L2(P), is given by
L2(P)∗ = {EP[ψP·] : P ∈ P and ψP ∈ L2(P)} .
This representation delivers an appropriate form for possible price systems.
The random variable ψP in the representation matches the classical state
price density of the Riesz representation when only one prior {P} = P is
present. The space’s description allows for an interpretation of a state price
density ψP based on some prior P ∈ P . The stronger capacity norm c2,P(·)
in comparison to the classical single prior L2(P)-norm implies a richer dual
space, controlled by the set of priors P . Moreover, one element in the dual
space implicitly selects a prior P ∈ P and ignores all other priors. This
foreshadows the insufficiency of a linear pricing principle under the present
uncertainty model, as indicated in the introduction.
The Price Space of Nonlinear Expectations
In this paragraph we introduce a set of sublinear functionals defined on
L2(P). The singular prior uncertainty of our model induces the appear-
ance of non-linear price systems.23 Let k(P) be the convex hull of P . The
coherent price space of L2(P) generated by linear c2,P-continuous functionals
is given by
L2(P)~+ =
{
Ψ :L2(P)→ R :Ψ(·)=sup
P∈R
EP[ψP·] with R ⊂ k(P), ψP ∈L2(P)+
}
.
23A subcone of the super order dual is considered in Aliprantis and Tourky (2002).
They introduce the lattice theoretic framework and consider the notion of a semi lattice.
In Aliprantis, Florenzano, and Tourky (2005); Aliprantis, Tourky, and Yannelis (2001)
general equilibrium models with a superlinear price systems are considered in order to
discuss a non-linear theory of value.
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Elements in L2(P)~+ are constructed by a set of c2,P-continuous linear func-
tionals {ΠP : L2(P) → R}P∈P , which are consolidated by a combination of
the point-wise maximum and convex combination. Strictly positive function-
als in L2(P)~++ satisfy additionally Ψ(X) > 0 for every X ∈ L2(P)+ with
P(X > 0) > 0 for some P ∈ P . The following example illustrates how a
sublinear functional in L2(P)~+ can be constructed.
Example 2 Let {Pn}n∈N be a partition of P. And let µn : B(M1(Ω)) → R
be a positive measure with support Pn and µn(Pn) = 1. The resulting prior
Pn(·) =
∫
Pn P(·)µn(dP) is given by a weighting operation Γµn. When we
apply Γµn to the density ψP we get ψ¯n(ω) =
∫
Pn ψP(ω)µn(dP), ω ∈ Ω. These
new prior density pairs (ψ¯n,Pn) can then be consolidated by the supremum
operation of the expectations, i.e. Γ({ΠP}P∈P)(·) = supn∈NEPn
[
ψ¯n·
]
.
For further details of Example 2, see Appendix A.1.1 and Appendix B.1.1.
The following proposition discusses properties and the extreme case of func-
tionals in the price space L2(P)~+. A full lattice-theoretical discussion of our
price space L2(P)~+ lies beyond the scope of this chapter.24
Proposition 1 Functionals in L2(P)~+ satisfy 1. sub-additivity, 2. posi-
tive homogeneity, 3. constant preserving, 4. monotonicity and 5. c2,P-
continuity.25
Moreover, for every positive measure µ of B(P) with µ(P) = 1, we have the
following inequality for every X ∈ L2(P)
EPµ [ψµX] ≤ sup
P∈k(P)
EP[ψPX], where Pµ(·) =
∫
P
P(·)µ(dP).
Below, we introduce the consolidation operation Γ for the prior-dependent
price systems. Γ(P) refers to the set of priors in P which are relevant. In
Example 2, we observe Γµn(P) = Pn.
Remark 1 Price systems in L2(P)~+ resemble the structure of ask prices.
However, the related bid price can then be described by the super order dual
−L2(P)~−, since sup(·) = − inf(−·). From this perspective, we could also con-
struct a fully nonlinear, monotone and positive homogeneous price systems
Ψ as elements in L2(P)~+ − L2(P)~−. For some cover P+ ∪ P− = P we have
X 7→ Ψ(X) = sup
P∈P+
EP[ψPX] + inf
P′∈P−
EP
′
[ψP′X]. (1)
At this stage, the nonlinear price functional can be seen as a fully nonlinear
expectation E(·) ≤ EP(·), being dominated by EP on L2(P) (see Remark 3.1.
below and Section 8 of Chapter III in Peng (2010) for more details).
24However, it is worthwhile to mention that Theorem 12 in Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011)
characterizes σ-order continuity of sublinear functionals in L2(P)~+.
25Formally this means: 1.Ψ(X + Y ) ≤ Ψ(X) + Ψ(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ L2(P), 2.Ψ(λX) =
λΨ(X) for all λ ≥ 0, X ∈ L2(P), 3.Ψ(c) = c for all c ∈ R, 4. If X ≥ Y then Ψ(X) ≥ Ψ(Y )
for all X,Y ∈ L2(P) and 5. Let (Xn)n∈N converge in c2,P to some X, then we have
limn Ψ(Xn) = Ψ(X).
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Marketed Spaces and Scenario-Based Price Systems
In the spirit of Aliprantis, Florenzano, and Tourky (2005) our commodity-
price duality is given by the following pairing 〈L2(P), L2(P)~+〉.
For the single prior framework, viability and the extension of the price system
are associated with each other. This structure allows only for linear prices.
In our framework this corresponds to a consolidation via the Dirac measure
δ{P} for some P ∈ P , so that Γ(P) = {P}.
We begin by introducing the marketed subspaces MP ⊂ L2(P), P ∈ P . The
underlying idea is that any claim in MP can be achieved, whenever P ∈ P
is the true probability measure. This input data resembles a partial equilib-
rium, depending on the prior under consideration. 26 Claims in the marketed
space MP can be bought and sold whenever the related prior governs the
economy. We illustrate this in the following examples.
Example 3 1. Let us consider the role of marketed spaces in the very simple
situation when no prior dependency is present, i.e. MP = M for every P ∈ P.
Specifically, set
M =
{
X ∈ L2(P) : EP[X] = const. for every P ∈ P} .
As we show in Corollary 1, this space consists of (unambiguous) contin-
gent claims which do not depend on the prior of the corresponding linear
expectation operator. It turns out that this space has a strong connection to
symmetric martingales.
2. Suppose the set of priors is constructed by the procedure in Example 1.
The marketed spaces differ because of the P-dependent replication condition.
Specifically, this is encoded in an equation which holds only P-almost surely.
Let the marketed space be generated by the quadratic variation of an uncer-
tain asset with terminal payoff 〈B〉T and a riskless asset with payoff 1. We
have by construction 〈B〉T =
∫ T
0
αsds Pα-a.s., the marketed space under Pα
as given by
MPα =
{
X ∈ L2(Pα) : X = a+ b ·
∫ T
0
αsds Pα-a.s., a, b ∈ R
}
.
But 〈B〉 coincides with the P-quadratic variation under every martingale law
P ∈ P. Therefore a different αˆ builds a different marketed space MPαˆ. Sup-
pose α = αˆ P0-a.s. on [0, s] for some s ∈ (0, T ] then we have MPα ∩MPαˆ
consists also of non trivial claims. Note, that Pα and Pαˆ are neither equiva-
lent nor mutually singular.27
26One may think that a countable set of scenarios could be sufficient. As in Bion-Nadal
and Kervarec (2012), the norm can be represented via different countable dense subsets
of priors. However, for the marketed space we allow for a direct prior dependency of all
possible scenarios P. This implies that different choices of countable and dense scenarios
can deliver different price systems (see Definition 1 below).
27The event {ω : 〈B〉r(ω) =
∫ r
0
αt(ω)dt, r ∈ [0, s]} has positive mass under both priors,
but the priors restricted to the complement are mutually singular. We refer to Example
3.7 in Epstein and Ji (2013a) for a similar example.
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We fix linear price systems piP on MP. As illustrated in Example 3, it is
possible that the piP1 , piP2 ∈ {piP}P∈P have a common domain, i.e MP1∩MP2 6=
{0}. In this case one may observe different evaluations among different priors,
i.e piP1(X) 6= piP2(X) with X ∈ MP1 ∩ MP2 . To account for this possible
phenomenon, we associate a linear price system piP : MP → R for each
marketed space. In this context, we posit that coherence is based on sublinear
price systems,28 as illustrated in the following example (see also Heath and
Ku (2006) for a discussion).
Example 4 Let the uncertainty model consist of two priors P = {P,P′}. If
P is the true law, the market model is given by the set of marketed claims MP
priced by a linear functional piP. If P′ is the true law, we get MP′ and piP′.
As in Example 3.2, constructing a claim via self-financing strategies implies
an equality of portfolio holdings that must be satisfied almost surely only for
the particular probability measure. If the trader could choose between the sets
MP′+MP to create a portfolio, additivity would be a natural requirement with
the consistency condition piP′ = piP on MP′ ∩ MP. However, the trader is
neither free to choose a mixture of claims, nor may she choose a scenario,
simply because of existing ignorance.
An equality of prices at the intersection is less intuitive, since the different
priors create a different price structure in each scenario. We therefore argue,
that sup(piP′(X), piP(X)) is a robust and reasonable price for a claim X ∈
MP′ ∩MP in our multiple prior framework. This yields to subadditivity. In
contrast to the classical law of one price, linearity of the pricing functional
is merely true under a fixed prior.29
The set {piP}P∈P of linear scenario-based price functionals inherit all the
information of the underlying financial market. In the single prior setting
incompleteness means MP 6= L2(P).30 MP ⊗ MP′ refers to the Cartesian
product of the relevant basis elements in MP and MP′ .
Definition 1 Fix subspaces {MP}P∈P with MP ⊂ L2(P) and a set {piP}P∈P
of linear price functionals piP : MP → R. A price system for ({piP}P∈P,Γ) is
a functional on the Cartesian product of Γ-relevant scenarios
pi(⊗P) :
⊗
P∈Γ(P)
MP → R
28This price system can be seen as an envelope of the price correspondence pi(X) =
{piP (X) : X ∈MP,P ∈ P}, as in Clark (1993).
29Sublinearity induced by market frictions is conceptually different. For instance, in
Jouini and Kallal (1999) one convex set of marketed claims is equipped with a convex
pricing functional, in which case, the possibility of different scenarios is not included.
30Note that Ω is separable by assumption, hence L2(P) = L2(Ω,F ,P) is a separable
Hilbert space for each P ∈ P and admits a countable orthonormal basis. In terms of
Example 2, P0 is the Wiener measure. In this situation, L2(P0) can be decomposed via
the Wiener chaos expansion. A similar procedure could be done for the canonical process
Xα related to some Pα. So we can generate an orthonormal basis for each L2(Pα), with
α ∈ D. However, we take an infinite product, if |Γ(P)| 6<∞, since an infinite orthonormal
sum is not in general a Hilbert space.
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such that the projection to MP is given by the restriction pi(⊗P)MP = piPMP.
Each P-related marketed space MP consists of contingent claims which can be
achieved frictionless, when P is the true law. We have a set of different price
systems {piP :MP → R}P∈P . When we aim to establish a meaningful consol-
idation of the scenarios we need an additional ingredient, namely Γ. This
consolidation determines the operator which maps an extension of pi(⊗P)
into the price space L2(P)~++ and therefore influences the whole marketed
space.
3.2.3 Preferences and the Economy
Having discussed the commodity price dual and the role of the consolidation
of linear price systems, we introduce agents which are characterized by their
preference of trades on R × L2(P), P ∈ P . There is a single consumption
good, a numeraire, which agents will consume at t = 0, T . Thus, bundles
(x,X) are elements in R× L2(P), which are the units at time zero and time
T with uncertain outcome. We call the set of rational preference relations
%P on R × L2(P), A(P), which satisfies convexity, strict monotonicity, and
L2(P)-continuity. Let
B(x,X, piP,MP) = {(y, Y ) ∈ R×MP : y + piP(Y ) ≤ x+ piP (X)}
denote the budget set for a price functional piP : MP → R. We are ready
to define an appropriate notion of viability. Such a minimal consistency
criterion can be regarded as an inverse no trade equilibrium condition.
Definition 2 A price system is scenario-based viable, if for each P ∈ Γ(P)
there is a preference relation %P∈ A(P) and a bundle (xˆP, XˆP) ∈ B(0, 0, piP,MP)
such that
(xˆP, XˆP) is %P-maximal on B(0, 0, piP,MP).
The conditions are necessary and sufficient for a classical economic equilib-
rium under each scenario P ∈ Γ(P), when we find such preference relations.
Note that this definition has up to some degree the preference flavor of Bew-
ley (2002). In the case of Example 3.1, scenario-based viability is exactly the
existence of an agent with Bewley preferences and a maximal consumption
bundle (xˆ, Xˆ), not depending on the prior.31
In the following, we relate the viability of ({piP}P∈P ,Γ) with price systems in
L2(P)~+. Let MPP = MP ∩ L2(P), with P ∈ P .
31The fundamental theorem of asset pricing in Dybvig and Ross (2003) contains a third
equivalent statement, the existence of an agent (preferring more than less) being in an
optimal state. The adequate concept of strict monotone preferences is subtle and impor-
tant when the uncertainty is given by a set of mutually singular priors. For instance,
the classical strict monotonicity (X ≥ Y and X 6= Y implies X  Y ) seems to be too
strong. For instance, maxmin preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) do not satisfy
this monotonicity under the P.
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Theorem 1 A price system ({piP}P∈P ,Γ) is scenario-based viable if and only
if there is an Ψ ∈ L2(P)~++ such that piPMPP ≤ ΨMPP for each P ∈ Γ(P).
This characterization of scenario-based viability takes scenario-based mar-
keted spaces {MP}P∈P as given. Moreover, the consolidation operator Γ is
a given characteristic of the coherent price system. With this in mind, one
should think that in a general equilibrium system the locally given prices
{piP}P∈P should be part of it. The extension we perceive can be seen as a
regulated and coherent price system for every claim in L2(P).
In comparison to the single prior case, the structure of incompleteness de-
pends on the set of relevant priors Γ(P). As described in Example 3.2, this
is a natural situation. As such, prior-dependent prices piP are also plausible.
The expected payoff as a pricing principle depends on the prior under con-
sideration, as well. In this way, the concept of scenario-based prices accounts
for every Γ-relevant price system simultaneously.
As indicated in Example 3.1, there is a closed subspace of unambiguous
claims where the valuation is unique. In Section 3, we use the related sym-
metry property for the introduction of a reasonable martingale notion. Let
R ⊂ P and define the R-marketed space by
M(R) = {X ∈ L2(P) : EP[X] is constant for all P ∈ R} .
Only the continent claims in M(R) reduce the valuation to a linear pricing, if
Γ(P) = R.32 Claims in M(R) are unambiguous. This can also be formulated
as a property of events U(R) = {A ∈ F : P (A) is constant for all P ∈ R}.33
From Theorem 1 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Every Ψ in Theorem 1 is linear and c2,P-continuous on M(Γ(P)).
We have two operations which constitute the distillation of uncertainty. This
consolidation can be seen as a characterization of the Walrasian auctioneer,
in which case diversification should be encouraged. But this refers to the
sublinearity of Ψ.
Remark 2 One may ask which Γ is appropriate. Such a question is re-
lated to the concept of mechanism design. The market planner can choose a
consolidation that influences the indirect utility of a reported preference re-
lation. However, the full discussion of these issues lies beyond the scope of
this chapter.34
32Or unless Γ is given a priori by a linear pricing, e.g. Γ = δ{P} for some P ∈ P.
33Note, that for the single prior case every closed subspace of L2(P) can be identified
with a sub σ-algebra in terms of a projection via the conditional expectation operator.
Although U is not a σ-algebra, but a Dynkin System, it identifies in a similar way a certain
subspace. See also Epstein and Zhang (2001) for a definition of unambiguous events and
an axiomatization of preferences on this domain.
34A starting point could be Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2009), who consider a
mechanism design problem under Knightian uncertainty.
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3.3 Asset Markets and Symmetric Martingales
We extend the primitives with trading dates and trading strategies. A time
interval is considered where the market consists of a riskless security and
a security under volatility uncertainty. Within the financial market model,
we discuss the modified notions of arbitrage and equivalent martingale mea-
sures. Theorem 2 associates scenario-based viability with equivalent sym-
metric martingale measure sets. The last section considers the so called
G-framework. Here, the uncertain security process is driven by a G-Itoˆ pro-
cess, which shows that the concept of symmetric martingale measure sets is
far from empty.
Background: Risk-neutral asset pricing with one prior
In order to introduce dynamics and trading dates, we fix a time interval [0, T ]
and a filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] on (Ω,F ,P). Fix an F-adapted risky asset price
(St) ∈ L2(P⊗ dt) and a riskless bond S0 ≡ 1. We next review some terminology.
The portfolio process of a strategy η = (η0, η1) is called Xη. Simple self-financing
strategies are piecewise constant F-adapted processes η such that dXη = ηdS,
which we call A(P). A P-arbitrage in A(P) is a strategy (with zero initial capital)
such that XηT ≥ 0 and P
(
XηT > 0
)
> 0.
A claim is marketed, i.e. X ∈M , if there is a η ∈ A(P) such that X = ηTST P-a.s.,
then we have the (by the law of one price) pi(X) = η0S0. An equivalent martingale
measure (EMM) Q must satisfy that S is a Q-martingale and dQ = ψdP, where
ψ ∈ L2(P)++ is a Radon Nykodym-Density with respect to P. Theorem 2 of Har-
rison and Kreps (1979) states the following:
Under no P-arbitrage, there is a one to one correspondence between the continuous
linear and strictly positive extension of pi : M → R to L2(P) and a EMM Q. The
relation is given by Q(B) = Π(1B) and Π(X) = EQ[X], B ∈ FT and X ∈ L2(P).
This result can be seen as a preliminary version of the first fundamental theorem
of asset pricing.
3.3.1 Volatility Uncertainty, Dynamics and Arbitrage
We specify the mathematical framework and the modified notions, such as
arbitrage. The present uncertainty model (Ω,F ,P) is based on the explicit
formulation of volatility uncertainty. Afterwards, we introduce the notion of
a martingale with respect to a conditional sublinear expectation, the financial
market and the robust arbitrage concept.
Dynamics and Martingales under Sublinear Expectation
The principle idea is to transfer the results from Section 2 into a dynamic
setup. The specification in Example 1 of Section 2.1 serves as our uncer-
tainty model. We can directly observe the sense in which the quadratic vari-
ation creates volatility uncertainty. We introduce the sublinear expectation
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E : L2(P)→ R given by the supremum of expectations of P = {Pα : α ∈ D}.
It is possible to work within the larger space Lˆ2(P). An explicit represen-
tation of Lˆ2(P) is given in Appendix A.1. Moreover, we assume that P is
stable under pasting (see Appendix A.2. for details).
As we aim to equip the financial market with the dynamics of a sublinear
conditional expectation, we introduce the information structure of the finan-
cial market given by an augmented filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ]. The setting is
based on the dynamic sublinear expectation terminology as instantiated by
Nutz and Soner (2012).
We give a generalization of Peng’s G-expectation as an example, satisfying
the weak compactness of P when the sublinear expectation is represented in
terms of a supremum of linear expectations. In Section 3.3 and in Appendix
B.3, we consider the G-expectation as an important special case. That said,
a possible association of results in Section 2 depends heavily on the weak
compactness of the generated set of priors P .
Example 5 Suppose a trader is confronted with a pool of models describing
volatility, such as the stochastic volatility model in Heston (1993). After
a statistical analysis of the data, two models remain plausible Pα and Pαˆ.
Nevertheless, the implications for the trading decision deviate considerably.
Even the asset span on its own depends on each scenario (see Example 3).
A mixture of both models does not change this uncertain situation at all.
In order to address the possibilistic issue, let us define the universal extreme
cases σt = inf(αt, αˆt) and σt = sup(αt, αˆt). When thinking about a reasonable
uncertainty management, no scenario between σ and σ should be ignored.
The uncertainty model which accounts for all these cases is given by
P = {Pα : αt ∈ [σt, σt] P0 ⊗ dt a.e.}.
A related construction of a sublinear conditional expectation is achieved in
Nutz (2012), where the deterministic bounds of the G-expectation are replaced
by path dependent bounds.35
In the following, we introduce an appropriate concept for the dynamics of the
continuous-time multiple-prior uncertainty model. The associated objectives
are trading dates, the information structure and the price process (as the
carrier of the uncertainty). In order to introduce the price process S =
(St)t∈[0,T ] of an uncertain and long lived security, we have to impose further
primitives. Define the time depending set of priors
P(t,P)o = {P′ ∈ P : P = P′ on Fot }.
This set of priors consists of all extensions P : Fot → [0, 1] from Fot to F in P .
In other words, P(t,P)o contains exactly all probability measures in P defined
35This framework is also included in Epstein and Ji (2013a). In this setting, drift and
volatility uncertainty are considered simultaneously. Drift uncertainty or κ-ambiguity are
well known terms in financial economics. A coherent and well-developed theory, known as
g-expectation, is available under a Brownian filtration.
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on F that agree with P in the events up to time t. Fix a contingent claim
X ∈ L2(P). In Nutz and Soner (2012), the unique existence of a sublinear
expectation (EPt (X))t∈[0,T ] is provided by the following construction36
EPt (X)o = Pess sup
P′∈P(t,P)o
EP
′
[X|Ft] P-a.s. for all P ∈ P , lim
r↓t
Er(X)o = Et(X).
The conditional expectation operator satisfies the Law of Iterated Expec-
tation, i.e. EPs (EPt ) = EPs with s ≤ t. We can define a martingale simi-
larly to the single prior setting.37 The nonlinearity implies that if a process
X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is a martingale under EPt (·) then −X is not necessarily a
martingale.
Definition 3 An F-adapted process X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is a P-martingale if
EPs (Xt) = Xs P-q.s., for all s ≤ t.
We call X a symmetric P-martingale if X and −X are both P-martingales.
In the next subsection we discuss the martingale property of asset prices
processes under a modified sublinear expectation. As we will see, the space
M(P) is closely related to symmetric martingales. Conceptually, the sym-
metry refers to a generalized Put-Call parity and formalizes the uncertainty-
neutral valuation in terms of martingales.
The Primitives of the Financial Market and Arbitrage
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the riskless asset is S0t = 1, for
every t ∈ [0, T ], i.e. the interest rate is zero. We call the related abstract
financial marketM(1, S) on the filtered space uncertainty space (Ω,F ,P ;F),
whenever the price process of the uncertain asset S = (St)t∈[0,T ] satisfies
St ∈ L2(P) for every t ∈ [0, T ] and F-adaptedness.
A simple trading strategy38 is an F-adapted stochastic process (ηt)t∈[0,T ] in
L2(P) × L2(P) when there is a finite sequence of dates 0 < t0 ≤ · · · ≤
tN = T such that η = (η
0, η1) can be written with ηi ∈ L2(Ω,Fti ,P) as
ηt =
∑N−1
i=0 1[ti+1,ti)(t)η
i. The fraction invested in the riskless asset is denoted
by η0t , t ∈ [0, T ]. A trading strategy is self-financing if η0tn−1S0tn + η1tn−1Stn =
η0tnS
0
tn+η
1
tnStn P-q.s. and for every n ≤ N . The value of the portfolio satisfies
Xηt ∈ L2(P) for every t ∈ [0, T ].
The set of simple self-financing trading strategies is denoted by A. This
financial market M(1, S) with trading strategies in A is called M(1, S,A).
It is well known that a necessary condition for equilibrium is the absence of
36Pess sup denotes the essential supremum under P. Representations of such martingales
can be formulated via a 2BSDE. This concept is introduced in Cheridito, Soner, Touzi,
and Victoir (2007), see also Soner, Touzi, and Zhang (2012b).
37For the multiple prior case with mutually equivalent priors we refer to Riedel (2009).
38As mentioned in Harrison and Pliska (1981) simple strategies rule out the introduction
of doubling strategies and hence a notion of admissibility.
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arbitrage. Therefore, with regard to the equilibrium consistency condition of
the last section, we introduce arbitrage in the financial market of securities.
The modeled uncertainty of the financial market motivates us to consider a
stronger and robust notion of absence of arbitrage.
Definition 4 Let R ⊂ P. We say there is an R-arbitrage opportunity in
M(1, S,A) if there exists an admissible pair η ∈ A such that η0S0 ≤ 0,
ηTST ≥ 0 R-q.s., and Pˆ (ηTST > 0) > 0 for at least one Pˆ ∈ R.
The choice of the definition is based on the following observation. This
arbitrage strategy is riskless for each P ∈ R and if the prior Pˆ constitutes the
market one would gain a profit with a strictly positive probability. With this
in mind, the P-arbitrage notion can be seen as a weak arbitrage opportunity
with the corresponding cone L2(P)+ \ {0}. Alternatively, we could argue
that absence of R-arbitrage is consistent with a weak dominance principle
based on R.
To connect the prior-dependent marketed spaces of Definition 1, we say that
a claim X ∈ L2(P) is marketed in M(1, S,A) at time zero under P ∈ P if
there is an η ∈ A such that X = ηTST holds only P-almost surely. In this
case we say η hedges X and lies in MP. η0S0 = piP(X) is the price of X in
M(1, S,A) under P ∈ P .
With Example 3 and 4 in mind, fix the marketed spaces MP ⊂ L2(P), P ∈ P .
The price of a marketed claim under the prior P should be well defined. Let
η, η′ ∈ A(P) generating the same claim X ∈ MP, i.e. ηTST = η′TST P-a.s.
We have η0S0 = η
′
0S0 = piP(X) under absence of P-arbitrage. Note, that
this may not be true under no Pˆ-arbitrage, with P 6= Pˆ ∈ P . This is related
to the law of one price under a fixed prior. Now, similarly to the single
prior case, we define viability in a financial market. We say that a financial
market M(1, S,A) is viable if it is Γ(P)-arbitrage free and the associated
price system ({piP}P∈P ,Γ) is scenario-based viable.
3.3.2 Equivalent Symmetric Martingale Measure Sets
In Section 2 we introduced the price space of sublinear functionals generated
by a set of linear c2,P-continuous functionals. The extension of the price func-
tional is strongly related to the involved linear functionals which constitutes
the price systems locally. In this fashion, we introduce a modified notion of
fair pricing. In essence, we associate a risk-neutral prior to each local and
linear extension of a price system. Here, the term local refers to a fixed prior,
so that at this stage no volatility uncertainty is present.
In our uncertainty model, the price of a claim equals the (discounted) value
under a specific sublinear expectation. Exploration of available information,
when multiple priors are present, changes the view of a rational expectation.
In economic terms, the notion of symmetric martingales eliminates prefer-
ences for ambiguity in the valuation. This is the base to introduce the fol-
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lowing rational pricing principle in terms of sublinear expectations with a
symmetry condition.
Definition 5 A set of probability measures Q on (Ω,F) is called equivalent
symmetric martingale measure set (EsMM-set) if the given conditions hold:
1. For every Q ∈ Q there is a P ∈ k(P) such that P and Q are equivalent
to each other, so that dQ
dP ∈ L2(P).
2. The uncertain asset (St) is a symmetric EQ-martingale, where EQ is
the conditional sublinear expectation under Q.
The first condition formulates a direct relationship between an element Q in
the EsMM-set Q and the primitive priors P ∈ P . The square integrability
is a technical condition that guarantees the association to the equilibrium
theory of Section 2. The second is the accurately adjusted martingale con-
dition. The idea of a fair gamble should reflect the neutrality of preferences
for risk and ambiguity. Under the new sublinear expectation, the asset price
and hence the portfolio process, are symmetric martingales. This implies, as
discussed in the introduction, that the value of the claim does not depend on
the prior. The valuation is mean unambiguous, i.e. preferences for ambiguity
under Q are neutral. One can think of the ambiguity neutral part in the val-
uation in terms of maxmin preferences from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).39
In this situation, the expected utility is under every prior Q ∈ Q the same.
Similarly to pricing under risk, where risk preferences do not matter, analo-
gous reasoning should be true concerning preferences for ambiguity. As such,
saying everyone is uncertainty neutral immediately leads one to come up with
the uncertainty neutral expectation EQ.
The case of only one prior is related to the well-known risk-neutral valuation
principle. Under volatility uncertainty, this principle needs a new require-
ment due to the more complex uncertainty model. In this sense the symmetry
condition encodes ambiguity neutrality as part of uncertainty neutrality.
Remark 3 1. In the light of Remark 1, let us mention that Definition 3 and
5 can be generalized to the notion nonlinear conditional expectations (Et)
satisfying the Law of Iterated Expectation, see Section 9 in Chapter III of
Peng (2010). The definition of a E-martingale is straightforward.
Concerning the definition of an EsMM-set, the object Q would refer to the set
of priors representing E. In Remark 1, a possible construction is illustrated.
A further weakening of the symmetric martingale property is possible. Instead
of that we could merely require the E-martingale property of (St).
2. Note that in the case of a single prior framework, i.e. P = {P}, the notion
of EsMM-sets is reduced to accommodate EMM’s. In this regard we can think
39However, the same argument is applicable to the α-MEU preferences of Ghirardato,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004), the smooth ambiguity preferences of Klibanoff, Mari-
nacci, and Mukerji (2005) and variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rus-
tichini (2006).
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of canonical generalization. On the other hand, classical EMM’s and a linear
price theory are still present. Every single-valued EsMM-set {Q} can be seen
as an EMM under P ∈ P. Here, the consolidation is given by Γ = δP and we
have Γ(P) = {P}. In this situation, Γ reveals the ignorance of every other
possible prior P′ ∈ P.
The following result justifies the discussion involving uncertainty neutrality
and the symmetry condition for martingales. The one to one mapping of
Theorem 2 and the choice of the price space fall into place. In this manner
we show that the existence of an R-arbitrage in M(1, S,A) with Γ(P) = R
is inconsistent with an economic equilibrium for agents in A(P), with P ∈ R.
We fix an associated price system using the procedure described at the end
of Subsection 3.1.
Theorem 2 Suppose the financial market model M(1, S,A) does not allow
any P-arbitrage opportunity. Then there is a bijection between coherent price
systems Ψ : L2(P)→ R in L2(P)~++ of Theorem 1 and EsMM-sets, satisfying
stability under pasting of the induced set Γ(P).40 The relationship is given
by Ψ(X) = EQ(X), where
Q = {Q ∈M1(Ω) : dQdP = ψP,P ∈ Γ(P), ψP ∈ L2(P)++}
is the associated EsMM-set.
Let R ⊂ P and M(R) be the set of all EsMM-sets Q such that the related
consolidation Γ satisfies Γ(P) = R. Theorem 2 can be seen as the formulation
of a one-to-one mapping between a subset of
L2(P)~++ and
⋃
R⊂k(P)
M(R).
There is a hierarchy of sublinear expectations, related to the chosen consol-
idation operator Γ and the EsMM-sets, which are ordered by the inclusion
relation. We illustrate the relationship between Γ and an EsMM-set in the
following example.
Example 6 For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that P = {P1,P2,P3,P4},
so that any pasting property is ignored. Starting with the sublinear price sys-
tem, we have four price functionals pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4 and the consolidation op-
erator Γ. Let us assume that Γ = (+,∧) and λ ∈ (0, 1). This gives us
λpi1 +(1−λ)pi2 = piλ and Γ(pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4) = piλ∧pi3. The resulting EsMM-set
is given by Q = {ψλ×Pλ, ψ3×P3} ∈M(P\{P4}), where Pλ = λP1+(1−λ)P2,
ψλ = λψ1 + (1− λ)ψ2 and EPλ [ψλ] = 1 = EP3 [ψ3].
We close this consideration with some results analogous to those of the single
prior setting where we combine Theorem 2 and Theorem 1.
40See Definition 6 in Appendix A for this important concept. In essence, this condition
is needed to define a conditional sublinear expectation based on Q, satisfying the iterated
law of conditional expectation.
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Corollary 2 Let R = Γ(P) ⊂ P be stable under pasting and given.
1. M(1, S,A) is viable if and only if there is an EsMM-set.
2. Market completeness, i.e MP = L
2(P) for each P ∈ R, is equivalent to
the existence of exactly one EsMM-set in M(R).
3. If M(R) is nonempty, then there exists no R-arbitrage.
4. If there is a strategy η ∈ A with η0S0 ≤ 0, ηTST ≥ 0 R-q.s. and
EQ(ηTST ) > 0, for some Q ∈ M(R), then there is an R-arbitrage
opportunity.
The result does not depend on the preference of the agent. The expected re-
turn under the sublinear expectation EQ equals the riskless asset. Hence, the
value of a claim can be considered as the expected value in the uncertainty-
neutral world.41
3.3.3 A Special Case: G-Expectation
Now, we select a stronger calculus to model the asset prices as a stochastic
differential equation driven by a G-Brownian motion.42 In this situation the
volatility of the process concentrates the uncertainty in terms of the deriva-
tive of the quadratic variation. The quadratic variation of a G-Brownian
motion creates volatility uncertainty. Again, we review the related result of
the single prior framework.
Background: Itoˆ processes in the single prior framework
We specify the asset price in terms of an Itoˆ process dSt = µ(t, St)dt+σ(t, St)dBt,
S0 = 1, driven by a Brownian motion B = (Bt)t∈[0,T ] on the given filtered probabil-
ity space, µ(·, x), σ(·, x), with x ∈ R+ are adapted processes such that (St) is a well
defined process taking values in R+. The filtration is generated by B. The inter-
est rate is r = 0. Let Eθ be the exponential martingale, given by dEθt = E
θ
t θtdBt,
Eθ0 = 1, with a consistent kernel θ we can apply Girsanov theorem. The following
result is from Harrison and Kreps (1979):
The set of equivalent martingale measures is not empty if and only if ρ = EθT ∈
L2(P), θ ∈ L2(P⊗ dt) and S∗ = ∫ σdB is a P-martingale.
ρ can be interpreted as a state price density. The associated market price of risk
θt =
µt−r
σt
is the Girsanov or pricing kernel of the state price density.
41However, the sublinear expectation depends on Γ.
42An illustration of the concept in a discrete time framework is achievable, via the
application of the results in Cohen, Ji, and Peng (2011).
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Security prices as G-Itoˆ processes and sublinear valuation
An important special case is an uncertainty model given by theG-expectation
EG : L
2
G(Ω) → R,43 where L2G(Ω) = Lˆ2(P) is described at the beginning of
Appendix A.1. More precisely, the uncertainty model is induced by the
following sublinear expectation space (C([0, T ];R), L2G(Ω), EG) as given.
We select the next rational base, namely an interval [σ, σ] ⊂ R++, instead of a
constant volatility σ. As indicated in the introduction, volatility uncertainty
refers to the awareness that every adapted process (σt) taking values in [σ, σ]
may constitute one possible prior or scenario. We introduce an asset price
process driven by a G-Brownian motion (BGt )t∈[0,T ]. In Appendix B.3 we
present a small primer of the applied results.
Under the objective description of the real world, given by P and induced
by [σ, σ], the asset price is driven by the following G-stochastic differential
equation
dSt = µ(t, St)d〈BG〉t + V (t, St)dBGt , t ∈ [0, T ], S0 = 1.
Let µ : [0, T ] × Ω × R → R and V : [0, T ] × Ω × R → R+ be processes such
that a unique solution exists.44 Moreover, let V (·, x) be a strictly positive
process for each x ∈ R+. The riskless asset has interest rate zero.
The Girsanov theorem for G-Brownian motion is precisely what is needed
to verify the symmetric EQ-martingales property of the price processes S
under some sublinear expectation given by an EsMM-set Q. The present
uncertainty model enables us to apply the necessary stochastic calculus. As
such, we model the financial market in the G-expectation setting, intro-
duced in Peng (2006) and Peng (2010). Central results, such as a martin-
gale representation and a well behaved underlying topology are desired for
the foundational grounding of asset pricing. The second condition of Def-
inition 5 highlights how a Girsanov transformation adapts to a symmetric
EQ-martingale and thus guarantees the existence of nontrivial EsMM-sets.45
For this purpose we define the related sublinear expectation generated by an
EsMM-set, Q = {Q : dQ = ψdP, P ∈ P}:
sup
Q∈Q
EQ[X] = EQ(X) = EG[ψX], X ∈ L2G(Ω).
Note that we consider an aggregated family of state price densities ψ ∈ L2G(Ω)
which is defined P-q.s. This means that the density is now a uniform object
under our uncertainty model, i.e. ψ = ψP P-a.s. for all P ∈ P (see also
Remark 4 below). Theorem 3 justifies the choice of this shifted sublinear
expectation when the asset price is restrained to a symmetric martingale for
an uncertainty-neutral expectation.
43It is shown in Theorem 52 by Denis, Hu, and Peng (2011), that this sublinear expec-
tation can be represented by a weakly compact set, when the domain is in L2G(Ω).
44We refer to Chapter 5 in Peng (2010) for existence results of G-SDE’s.
45Trivial EsMM-sets consist of mutually equivalent priors, associated to a single P ∈ P.
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Let us introduce the universal state price density Eθ, with ψ = EθT P-q.s.,
being a symmetric martingale of exponential type under the G-expectation,
with an integrable pricing kernel (θt)t∈[0,T ] (or market price of uncertainty)
dEθt = E
θ
tθ(t, St)dB
G
t , E
θ
0 = 1.
Applying the results in Appendix B.3 allows us to write Eθ explicitly as
Eθt = exp
(
− 1
2
∫ t
0
θ(r, Sr)
2d〈BG〉r −
∫ t
0
θ(r, Sr)dB
G
r
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Let the pricing kernel solve V (t, St)θ(t, St) = µ(t, St) P-quasi surely, for
every t ∈ [0, T ]. Before we formulate the last result we define S∗t = S∗0 +∫ t
0
V (r, S∗r )dB
G
r , t ∈ [0, T ] and assume that a unique solution on (Ω, L2G(Ω), EG)
exists for some state-dependent process V , see Peng (2010).
Theorem 3 The set of EsMM-sets contains a Q ∈M(P) if and only if S∗
is an EG-martingale and
EG
[
exp
(
δ ·
∫ T
0
θ(r, Sr)
2d〈BG〉r
) ]
<∞, for some δ > 1
2
.
With Theorem 2 in mind we can associate the concept of scenario-based
viability. Let X ∈ L2G(Ω) be a contingent claim such that it is priced by
P-arbitrage then the fair value is given by Ψ(X) = EG[EθTX], whenever Γ
consists only of a consolidation via the maximum operation.
Moreover, one can define a new Gˆ-expectation related to a volatility uncer-
tainty of a closed subinterval [σˆ1, σˆ2] ⊂ [σ, σ]. We can identify a consolidation
operator by ΓGˆ(P) = {Pα : α ∈ [σˆ1, σˆ2]}. In this case Theorem 3 can be re-
formulated in terms of the existence of an EsMM-set QGˆ ∈M (ΓGˆ(P)).
Remark 4 The more precise calculus of the G-expectation is based on an
analytic description of nonlinear partial differential equations. This allows
us to create a uniform state price density process in terms of an exponential
martingale, based on a G-martingale representation theorem (see Appendix
B 3). With this in mind, a more elaborated notion of EsMM-sets can be
formulated by requiring that the family of densities {ψP}P∈P create a uniform
process as a symmetric martingale under the sublinear expectation EP = EG.
Remark 5 Under the assumption of G-Brownian motion, Epstein and Ji
(2013a) obtain an analogous state price density process. Without applying
a Girsanov-type theorem, they use a density process in the important case
µ(t, St) = µtSt and V (t, St) = VtSt. In comparison to our flexible local
functional form, their asset price is apparently governed by dSt = St(btdt +
VtdB
G
t ).
46 In this case, the relationship between the asset price processes,
with the special pricing kernel
(
µt
Vt
)
= (θt) ∈M2G(0, T ), is given by∫ t
0
µsd〈BG〉s =
∫ t
0
µsaˆsds =
∫ t
0
bsds, where aˆs =
d
ds
〈BG〉s.
46This allows us to model local volatility structures and volatility uncertainty at the
same time.
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Extensions to continuous trading strategies seem to be next natural step.
Nevertheless, an admissibility condition should be requested, in order to ex-
clude doubling strategies. Considering markets with more than one uncertain
security requires a multidimensional Girsanov theorem.47 We close this sec-
tion with an example of the connection between super-replication of claims
and EsMM-sets.
Example 7 Under one prior P = {P}, Delbaen (1992) obtained the super-
replication price in terms of martingale measures in M({P}):
ΛP(X) = inf{y ≥ 0|∃ θ ∈ A(P) : y + θTST ≥ X P-a.s.} = sup
Q∈M({P})
EQ[X]
When the uncertainty is given by a set of mutually singular priors, a super-
replication price can be derived, see Denis and Martini (2006), in terms of
a set of martingale laws M such that ΛP(X) = supQ∈MEQ[X]. In the G-
framework with simple trading strategies, this set M is an EsMM-set. When
applying our theory to this problem, we get
ΛP(X) = inf{y ≥ 0|∃ θ ∈ A : y + θTST ≥ X P-q.s.}
= sup
P∈P
sup
Q∈M({P})
EQ[X]
= EG[ETX],
upon applying our Theorem 3 as well as Theorem 3.6 form Vorbrink (2010).
This is associated to the maximal EsMM-set in M(P). However, with Propo-
sition 1 every EsMM-set delivers a price below this super-hedging price.
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
We present a framework and a theory of derivative security pricing where the
uncertainty model is given by a set of mutually singular probability measures
which incorporates volatility uncertainty. The notion of equivalent martin-
gale measures changes, and the related linear expectation principle becomes
a nolinear theory of valuation. The associated arbitrage principle should
consider all remaining uncertainty in the consolidation.
The results of this chapter establishes preliminary version of the fundamen-
tal theorem of asset pricing (FTAP) under mutually singular uncertainty. In
Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994) and Delbaen and Schachermayer (1998),
a definitive FTAP is achieved for the single prior uncertainty model in great
generality. The notion of arbitrage is in principle a separation property of
convex sets in a topological space. In this regard, the choice of the underlying
topological structure is essential for observing a FTAP. For instance, Leven-
tal and Skorohod (1995), establish a FTAP with an approximate arbitrage
based on a different notion of convergence.
47See Osuka (2011).
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In our setting, two aspects must be kept in mind for deriving a FTAP with
mutually singular uncertainty. Firstly, the spaces of claims and portfolio
processes are based on a capacity norm, and thus forces one to argue for the
quasi sure analysis, a fact implied in our definition of arbitrage (see Defini-
tion 4). A corresponding notion of free lunch with vanishing uncertainty will
have to incorporate this more sensitive notion of random variables.
Secondly, the sublinear structure of the price system allows for a nonlinear
separation of convex sets. With one prior, the equivalent martingale measure
separates achievable claims with arbitrage strategies. In our small meshed
structure of random variables this separation is guided by the consolidation
operator Γ. The preference-free pricing principle gives us a valuation via
expected payoffs of different adjusted priors. In comparison to the prefer-
ence and distribution free results in a perfectly competitive market, see Ross
(1976), the implicit assumption is the common knowledge of uncertainty, de-
scribed by a single probability measure. The design of uncertainty prescribes
the consequences for pricing without a consumption-based utility gradient
approach.
The valuation of claims, determined by P-arbitrage, contains a new object
Γ, which may inspire skepticism. However, note that the consolidation oper-
ator Γ could be seen as a tool to regulate financial markets. The valuation
of claims in the balance sheet of a bank should depend on Γ. For instance,
this may affect fluctuations of opinion in the market as a consequence of
uncertainty. In Remark 2 of Section 2 we describe how a good consolidation
may be found via consideration of mechanism design. Such considerations
may provide a base for the choice of the valuation principle under multiple
priors.48
Nonlinear Expectations and Market Efficiency
In Remark 1 of Section 2 and Remark 3.1 of Section 3 we indicate how a
fully nonlinear price system can be accomplished. In fact this is an approach
hinting at a positive theory of nonlinear expectations, where the observable
aggregated market sentiment could be captured by the partition of optimists
and pessimists.
Such an attempt is a possible starting point to measure the degree of market
efficiency. In fact, if markets are efficient in the weak form, deflated asset
prices would by symmetric martingales and reveal all information. An ap-
proximately efficient market could be detected by observing the martingale
property under a nonlinear conditional expectation. In this case the mar-
ket prices can be regarded as the best linear approximation of the nonlinear
market expectation of the economy.
Preferences and Asset pricing
The uncertainty model in this chapter is closely related to Epstein and Wang
48As a first heuristic, it is possible that utilitarian (convex combination) and Rawlsian
(supremum operation) welfare functions may constitute a principle of fair pricing. Here,
the prior is chosen behind the “veil of ignorance”. See also Section 4 of Wilson (1996).
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(1994) and especially to Epstein and Ji (2013a) as they consider equilibria
with linear prices in their economy. This leads to an indeterminacy in terms
of a continuum of linear price systems. The relationship between uncertainty
and indeterminacy is caused by the constraint to pick one effective prior. The
Lucas critique49 applies insofar as it describes the unsuitable usage of a pes-
simistic investor to fix an effective prior in reduced form.
Our valuation principle is based on a preference-free approach. We value
contingent claims in terms of mean unambiguous asset price processes. In
other words, the priors of the uncertainty neutral model yield expectations
of the security price that do not merely depend on the chosen “risk-neutral”
prior. Nevertheless, the idea of a risk-neutral valuation principle is not ap-
propriate, as different mutually singular priors deliver different expectations,
that cannot be related via a single density.
From this point of view, we disarrange the indeterminacy of linear prices, and
allow for the appearance of a planner to configure the sublinearity. In this
sense, the regulator as a policy maker is now able to confront unmeasurable
sudden fluctuations in volatility. A single prior, as a part of the equilibrium
output, can create an invisible threat of convention, which may be used to
create the illusion of security when faced with an uncertain future. In a
model with mutually singular priors, the focus on a single prior creates a
hazard. Events with a positive probability under an ignored prior may be a
null set under an effective prior in a consumption-based approach.
Sublinear prices and regulation via consolidation
In this context, sublinearity is associated with the principle of diversification.
In these terms, an equilibrium with a sublinear price system covers the con-
cept of Walrasian prices which decentralize with the coincidental awareness
of different scenarios. A priori, the instructed Walrasian auctioneer has no
knowledge of which prior P in P occurs. The degree of discrimination is
related to the intensity of nonlinearity. Note that this is a normative cat-
egory and opens the door to the economic basis of regulation. Each prior
is a probabilistic scenario. The auctioneer consolidates the price for each
possible scenario into one certain and robust valuation. This is also true
for an agent in the model, hence the auctioneer should be able to discrimi-
nate under-diversification in terms of ignorance of priors in this uncertainty
model. Further, a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility assumption results in
an overconfidence of certainty in the associated agent.
Since we want to generalize fundamental theorems of asset pricing, we are
concerned with the relationship between equivalent martingale measures, vi-
able price systems and arbitrage. In this setting, these concepts must be
recast because of the multiple prior uncertainty. In contrast, with one prior
an equivalent martingale measure is associated with a linear price system.
The underlying neoclassical equilibrium concept is a fully positive theory.
In the multiple prior setting such a price extension can be regarded as a
49See Section 3.2 in Epstein and Schneider (2010).
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diversification-neutral valuation principle. Here, diversification is focused on
a given set of priors P . Should the unlucky situation arise that an uncon-
sidered prior governs the market, it is the task of the regulator to robustify
these possibilities via an appropriate price system. For instance, uniting two
valuations of contingent claims cannot be worse than adding the uncertain
outcomes separately. This is the diversification principle under P .
Recalling the quotation of Aliprantis, Tourky, and Yannelis (2001) in the
introduction, the degree of sublinearity in our approximation is regulated by
the type of consolidation of scenario-dependent linear price systems.
3.5 Appendix A: Details and Proofs
3.5.1 Section 2
Let L0(Ω) denote the space of all measurable real-valued functions on Ω.
Lˆ2(P) = L2(P)/N be the quotient of L2(P), the closure of Cb(Ω) by c2,P
in L0(Ω). N denotes the ideal of c2,P in L0(Ω) null elements. Such null
elements are characterized by random variables which are P-polar. P-polar
sets evaluated under every prior are zero or one, although, the value may
differ between different priors. A property holds quasi-surely (q.s.) if it
holds outside a polar set. Furthermore, the space Lˆ2(P) is characterized by
Lˆ2(P) =
{
X ∈ L0(Ω) : X has a q.c. version, lim
n→∞
EP(|X|21{|X|>n}) = 0
}
,
A mapping X : Ω → R is said to be quasi-continuous if ∀ε > 0 there exists
an open set O with supP∈P P (O) < ε such that X|Oc is continuous. We
say that X : Ω → R has a quasi-continuous version (q.c.) if there exists a
quasi–continuous function Y : Ω → R with X = Y q.s. The mathematical
framework provided enables the analysis of stochastic processes for several
mutually singular probability measures simultaneously. All equations are
understood in the quasi-sure sense. This means that a property holds almost-
surely for all scenarios P ∈ P . Since, for all X, Y ∈ L2(P) with |X| ≤ |Y |
imply c2,P(X) ≤ c2,P(Y ), we have that L2(P) is a Banach lattice.50
In the following we discuss the different operations for consolidation. Let
ΠP = E
P[ψP·] ∈ L2(P)∗, with P ∈ P . Let µ be a measure on the Borel
measurable space (P ,B(P)) with µ(P) = 1 and full support on P . In this
context we can consider the additive case in L2(P)~+, where a new prior is
generated:51
Γµ :
⊗
P∈P
L2(P)∗ → L2(P)~+, Γµ({ΠP}P∈P) =
∫
P
ψP · µ(dP) = EPµ [ψPµ·],
50This is of interest for existence results from general equilibrium theory.
51The related operation of convex functionals would corresponds to the convolution
operation. Without convexity of P, the prior Pµ may only lie in the convex hull of k(P).
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where ψPµ is constructed as in Example 2. We can consider the Dirac measure
δP as an example for µ. The related consideration of only one special prior
in P is in essence the uncertainty model in Harrison and Kreps (1979). The
operation in question is given by (ΠP)P∈P 7→ EP[ψP·]. The second operation
in L2(P)~+ is a point-wise maximum:
Γsup :
⊗
P∈P
L2(P)∗ → L2(P)~+, Γsup({ΠP}P∈P) = sup
P∈P
EP[ψP·].
This is an extreme form of consolidation and can be considered as the highest
awareness of all priors. Note that combinations between the maximum and an
addition operation are possible as indicated in Example 2 and Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1 Since L2(P) is a Banach lattice, the 5th claim
follows from Theorem 1 in Biagini and Frittelli (2010), whereas the other
claims follow directly from the construction of the functionals in L2(P)~+. 
For the proof of Theorem 1, we define the shifted preference relationship %0P
such that every feasible net trade is worse off than (0, 0) ∈ B(0, 0, piP,MP).
Obviously, an agent given by %0P does not trade. Hence, an initial endowment
constitutes a no trade equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1 Let the price system ({piP}P∈P ,Γ) be given and we
have a Ψ ∈ L2(P)~+ on L2(P) such that piPMPP ≤ ΨMPP for each P ∈ Γ(P),
where MPP = MP ∩ L2(P). The preference relation on R× L2(P ), given by
(x,X) <0P (x′, X ′) if x+−ΠP(−X) ≥ x′ +−ΠP(−X ′),
is in A(P). For each P ∈ Γ(P), the bundle (xˆP, XˆP) = (0, 0) satisfies the
viability condition of Definition 2, hence {piP}P∈Γ(P) is scenario-based viable.
In the other direction, let pi(⊗P) : ⊗MP → R be a price system. The pref-
erence relation <0P∈ A(P) satisfies for each (xˆP, XˆP), P ∈ Γ(P), the viability
condition. We may assume for each P, (xˆP, XˆP) = (0, 0), since it is only a
geometric deferment. Consider the following sets
0P =
⊗
P∈Γ(P)
{(x,X) ∈ R× L2(P) : (x,X) P (0, 0)},
B(⊗P) =
⊗
P∈Γ(P)
B(0, 0, piP,MP).
We have that B(⊗P) and 0P are convex sets. The Riesz space product
⊗L2(P) = ⊗P∈Γ(P)L2(P) (see paragraph 352 K in Fremlin (2000)), is under
the norm c2,P again a Banach lattice (see paragraph 354 X (b) in Fremlin
(2000)). By the L2(P)-continuity of each %0P, the set 0P is c2,P-open in
⊗L2(P).
According to the separation theorem for a topological vector space, for each
P ∈ Γ(P) there is a non zero linear and c2,P-continuous functional φP on
⊗P∈Γ(P)(R× L2(P)) with
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1. φP(x,X) ≥ 0 for all (x,X) ∈0P
2. φ(x,X) ≤ 0 for all (x,X) ∈ B(⊗P)
3. {(yP, YP)}P∈Γ(P) = (y, Y ) with prR×L2(P)(φP)(y, Y ) =: φP(yP, YP) < 0,
since φP is non-trivial. Note that condition 3. depends on the chosen P.
Strict monotonicity of %0P implies (1, 0) 0P (0, 0). The L2(P)-continuity of
each <0P gives us (1 + εy, εY ) 0P (0, 0), for some ε > 0, hence
φP(1 + εyP, εYP) = −φP(1, 0) + εφP(yP, YP) ≤ 0
and φP(1, 0) ≥ −εφP(yP, YP) > 0.
We have φP(1, 0) > 0 and after a renormalization let φP(1, 0) = 1. More-
over, we can write φP(xP, XP) = xP + ΠP(XP), where ΠP : L
2(P)→ R can be
identified as an element in the topological dual L2(P)∗.
We show strict positivity of ΠP on L
2(P). Let X ∈ L2(P)+ \ {0} we have
(0, X) 0P (0, 0), hence (−ε,X) 0P (0, 0), and therefore ΠP (X)− ε ≥ 0.
Moreover we have L2(P)-positivity of ΠPL2(P) on L2(P), i.e. X ≥ 0 P-q.s.
implies ΠPL2(P) ≥ 0. Since L2(P) is a Banach lattice, ΠP ∈ L2(P)∗ follows.
Let X ∈ MPP , since (−piP(X), X), (piP(X),−X) ∈ B(0, 0, piP,MPP ) we have
0 = φ(piP(X), X) = piP (X)− ΠP (X) and ΠPMPP = piP follows.
Γ({ΠP}P∈Γ(P)) = Ψ is by construction in L2(P)~+. The strict positivity of Ψ
follows from the strict positivity of each ΠP. ΨMPP ≥ piP follows from an
inequality in the last part of Proposition 1 and ΠPMP = piP. 
We illustrate the construction in the following diagram:
{piP : MP → R}P∈P  // pi(⊗P) :
⊗
P∈Γ(P) MP → R_
Hahn Banach
{
ΠP : L
2(P)→ R}P∈Γ(P)  Γ // Ψ :L2(P)→ R
Proof of Corollary 1 By construction every functional Ψ can be repre-
sented as the supremum of priors, which are given by convex combinations.
Since X ∈ M(Γ(P)), the supremum operation has no effect on X and the
assertion follows. 
3.5.2 Section 3
Next, we discuss the augmentation of our information structure. The unaug-
mented filtration is given by Fo. As mentioned in Subsection 3.1, the set of
priors have to be stable under pasting in order to apply the framework of
Nutz and Soner (2012). For the sake of completeness, we recall this notion.
Definition 6 The set of priors is stable under pasting if for every P ∈ P,
every Fo-stopping time τ , B ∈ Foτ and P1,P2 ∈ P(Foτ ,P), We have Pτ ∈ P,
where
Pτ (A) = EP
[
P1(A|Foτ )1B + P2(A|Foτ )1Bc
]
, A ∈ Foτ .
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In the multiple prior setting, with a given reference measure this property
is equivalent to the well-known notion of time consistency. However, this is
not true if there is no dominant prior.52
The usual condition of a “rich” σ-algebra at time 0 is widely used in mathe-
matical finance. But the economic meaning is questionable. Our uncertainty
model of mutually singular priors can be augmented, similarly to the classical
case, using the right continuous filtration given by F+ = {F+t }t∈[0,T ] where
F+t =
⋂
s>t
Fot , for t ∈ [0, T ).
The second step is to augment the minimal right continuous filtration F+ by
all polar sets of (P ,FoT ), i.e. Ft = F+t ∨ N (P ,FoT ). This augmentation is
strictly smaller than the universal augmentation
⋂
P∈P Fo
P
. This choice is
economically reasonable since the initial σ-field does not contain all 0-1 limit
events. An agent considers this exogenously specified information structure.
It describes what information the agent can know at each date. This is the
analogue to a filtration in the single prior framework satisfying the usual
conditions. For the proof below, we need results from Appendix B.1.
Proof of Theorem 2 We fix an EsMM-set Q. The related consolidation Γ
gives us the set of relevant priors Γ(P) ⊂ P. Let ψP = dQdP , for each Q ∈ Q
and the related P ∈ P. We have ψP ∈ L2(P). Let the associated strictly
positive Ψ ∈ L2(P)~++ be given.
Take a marketed claim Xm ∈ MPP with P ∈ Γ(P) and let η ∈ A be a self-
financing trading strategy that hedges Xm. Since η ∈ A, by the decomposition
rule for conditional EQ-expectation, see for instance Theorem 2.6 (iv) in Ep-
stein and Ji (2013b), and since S is a symmetric EQ-martingale, the following
equalities
EQt (ηuSu) = η+t EQt (Su) + η−t EQt (−Su) = η+t St − η−t St = ηtSt,
hold, where η = η+ − η− with η+, η− ≥ 0 P-quasi surely and 0 ≤ t ≤ u ≤ T .
Therefore we achieve
Ψ(Xm) = EQ0 (ηTST ) = η0S0 ≥ piP(Xm), P ∈ Γ(P).
For the other direction, let Ψ ∈ L2(P)~++ with ΨMP ≥ piP, related to a set
of linear functionals {piP}P∈P and {ΠP}P∈P , such that ΠMP = piP. This can
be inferred from Ψ and the construction in the proof of the second part of
Theorem 1. Now, we define Q in terms of Γ.
We illustrate the possible cases which can appear. For simplicity we assume
P = {P1,P2,P3}. Let Pk,j = 12Pk + 12Pj and ψk,j = 12ψk + 12ψj, recall that we
can represent each functional ΠP(·) by EP[ψP·]. We have
1
2
(Π1 + Π2) ∧ Π3 becomes
{
ψ1,2 × P1,2, ψ3 × P3
}
= Q.
52 Additionally, the set of priors must be chosen maximally. For further consideration,
we refer the reader to Section 3 in Nutz and Soner (2012).
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Consequently, Q = {Q : dQ = ψPdP, P ∈ Γ(P) ⊂ k(P), ψP ∈ L2(P)}, where
ψP, with P /∈ P, is constructed by the procedure of Example 2. The first
condition of Definition 5 follows, since the square integrability of each ψP
follows from the c2,P-continuity of linear functionals which generate Ψ.
We prove the symmetric Q-martingale property of the asset price process.
Let B ∈ Ft, η ∈ A be a self-financing trading strategy and
η1s =
1 s ∈ [t, u) and ω ∈ B
0 else ,
η0s =

St, s ∈ [t, u) and ω ∈ B
Su − St, s ∈ [u, T ) and ω ∈ B
0 else.
This strategy yields a portfolio value
ηTST = (Su − St) · 1B,
the claim ηTST is marketed at price zero. In terms of the modified conditional
sublinear expectation (EQt )t∈[0,T ], we have with t ≤ u
EQt ((St − Su)1B) = 0.
By Theorem 4.7 Xu and Zhang (2010), it follows that St = EQt (Su).53 But
this means that (St)t∈[0,T ] is an EQ-martingale. The same argumentation
holds for −S, hence the asset price S is a symmetric EQ-martingale. 
Proof of Corollary 2 1. Suppose there is a Q ∈ M(P) and let η ∈ A
such that ηTST ≥ 0 P-q.s. and P′(ηTST > 0) > 0 for some P′ ∈ P.
Since for all Q ∈ Q there is a P ∈ k(P) such that Q ∼ P, there is a
Q′ ∈ Q with Q′(ηTST > 0) > 0. Hence, EQ(ηTST ) > 0 and by Theorem
2 we observe EQ(ηTST ) = η0S0. This implies that no P-arbitrage exists.
2. In terms of Theorem 1, each P ∈ R admits exactly one extension. With
Theorem 2 the result follows.
3. By Theorem 2, there is a related Ψ in L2(P)~+, wit Γ(P) = R. Fix a
costless strategy η ∈ A such that η0S0 = 0 hence Ψ(ηTST ) = 0. The
viability of Ψ implies ηTST = 0 R-q.s. Hence, no R-arbitrage exists.
4. This then follows by the same argument as in Harrison and Pliska
(1981) (see the Lemma on p.228), since EQ is strictly positive, by The-
orem 2. 
For the proof of Theorem 3, we apply results from stochastic analysis in
the G-framework. The results are collected in Appendix B.3.
53The result is proven for the G-framework. However the assertion in our setting holds
true as well by an application of the martingale representation in Proposition 4.10 by Nutz
and Soner (2012).
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Proof of Theorem 3 Let Q = {Q : dQ = ρdP,P ∈ P} be an EsMM-set,
where the density ρ satisfies ρ ∈ L2G(Ω) and EG[ρ] = −EG[−ρ]. Next define
the stochastic process (ρt)t∈[0,T ] by ρt = EG[ρ|Ft] resulting in a symmetric
G-martingale to which we apply the martingale representation theorem for
G-expectation, stated in Appendix B.3. Hence, there is a γ ∈M2G(0, T ) such
that we can write
ρt = 1 +
∫ t
0
γsdB
G
s , t ∈ [0, T ], P-q.s.
By the G-Itoˆ formula, stated in the Appendix B.3, we have
ln(ρt) =
∫ t
0
φsdB
G
s +
1
2
∫ t
0
φ2sd〈BG〉s, P-q.s
for every t ∈ [0, T ] in L2G(Ωt) and hence
ρ = EφT = exp
(
− 1
2
∫ T
0
θ2sd〈BG〉s −
∫ T
0
θsdB
G
s
)
, P-q.s.
With this representation of the density process we can apply the Girsanov
theorem, stated in Appendix B.3. Set φt =
ρt
γt
and consider the process
Bφt = B
G
t −
∫ t
0
φsds, t ∈ [0, T ].
We deduce that Bφ is a G-Brownian motion under Eφ(·) = EG[φ·] and S
satisfies
St = S0 +
∫ t
0
VsdB
φ
s +
∫ t
0
(µs + Vsφs)d〈Bφ〉s t ∈ [0, T ]
on (Ω, L2G(Ω)), Eφ). Since V is a bounded process, the stochastic integral
is a symmetric martingale under Eφ. S is a symmetric Eφ-martingale if
and only if µt + Vtφt = 0 P-q.s. We have shown that ρ is a simultaneous
Radon-Nikodym type density of the EsMM-set Q. Hence, there is a nontrivial
EsMM-set in M(P), since φt = θt P-q.s for every t ∈ [0, T ]. 
3.6 Appendix B: Required results
In this Appendix we introduce the mathematical framework more carefully.
We also collect all the results applied in Sections 2 and 3. First, we state
the mentioned criterion for the weak compactness of P . Let σ1, σ2 : [0, T ]→
R+ be two measures with a Holder continuous distribution function t 7→
σi([0, t]) = σi(t).
As introduced in Section 2.1, a measure P on (Ω,F) is a martingale prob-
ability measure if the coordinate process is a martingale with regard to the
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canonical (raw) filtration.
Criterion for weak compactness of priors, Denis and Kervarec (2013): Let
P(σ1, σ2) be the set of martingale probability measures with
dσ1(t) ≤ d〈B〉Pt ≤ dσ2(t),
where 〈B〉P is the quadratic variation of B under P. Then the set P(σ1, σ2)
is weakly compact.
3.6.1 The sub-order dual
In this subsection we discuss the mathematical preliminaries for the price
space of sublinear functionals for Section 3.
The topological dual space:
1. Let c2,P be a capacity norm, as defined in Section 2.2. Every continuous
linear form l on L2(P) admits a representation:
l(X) =
∫
Xdµ ∀X ∈ L2(P),
where µ is a bounded signed measure defined on a σ-algebra containing
the Borel σ-algebra of Ω. If l is a non-negative linear form, the measure
µ is non-negative finite.
2. We have L2(P)∗ = {µ = ∫ ψPdP : P ∈ P and ψP ∈ L2(P)}.
The first claim is stated in Proposition 11 of Feyel and de La Pradelle (1989).
The second assertion can be proven via a modification of Lemma I.28 and
Theorem I.30 in Kervarec (2008), where the case of L1(P)∗ is treated.
Semi lattices and their intrinsic structure
The space of coherent price systems L2(P)~++ plays a central role in Theo-
rem 1 and 2. Every consolidation operator has a domain in
⊗
P∈P L
2(P)∗ and
maps to L2(P)~. We begin with the most simple operation of consolidation,
ignoring a subset of priors and giving a weight to the others.
Let µ ∈ M≤1(P) be the positive measure µ such that µ(P) ≤ 1. The
underlying space is
⊗
P∈P L
2(P)∗, when considering simultaneously the rep-
resentations of continuous and linear functionals on L2(P). So let N ⊂ B(P)
be a Borel measurable set and µ ∈ M≤1(P). The consolidation via convex
combination is given by
Γ(µ,N) :
⊗
P∈P
L2(P)~ → L2(P)∗, {ΠP}P∈P 7→
∫
N
ψPdµ(dP).
The size of N determines the degree of ignorance related to the exclusion
of the prior in the countable reduction. A measure with a mass strictly less
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than one implies an ignorance. Here, a Dirac measure on P is a projection
to one certain probability model.
Next, we consider the supremum operation of functionals. The operation of
point-wise maximum preserves the convexity. We review a result which gives
an iterated application of the Hahn-Banach Theorem.
Representation of sublinear functionals Frittelli (2000): Let ψ be a sublinear
functional on a topological vector space V , then
ψ(X) = max
x∗∈Pψ
x∗(X),
where Pψ = {x∗ ∈ X∗ : x∗(X) ≤ ψ(X) for all X ∈ V } 6= ∅
The maximum operation can also be associated to a lattice structure. In
economic terms, this is related to a normative choice of the super hedging
intensity. The diversification valuation operator consolidation is set to one
nonlinear valuation functional. Note that the operation preserves mono-
tonicity.
3.6.2 Stochastic analysis with G-Brownian motion
We introduce the notion of sublinear expectation for the G-Brownian motion.
This includes the concept of G-expectation, the Itoˆ calculus with G-Brownian
motion and related results concerning the representation of G-expectation
and (symmetric) G-martingales. For a more detailed detour we refer to the
Appendix in Vorbrink (2010) and to references therein. At the end of this
section we present a Girsanov theorem for G-Brownian motion, which we
apply in Theorem 3 of Subsection 3.3. Let Ω 6= ∅ be a given set. Let H be a
linear space of real valued functions defined on Ω with c ∈ H for all constants
c and |X| ∈ H if X ∈ H. Note that in our model we consider the completion
of Cb(Ω) = H and Ω = ΩT = C0([0, T ]).
A sublinear expectation Eˆ on H is a functional Eˆ : H → R satisfying mono-
tonicity, constant preserving, sub-additivity and positive homogeneity. The
triple (Ω,H, Eˆ) is called a sublinear expectation space. For the construction
of the G-expectation, the notion of independence and G-normal distributions
we refer to Peng (2010).
A process (Bt)t≥0 on a sublinear expectation space (Ω,H, Eˆ) is called a G–
Brownian motion if the following properties are satisfied:
(i) B0 = 0.
(ii) For each t, s ≥ 0: Bt+s −Bt ∼ Bt and Eˆ[|Bt|3]→ 0 as t→ 0.
(iii) The increment Bt+s − Bt is independent from (Bt1 , Bt2 , · · · , Btn) for
each n ∈ N and 0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn ≤ t.
(iv) Eˆ[Bt] = −Eˆ[−Bt] = 0 ∀t ≥ 0.
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The following observation is important for the characterization ofG–martingales.
The space Cl,Lip(Rn), where n ≥ 1 is the space of all real-valued continuous
functions ϕ defined on Rn such that |ϕ(x) − ϕ(y)| ≤ C(1 + |x|k + |y|k)|x −
y| ∀x, y ∈ Rn. We define Lip(ΩT ) := {ϕ(Bt1 , · · · , Btn)|n ∈ N, t1, · · · , tn ∈
[0, T ], ϕ ∈ Cl,Lip(Rn)}. The Itoˆ integral can also be defined for the following
processes: Let H0G(0, T ) be the collection of processes η having the following
form: For a partition {t0, t1, · · · , tN} of [0, T ], N ∈ N, and ξi ∈ Lip(Ωti) ∀i =
0, 1, · · · , N − 1, let η be given by
ηt(ω) :=
∑
0≤j≤N−1
ξj(ω)1[tj ,tj+1)(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
For η ∈ H0G(0, T ) let ‖η‖M2G :=
(
EG
[∫ T
0
|ηs|2ds
]) 1
2
and denote by M2G(0, T )
the completion of H0G(0, T ) under this norm. We can construct Itoˆ’s integral
I on H0G(0, T ) and extend it to M
2
G(0, T ) continuously, by I : M
2
G(0, T ) →
L2(P). The next result is an Itoˆ formula. The presentation of basic notions
on stochastic calculus with respect to G-Brownian motion lies beyond the
scope of this appendix.
Itoˆ-formula, Li and Peng (2011): Let Φ ∈ C2(R) and dXt = µtd〈BG〉t +
VtdB
G
T , t ∈ [0, T ], µ, V ∈M2G(0, T ) are bounded processes. Then we have for
every t ≥ 0:
Φ(Xt)− Φ(Xs) =
∫ t
s
∂Φ(Xu)VudB
G
u +
1
2
∫ t
s
∂Φ(Xu)µu + ∂
2Φ(Xu)V
2
u d〈BG〉u.
Next, we discuss martingales in the G-framework. In Song (2011), this iden-
tity declares that a G-martingale M can be seen as a multiple prior mar-
tingale which is a supermartingale for any P ∈ P and a martingale for an
optimal measure.
Characterization for G-martingales, Soner, Touzi, and Zhang (2011): Let
x ∈ R, z ∈M2G(0, T ) and η ∈M1G(0, T ). Then the process
Mt := x+
∫ t
0
zsdBs +
∫ t
0
ηsd〈B〉s −
∫ t
0
2G(ηs)ds, t ≤ T,
is a G–martingale.
In particular, the non-symmetric part −Kt :=
∫ t
0
ηsd〈B〉s −
∫ t
0
2G(ηs)ds, t ∈
[0, T ], is a G-martingale which is different compared to classical probability
theory since {−Kt}t∈[0,T ] is continuous, and non-increasing with a quadratic
variation equal to zero. M is a symmetric G–martingale if and only if K ≡ 0.
Martingale representation, Song (2011): Let ξ ∈ L2G(ΩT ). Then the G–
martingale X with Xt := EG[ξ|Ft], t ∈ [0, T ], has the following unique rep-
resentation
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
zsdBs −Kt,
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where K is a continuous, increasing process with K0 = 0, KT ∈ LαG(ΩT ), z ∈
HαG(0, T ),∀α ∈ [1, 2), and −K a G–martingale. Here, HαG(0, T ) is the com-
pletion of H0G(0, T ) under the norm ‖η‖HαG :=
(
EG
[ ∫ T
0
|ηs|2ds
]α
2
) 1
α . If ξ is
bounded from above we have z ∈ M2G(0, T ) and KT ∈ L2G(ΩT ) (see Song
(2011)).
Finally we state a Girsanov type theorem with G-Brownian motion. In
Subsection 3.3 we discussed some heuristics in terms of a G-Doleans-Dade
exponential. Define the density process by Eθ as the unique solution of
dEθt = E
θ
tθtdB
G
t , E
θ
0 = 1. The proof of the Girsanov theorem is based on
a Levy martingale characterization theorem for G-Brownian motion.
Girsanov for G-expectation, Xu, Shang, and Zhang (2011): Assume the fol-
lowing Novikov type condition: There is an ε > 1
2
such that
EG
[
exp
(
ε ·
∫ T
0
θ2sd〈BG〉s
)]
<∞
Then Bθt = B
G
t −
∫ t
0
θs〈BG〉s is a G-Brownian motion under the sublinear
expectation Eθ(·) given by, Eθ(X) = EG[EθT ·X], Pθ = EθT ·P with X ∈ L2(Pθ).
Chapter 4
Brownian Equilibria under
Drift Uncertainty
4.1 Introduction
This work enlarges the class of dynamic utility specification which ensures
an equilibrium in continuous time and under uncertainty. We are interested
in recursive preference structures which allow for multiple prior uncertainty.
The standard model in economics assumes an additive utility structure,
i.e. the utility of an uncertain consumption stream c = (ct) is given by
U(c) = E[
∫ T
0
u(ct)dt]. Applications to intertemporal asset pricing are based
on equilibrium state price densities. Tackling the drawbacks of the stan-
dard model, especially the strong functional dependency between aggregate
income and equilibrium prices, necessitates broadening the preference specifi-
cations. This chapter concentrates on the expansion of utilities, guaranteeing
Arrow-Debreu equilibria on the commodity space of adapted consumption
rates processes.
In Duffie and Epstein (1992), a recursive utility specification is introduced,
called stochastic differential utility (SDU)
Ut(c) = E
[∫ T
t
f(cs, Us)ds|Ft
]
,
evaluated at t = 0. Such a specification factors the future utility of the re-
maining consumption stream and the evaluation of the present consumption.
This makes it possible to model an agent able to distinguish between the
different concepts of risk aversion and preferences for intertemporal substitu-
tion, whereby in the additive case the systemic relationship of these concepts
is unavoidable. With this utility specification, Duffie, Geoffard, and Skiadas
(1994) prove the existence of equilibria and discuss the dynamics of efficiency
via a system of forward backward integral equations.
Going one step further, in this chapter we consider the generalized SDU
(GSDU) from Lazrak and Quenez (2003) and Schroder and Skiadas (2003)
under a Brownian filtration (Ft). The process of the intertemporal utility
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is a solution of a so called backward stochastic differential equation.1 The
initial value of the solution (U,Z) of this recursive integral equation,
Ut(c) = E
[∫ T
t
f(s, cs, Us, Zs)ds
∣∣Ft] , t ∈ [0, T ] (1)
is the utility of an agent with aggregator f and given consumption rate pro-
cess c : [0, T ] × Ω → R. The endogenous process (Zt), as a part of the
solution, refers to the volatility of (Ut). In this family of utility functionals
source-dependent risk aversion, a kind of asymmetric risk aversion, can be
modeled. Furthermore, the notion of preference for information, introduced
and axiomatized by Skiadas (1998), is contained in the present GSDU-class,
see also Lazrak (2004).
A main goal is to consider models where each agent is faced with different im-
precise knowledge about the probability distribution describing the primitive
uncertainty. For instance, in Chen and Epstein (2002) Knightian uncertainty
is formalized via drift uncertainty, a continuous-time version of maxmin util-
ity from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). A subclass of the utility functionals,
for instance κ-ignorance, lies in the GSDU class. The implications of ambigu-
ity aversion for financial markets and asset pricing are studied in Epstein and
Miao (2003) for a two-agent equilibrium setting and in Epstein and Wang
(1994) for the discrete time case with a single representative agent.
Another class of continuous-time economies which incorporates Knightian
uncertainty is related to incomplete preferences motivated and axiomatized
by Bewley (2002). Here, the agents foreclose unmotivated gambles by an in-
ertia principle. For the static and finite state case, an equilibrium existence
result is established by Rigotti and Shannon (2005). In Dana and Riedel
(2013), such economies are considered in a discrete time setting. They re-
late them to variational preference anchored at the initial endowment (et), a
special case of variational preferences that have been axiomatized by Mac-
cheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006).
In order to apply our results to the above examples, we cannot assume dif-
ferentiability on the whole domain of the aggregator f . This leads to the non
differentiability of the utility functional, and forces us to consider supergra-
dient densities.
For the existence of an equilibrium, we follow the classical approach deal-
ing with infinite-dimensional commodity and price spaces by introducing the
concept of properness (or cone condition).2 The existence proof is an applica-
tion of the abstract existence result of Podczeck (1996). The empty interior
of the positive cone of the commodity space requests a pointwise (forward-)
properness condition which must hold at each consumption plan of a Pareto
optimal allocation.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, recasts
1We refer to El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997) for a detailed survey.
2For a first overview we refer to Mas-Colell and Zame (1991).
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the notion of GSDU utility functionals and discusses the supergradient. Sec-
tion 3 considers efficient allocations, proves the boundedness away from zero
of the components and the existence of general equilibrium. Proofs of auxil-
iary results are collected in the Appendix.
4.2 The Economy
Fix a time interval [0, T ], for some T ∈ (0,∞). The probability space
(Ω,F ,P) is equipped with a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] generated by an n-dimensional
Brownian motion (Bt)t∈[0,T ], and satisfying the usual conditions.
For simplicity, the case of l = 1 commodity is examined.3 We introduce the
Hilbert lattice of progressively measurable processes c : Ω× [0, T ]→ R with
finite norm ‖c‖2 = E[
∫ T
0
|ct|2dt] 12 , denoted by L2 = L2(P ⊗ dt). The con-
sumption set is given by the positive cone L2+.
4 The Hilbert space structure
of the commodity space allows us to consider the commodity-price duality
〈L2, (L2)∗〉 given by the scalar product of L2.
4.2.1 Main Result
The economy consists of m ∈ N agents. The utility of each agent i ∈
{1, . . . ,m} is described by a utility functional U i : L2+ → R which is given by
the initial value U i0 = E[
∫ T
0
f i(t, ct, U
i
t , Z
i
t)dt] of the solution (U
i, Zi) of the
following backward stochastic differential equation (Backward-SDE)
dU it = −f i(t, ct, U it , Zit)dt+ Zit>dBt U iT = 0. (2)
By generalized stochastic differential utility, GSDU for short, we denote the
functional c 7→ U i0, where U0 is the P-a.s initial value of (1). This is a rigorous
formulation of the utility backward recursion principle, considered first by
Duffie and Epstein (1992) in the continuous-time case under uncertainty. In
Proposition 3.5 of El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997) time consistency of
GSDU is shown. This principle can be seen as a benchmark for a rational
updating of intertemporal preferences. From an economic point of view, when
this Backward-SDE is used to define generalized stochastic differential utility,
it increases the modeling degree of freedom when having a Z component in
the aggregator. The quadratic variation of the utility process is given by
〈U〉t =
∫ t
0
‖Zs‖2Rnds. This intensity process appears in the intertemporal
aggregator, so that a direct effect of the n-dimensional adapted stochastic
process Z can explicitly express preferences on “local risk”. The following
conditions ensure the usual properties of the utility functional.
3The case of finite commodities can be treated by the same argumentation, we refer to
Duffie, Geoffard, and Skiadas (1994).
4Measures on Ω×[0, T ] which allow considerations of terminal consumption are possible.
In this case the BSDE in (2) has a non-trivial terminal condition.
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Assumption 1 The aggregator f is uniform Lipschitz continuous in u and
z with constant k > 0,5 satisfies a linear growth condition in c and
1. For all (t, u, z) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn+1, f(t, ·, u, z) is strictly increasing and
differentiable on (0,∞).
2. δf (c) := sup(t,u,z) |∂cf(t, c, u, z)| <∞ for all c > 0
3. Each sequence (cn)↘0 implies δf (cn) := inf(t,u,z) |∂cf(t, cn, u, z)|→ ∞.
4. For all t ∈ [0, T ], f(t, ·, ·, ·) is a concave and continuous function.
The Lipschitz-growth assumption on the aggregator guarantees unique exis-
tence of (2) for all c ∈ L2, see El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997).
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the GSDU-utility functional is con-
cave, strictly increasing and ‖ · ‖2-continuous.
In the following, we state a concrete preference specification such that As-
sumption 1 applies. We pick up this example in Subsection 2.2 and 2.3,
where we discuss economies with ambiguity averse agents.
Example 1 (Habit formation with subjective beliefs) The following aggre-
gator fk(t, c, z, u) = uk(c)− βk(t, c)u− θz induces a GSDU given by
Uk(c) = EPθ
[∫ T
0
e
∫ t
0 βk(r,cr)druk(ct)dt
]
= EP
[∫ T
0
Eβk,θt uk(ct)dt
]
, c ∈ L2+.
The subjective prior is given by dPθ = E0,θT dP, where E0,θ and Eβk,θ solve (3)
respectively. The process θ is strictly positive and bounded.
Next, we discuss the differential of the utility functional. For any process
(u, z) ∈ L2(P⊗ dt;R1+n), we introduce the stochastic exponential process Eu,z
which is defined as the solution of the SDE
dEu,zt = Eu,zt utdt+ Eu,zt z>t dBt, Eu,z0 = 1. (3)
We do not assume differentiability on the whole domain of the aggregator
since concavity allows us to consider the super-differential and give a charac-
terization in terms of super gradient densities (see the Appendix for details).
Proposition 2 Let Assumption 1 hold, c ∈ L2+ be bounded away from zero
and (U,Z) be a solution of the Backward-SDE (2). Define the time-dependent
correspondence ∂u,zf(c)t : Ω⇒ R1+n given by ∂u,zf(c)t(ω) = ∂U,Zf(t, ct, Ut, Zt)(ω).
Then, the differential of U0 at c of super-gradient densities is given by
∂U(c) =
{Eu,zt · ∂cf(t, ct, Ut, Zt) : (ut, zt) ∈ ∂u,zf(c)t, t ∈ [0, T ]}.
5This means |f(t, c, u, z) − f(t, c, u′, z′)| ≤ k|(u, z) − (u′, z′)| for all u, u′ ∈ R and
z, z′ ∈ Rn.
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The pure exchange economy is given by E =
{
L2+, U
i, ei
}
1≤i≤m, where each
U i is a GSDU-utility functional. An element (c¯1, . . . , c¯m; Π) ∈ (L2)m× (L2)∗,
consisting of a feasible allocation and a non-zero linear price functional, is
called an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium if for each i, c¯i maximizes agent i’s utility
over all c ∈ L2+ satisfying Π(ci − ei) ≤ 0 and
∑
c¯i = e. The main result is
the following.
Theorem 1 Suppose the endowment e ∈ L2+ of the economy is bounded away
from zero. For each agent i Assumption 1 holds and ei ∈ L2+ \ {0}.
Then there exists a contingent Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (c¯1, . . . , c¯m; Π) for
E, such that for every i, c¯i is bounded away from zero.
Moreover, the price system Π has a Riesz Representation pi ∈ L2+. For every
i there is a µi > 0 such that pi = µipi
i(c¯i) where pii(c¯i) is a super gradient
density.
The proof is an application of the abstract existence result in Podczeck
(1996), while the properties of the equilibrium are based on a priori esti-
mates, stochastic Gronwall inequalities and the full characterization of the
superdifferential. The main step is to prove that optimal allocations are
bounded away from zero.
The framework of the present economy opens the question on generic exis-
tence of equilibria. In finite-dimensional commodity spaces, the usual no-
tion of generic sets corresponds to full Lebesgue measure. In an infinite-
dimensional framework, one way out is to consider the concept of prevalence.6
The principle is discussed in Anderson and Zame (2001) and, as shown in
their Theorem 3.2, the set
{
(e1, . . . , em) ∈ L2,m+ :
∑
ek > ε P⊗ dt− a.e.} is
finite prevalent in L2,m+ , where ε > 0.
7
4.2.2 Maxmin Preferences in Continuous Time
An agent may not know the real world probability measure and is confronted
with a set of prior probability measures. This uncertainty or unmeasurable
risk is referred to as ambiguity. In Chen and Epstein (2002), a continuous-
time model is introduced which models the set of priors in terms of the
density kernel related to each prior. Let κk = (κk1, . . . , κ
k
n) ∈ Rn+8 and define
the set of densities by Θk =
{
θ ∈ L2,n : θit ∈ [−κki , κki ], 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
.
We construct the set of priors via Θk by considering, for each prior θ ∈ Θk, a
single SDU model Uk,θt = EP
θ
[
∫ T
t
gk(ct, Ut)dt|Ft] such that risk aversion and
6An alternative would be related to Baire’s Category theorem. A set of first category is
contained in a countable union of closed sets with an empty interior. However it detects an
empty interior for first category sets. This notion has little measure theoretic connection.
As mentioned in Mas-Colell (1990) on page 318, a topological generic set “has to be thought
of much less sharp than measure-theoretic concept available in the finite-dimensional case”.
7This indicates, that the condition on the aggregate endowment in Theorem 1 is less
strong than suspect at first glance.
8In principle, each κki can also be a bounded F-adapted process.
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intertemporal preferences can be encoded in gk, see Example 1. The utility
process of a pessimistic or ambiguity averse agent satisfies Ukt = minθ∈Θk U
k,θ
t ,
t ∈ [0, T ], where the process (Ukt , Zkt ) solves the Backward-SDE
dUkt = −
(
gk(t, ckt , U
k
t ) + min
θ∈Θk
〈θt, Zkt 〉
)
dt+ Zkt
>
dBt
= −gk(t, ckt , Ukt ) + κk · |Zkt |dt+ Zkt >dBt, UkT = 0.
Ambiguity aversion is referred to in consideration of the worst case util-
ity. Heuristically speaking, the bigger κki is, the more ambiguity aversion
is assigned to the agents. Put Kk = [−κk1, κk1] × . . . × [−κkn, κkn]. Since
z 7→ maxθ∈Kk θ · z is the convex conjugate of the indicator function 1kK ,
fk(t, c, u, z) = gk(c, u) + κkz is concave in z. Lipschitz continuity in z is im-
plied by the boundedness of each κki . The differentiability of the aggregator
fk in z is not satisfied.
In order to apply Theorem 1, we briefly check if the conditions in Assumption
1 hold. We may take an SDU aggregator gk : [0, T ]×R++×R→ R which is
consistent with Assumption 1. To mention a concrete functional form, take
a specification of Kreps and Porteus (1978) with time dependent parameters
gk(t, c, u) =
cp − βk(t)(au)p/a
p(au)(p−a)/a
,
with βk(t) ≥ 0 for all (t, k) ∈ [0, T ] × {1, . . . ,m} and a, p ≤ 1. In order
to keep the exposition simple, we have no heterogeneity or time dependence
with respect to the parameter a and p. The conditions of Theorem 1 are
satisfied.
Corollary 1 Equilibria with heterogeneous Maxmin utility exist generically.
We compute the super-differential of Uk at c explicitly. To do so, define the
worst case priors having density kernels given by
Θkc =
{
θ ∈ Θk : θt ∈ arg max
y∈Θt
y · E0,θt for all t ∈ [0, T ]
}
.
According to Theorem 1 the equilibrium allocation components are bounded
away from zero. Then by Proposition 2, the super-differential of each agent
k can be written as
∂Uk(c) =
{
(pit) : ∃θ ∈ Θkc , pit = ∂cgk(ct, Ukt ) · E∂ug
k,θ
t , for each t ∈ [0, T ]
}
,
In comparison with Chen and Epstein (2002), our Inada condition on f(t, ·, u, z),
instead of a growth condition on ∂fkc (t, ·, u, z), allows for a full characteriza-
tion of the superdifferential ∂Uk(ck) at the equilibrium consumption ck.
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4.2.3 Bewley Preferences in Continuous Time
This example studies an auxiliary economy with variational preferences which
can be linked to heterogeneous Bewley preferences. We show that Theorem
1 also covers the existence of equilibrium in such an economy. In Dana and
Riedel (2013), this concept of a discrete time Bewley economy is considered,
where preferences are incomplete by construction.
The set of priors of agent k is given Pk = {P k : dP k = E0,θt dP, θ ∈ Θk}, where
Θk is already introduced in Subsection 2.2. Agent k prefers consumption plan
x ∈ L2+ in comparison to y ∈ L2+ if and only if for all priors P′ ∈ Pk
EP′
[∫ T
0
uk(t, xt)dt
]
≥ EP′
[∫ T
0
uk(t, yt)dt
]
holds. This induces an incomplete preference relation. The existence of an
equilibrium with agents having such preferences is established by consider-
ing an auxiliary economy with complete static variational preferences. Fix a
strictly increasing, concave and continuous utility index uk : [0, T ]×R+ → R
satisfying the Inada conditions in its second variable, hence Assumption 1.1-
3 are satisfied.
We define for each agent k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} a variational utility functional an-
chored at the initial income ek ∈ L2+ by
V k(x) = min
P∈Pk
EP
[∫ T
0
uk(t, xt)− uk(t, ekt )dt
]
. (4)
Using the same Backward-SDE-arguments as the in proof of Theorem 2.2 in
Chen and Epstein (2002), one obtains that V k(x) is the initial value of the
solution (V k, Zk) of the following Backward-SDE
dV kt =
(
−(uk(t, xt)− uk(t, ekt )) + max
θ∈Θ
〈θt, Zkt 〉
)
dt+ Zkt
>
dBt, V
k
T = 0.
Specifically, the existence of the Backward-SDE follows by the same argu-
ments as in Subsection 2.2., since each ek ∈ L2+. Moreover, Assumption 1 is
satisfied.
Corollary 2 Equilibria with Bewley preferences exist generically.
With the existence of an equilibrium in this auxiliary economy, the proof
follows by the saw arguments as in Theorem 2.6 of Dana and Riedel (2013).
4.2.4 Radner Equilibria and Asset Pricing
To illustrate the generality of Theorem 1, we formulate the pricing kernel
of the underlying heterogeneous agent economy, when Itoˆ processes describe
the primitives. Let the aggregate endowment e of the economy and the
cumulative dividend process D of a long lived security be given by
det = µ
e
tdt+ σ
e
t
>dBt, dDt = µDt dt+ σ
D
t
>
dBt,
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with initial condition (e0, D0) ∈ R1+n++ and adapted integrable processes µet , µDt
and σet , σ
D
t . The process (σ
e
t ) is n-dimensional and (σ
D
t ) is n×n-dimensional
with P ⊗ dt-a.e. full rank. As a first step to establishing Theorem 1 as
an equilibrium foundation for mathematical finance, one has to discuss the
structure of the state price density. Under an additional assumption, the
appearance of the intensity process Z in the supergradients still ensures that
the equilibrium state price density pii(ci)t = ∂cf
i(t, cit, U
i
t , Z
i
t)Eu
i,zi
t is indeed
an Itoˆ process. This can be seen as follows. Eui,zi is again an Itoˆ process,
as a solution of (3). Now, assume that the partial derivative ∂cf
i(t, c, u, z)
does not depend on z and is three times continuously differentiable in c, u.
Note that this assumption holds true in our multiple prior economies of
Corollary 1 and 2. Now, following the implicit function argument in Section
2.5 of Duffie, Geoffard, and Skiadas (1994) there is a twice continuously
differentiable function Ki, depending on (t, e, E , U) = (t, e, {Eui,zi , U i}mi=1),
such that the α-efficient allocation can be written as {Ki(·, e·, E·, U i· )}mi=1,
where Eui,zi0 = αi.
Since the process U i is an Itoˆ process, pii is by the Itoˆ‘s formula an Itoˆ process
as well. The absolute continuity of the bounded variation component allows
for an interpretation of a money market captured by an interest rate process.
Corollary 3 Under Assumption 1, the differentiability assumption and the
assumed Itoˆ structure on e and D made before, there exists a Rander equi-
librium which implements the equilibrium allocation of Theorem 1. Let k ∈
{1, . . . , n}, the price process of the k’th long lived security satisfies
Skt =
1
Eui,zit · ∂cf i(t, cit, U it )
EP
[∫ T
t
Eui,zis · ∂cf i(t, cit, U it )dDks
∣∣∣Ft] , t ∈ [0, T ),
where cit = K
i(t, et, Et, Ut) for some agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Such a Radner implementation procedure can be used to observe a con-
sumption based capital asset pricing model, see Duffie and Zame (1989). For
simplicity, we set the consumption spot price to 1. For a direct construction
of the Radner equilibrium in a two-agent economy under Knightian uncer-
tainty we refer to Epstein and Miao (2003). In the κ-ignorance case this can
be found in Section 5.4 in Chen and Epstein (2002). An ambiguity premium
comes into play. This can be used to tackle the so called equity premium
puzzle.
The Corollary also has implications for the “pricing kernel puzzle”. As in
the static and finite state case considered by Hens and Reichlin (2013), the
pricing kernel of the state price density at time t is in the present GSDU
setting pii(et) = ∂cf
i(t,Ki(t, et, Et, Ut), U it , Zit) · Eu
i,zi
t . An application of Itoˆ’s
formula to the first factor, with respect to the Itoˆ process (et), and Itoˆ’s
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product rule gives the following explicit state price density
dpii(et)
Eui,zit
=
(
f icc(et)σ
e
t − f ic(et) · f iZ(et)
)>
dBt (E)
+f icc(et)
(
µet + 〈σet , f iZ(et)〉
)
+
σet
>· σet
2
f iccc(et) + f
i
c(et)f
i
U(et)dt,
where f ix(et) = ∂xf
i(t,Ki(t, et, Et, Ut), U it ), with x = c, U, Z. Note that by
(3), Eui,zit can be written in an explicit exponential form.
The very general Euler equation (E) covers many different heterogeneous
agent economies and is a testable implication of the present GSDU model.
However, we mention that the dynamics of the efficient allocation are given
by the solution (Et, Ut, Zt) of a fully coupled system of Forward-Backward-
SDE’s. In Dumas, Uppal, and Wang (2000), the system is discussed in the
case of Stochastic Differential Utility.
4.3 Existence of Equilibria
The objective of this section is to identify efficient and equilibrium allocations
for GSDU preferences. We begin by characterizing Pareto optimal allocations
with the solution of a social planning problem, and to prove the existence of
this solution. Afterwards we introduce the first order conditions. Moreover,
we show that Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee that the components
of the efficient allocation are bounded away from zero.
4.3.1 Efficient Allocations
We define the usual norm on the underlying space for allocations L2,m =
( L2)m, ‖c‖2,m := (∑mi=1 E[∫ T0 |cit|2dt] ) 12 , where c = (c1, . . . , cm). By L2,m+ , we
denote the positive cone of L2,m and by L2,m++ the quasi interior. The set of
feasible allocations is defined by Λ(e) :=
{
(c1, ..., cm) ∈ L2,m+ : e ≥
∑
ci
}
. A
weighting α ∈ Rm+ induces a representative agent Uα : L2,m+ → R, given by
Uα(c1, . . . , cm) :=
∑m
i=1 αiU
i(ci).
An allocation (cˆ1, . . . , cˆm) ∈ L2,m+ is α-efficient if it achieves the maximum
over Λ(e), i.e. Uα(cˆ) = maxc∈Λ(e) Uα(c). In the following, we state the
relation to α-efficiency when utility functionals are concave.
Proposition 3 Suppose the utility functionals are of GSDU type and sat-
isfy Assumption 1. Then there is an α-efficient allocation. Pareto optimal
allocations exist and
1. If
⋂m
i=1 ∂αiU
i(cˆi) 6= ∅, then cˆ = (cˆ1, . . . , cˆm) is α-efficient.
2. If (cˆ1, . . . , cˆm) is α-efficient and, for all i, cˆ
i is bounded away from zero,
then
⋂m
i=1 ∂αiU
i(cˆi) 6= ∅ holds.
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In order to apply the previous result to GSDU we have to establish a criterion
which ensures that the components of the efficient allocation are bounded
away from zero.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and is e
bounded away from zero. Fix an α-efficient allocation c = (c1, . . . , cm) ∈ L2,m++ .
Then, for each i, ci is bounded away from zero.
Proof of Lemma 1 Let ν = P ⊗ dt and take a c ∈ L2,m++ . For every i we
have U i(ci) > U i(0) since each U i is strictly increasing.
Suppose some cj is not bounded away from zero. Then for every h > 0 there
is an Hˆ = Hˆ(h) ∈ O such that ν(Hˆ) > 0 and cj ≤ h on Hˆ. Since e is
bounded away from zero, we have e > C ν-a.e. for some constant C > 0.
This gives us, if C is small enough, that there is an agent k such that ck ≥ C
m
on H ′ ⊂ Hˆ. We choose H = {cj < h}∩ {C
m
≤ ck ≤ Ck} which has a positive
measure.
On the other hand, since c = (c1, . . . , cm) is in the quasi interior of L
2,m
+ , for
every i, there is a set Ai ∈ O with ν(Ai) > 0 and a number ai > 0 such that
ci ≥ ai on Ai.
We show a Pareto improvement when multiples of H and Aj are traded be-
tween agent j and k. Let λk ∈ (0, h) and λj ∈ (0, aj
2
). Define the following
Backward-SDE’s:
cj 7→ (U,Z), cj − λj1Aj 7→ (UA, ZA) and cj − λj1Aj + λk1H 7→ (UAH , ZAH),
where U0 = U
j(cj), UA0 = U
j(cj − λj1Aj) and UAH0 = U j(cj − λj1Aj + λk1H)
are the corresponding evaluated utility functionals. We derive
U j(cj − λj1Aj + λk1H)− U j(cj)
≥ ekjTE
[∫ T
0
δfj(2h)λ
k1H(t)−kj
(|ZAHt −ZAt |+|Zt−ZAt |)+δfj(aj2
)
λj1Aj(t)dt
]
.
The inequality employed the estimates in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 (see the
Appendix). Next, we compute appropriate estimates for the Z parts. By the
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the a priori estimates in El Karoui, Peng,
and Quenez (1997), with λ2 = 2k, µ = 1 and β ≥ 2k(1 + k) + 1, we derive:
E
[∫ T
0
|Zs − ZAs |ds
]
≤
( Tλ2
µ2(λ2 − k)E
[∫ T
0
eβs|f j(s, cjs, Us, Zs)− f j(s, cjs − λj1Aj , Us, Zs)|2ds
]) 1
2
≤ (2TeβT )1/2E
[∫ T
0
δfj(a
j/2)λj1Aj(s)ds
]
The second inquality is a pointwise application of the mean value theorem,
the usage of λj < a
j
2
and cj ≥ aj on Aj and because ∂cf j is decreasing.
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Analogous arguments yield
E
[∫ T
0
|ZAHs − ZAs |ds
]
≤ (2TeβT )1/2E
[∫ T
0
δfj
(
aj
2
)
λk1H(s)ds
]
.
Since h can be taken to be arbitrarily small, δf (2h) becomes arbitrarily large
and by the last two derivations with e◦j = e◦kjT and eˆ◦j = e◦kjT · (2TeβT )1/2
, ◦ ∈ {+,−}:
U j(cj − λj1Aj + λk1H)− U j(cj)
≥ bje−jδfj(2h)E
[∫ T
0
λk1H(t)dt
]
− e+jδfj(a
j
2
)E
[∫ T
0
λj1Aj(t)dt
]
−e−jE
[∫ T
0
kj|ZAHt − ZAt |dt
]
− e+jE
[∫ T
0
kj|Zt − ZAt |dt
]
≥ λk
(
e−jδfj(2h)ν(H)− eˆ+jδfj(
aj
2
)ν(Aj)
)
−λj
(
e+jδfj(
aj
2
)ν(Aj) + eˆ−jδfj(
aj
2
)ν(H)
)
.
A utility improvement of agent j is related to the strict positivity of the last
term. An analogous derivation and a modification of Lemma 4 and Lemma
5 yield the corresponding inequality for agent k. Hence, in order to achieve
a Pareto improvement
1 >
e+jδfj(
aj
2
)ν(Aj) + eˆ−jδfj(a
j
2
)ν(H)
e−jδfj(2h)ν(H)− eˆ+jδfj(aj2 )ν(Aj)
· e
+kδfk(
C
2m
)ν(Aj) + eˆ−kδfk(
ak
2
)ν(H)
e−kδfk(2Ck)ν(H)eˆ+kδfk(
aj
2
)ν(Aj)
must hold. If we take a sufficiently small h, then, by the Inada style condition,
δf (2h) becomes arbitrarily large. Consequently ν(Hˆ) and hence ν(H) becomes
arbitrary small. We may choose Aj such that ν(H) = ν(Aj) > 0, this gives
us
1 >
e+jδfj(
aj
2
) + eˆ−jδfj(a
j
2
)
e−jδfj(2h)− eˆ+jδfj(aj2 )
· e
+kδfk(
C
2m
) + eˆ−kδfk(
ak
2
)
e−kδfk(2Ck)eˆ+kδfk(
aj
2
)
by choosing appropriate multiples λk ∈ (0, h) and λj ∈ (0, aj
2
) we finally get:
U j(cj − λj1Aj + λk1H) > U j(cj) and Uk(ck + λj1Aj − λk1H) > Uk(ck).
This yields a Pareto improvement, contradicting that (c1, . . . , cm) is a Pareto
optimal allocation. Therefore, each cj of the efficient allocation is bounded
away from zero. 
4.3.2 Properness and the Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we deal with the existence of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
In the end of the Appendix, we consider an economy defined on an abstract
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lattice and state the existence of a quasi equilibrium.
The notion of F -properness at x, see Definition 1 in the Appendix, can be
written as:
There is a v ∈ L2+ and an ε > 0 such that for all z with ‖z‖L2 < ε,
U(x+ λ(v− z)) > U(x), for small λ > 0 with x+ λ(v− z) ∈ L2+.
Now, we establish the existence of an equilibrium when the utility functional
U i : L2+ → R is given by a GSDU. Lemma 1 ensures that every component
of the efficient allocation is bounded away from zero.
We prove the existence of the equilibrium by an application of Theorem 2,
stated at the end of the Appendix. Therefore, we need F -properness to hold
at certain points. This is proven in the following lemma. The principle goes
back to Le Van (1996) where the case of separable utilities was treated. Apart
from Lemma 1, the main work was already done in Proposition 2, where the
square integrability of the super gradient density pi(c) = E∂cf i(·, c·, U·, Z·)
was proven. In this case, 〈pi(c), ·〉 is the supporting linear functional at c.
Lemma 2 Suppose that c = (c1, . . . , cm) is a Pareto optimal allocation with
U i(ci) ≥ U i(ei). Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the F -properness at
each ci holds.
Proof of Lemma 2 By a modification to Lemma 1, each ci is bounded away
from zero. The assumption of a quasi interior allocation may be substituted
by individual rationality.
Fix v ≡ 1 as the properness vector. According to Proposition 2, a super
gradient density pi(DU,Zf
i) ∈ L2++ at ci is given by
pi(DU,Zf
i)t = EDUf i,DZf it · ∂cf i(t, cit, U it , Zit).
The parametrization is related to the super-differential ∂U,Zf
i of the aggrega-
tor f i. For later use define
V :=
⋂
DU,Zf i∈∂U,Zf i
V (DU,Zf
i).
where V (DU,Zf
i) =
{
z ∈ L2 : 〈pi(DU,Zf i), (1− z)〉L2 > 0
}
. We show that V
is a neighborhood of 0 in L2. For each DU,Zf
i there exists an open ball around
zero which is contained in V (DU,Zf
i). Choose an arbitrary
z ∈
{
y ∈ L2 : ‖y‖L2 <
‖pi(DU,Zf i)‖L1
‖pi(DU,Zf i)‖L2
}
.
The positivity of pi implies 〈pi(DU,Zf i), z〉L2 < ‖pi‖L1〈pi(DU,Zf i), 1〉L2. Hence,
there is an open ball which is contained in V .
Let ci + λ(1 − z) ∈ L2+, where z ∈ V is arbitrary and λ > 0 is sufficiently
small. When λ > 0 tends to zero, the term λ−1U i(ci + λ(1 − z)) − U i(ci)
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increases, due to the concavity of U i. Fix some z ∈ V , whenever λ↘ 0, the
limit of the quotient exists by Giles (1982)9 and we have
lim
λ↘0
U i(ci + λ(1− z))− U i(ci)
λ
≥ 〈pi(DU,Zf i)t(1− z)〉L2 > 0.
The first inequality holds by Theorem 3 (p.122) in Giles (1982). The second
inequality is valid since z ∈ V ⊃ Bε(0). Now, consider a sufficiently small λ
with U i(ci + λ(1− z)) > U i(ci). In other words, U i is F-proper at ci . 
Proof of Theorem 1 Assumption 1 implies strict monotonicity, concavity
and norm continuity for each utility functional U i. The F-properness at each
ci is the content of Lemma 2, where (c1, . . . , cm) is an α-efficient allocation
with U i(ci) ≥ U i(ei) for all i. The existence of the Pareto optimal equilibrium
follows from Theorem 2. This implies α-efficiency for some α ∈ Rm+ \ {0}
and by Lemma 1, each c¯i is bounded away from zero.
The linear functional Π is L2-continuous. Since P⊗dt is a finite measure, we
conclude that there is a pi ∈ L2 such that Π(·) = 〈·, pi〉L2. Each c¯i is bounded
away from zero. Therefore the set of feasible directions F (c¯i) is norm-dense
in L2. The equilibrium allocation maximizes the utility of each agent:
U i(c¯i) = max
c∈L2+:Π(ci−ei)≤0
U i(ci)
Each c¯i is bounded away from zero and hence the Slater condition is satisfied
with Π( c¯
i
2
− ei) = g( c¯i
2
) < 0. By the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem,10 for concave
functionals, it is necessary and sufficient for the optimality of c¯i that there
is a µi ≥ 0 such that 0 ∈ ∂ − U i(c¯i) + µi∇Π(c¯i), µig(c¯i) = 0, on the set of
feasible directions F (c¯i).
U i is strictly monotone, consequently g(c¯i) = 0.µi = 0 would then imply
0 ∈ ∂U i(c¯i) and this contradicts the strict monotonicity of U i. This proves
the strict positivity of µi and we have, for all h ∈ F (c¯i), DU i(c¯i)(h) =
µi∇Π(h), for some DU i(c¯i) ∈ ∂U i(c¯i). Each c¯i is bounded away from zero.
By Proposition 2 each supergradient has the stated form. 
4.4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 The first two assertions can be found in El Karoui,
Peng, and Quenez (1997), the third is a modification of Proposition 1 in
Duffie and Epstein (1992). 
The partial super-gradient of the aggregator with respect to the correspond-
ing component x is denoted by Dxf(t, ·, x, ·). The partial super-differential in
u and z, namely ∂z,zf at (t, c, u, z), consists of all pointwise supergradients
9See Theorem 1 on page 117.
10We refer to Theorem 3.1.4 in Barbu and Precupanu (1986)
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(DUf(t, c, u, z), DZf(t, c, u, z)) = (u, z) ∈ R × Rn such that f(t, c + x, u +
y1, z + y2) ≤ f(t, c, u, z) + ∂cf(t, c, u, z)x + ay1 + by2. For k = U,Z, the
stochastic process (Dkf(t, ct, Ut, Zt))t∈[0,T ] is denoted by Dkf .
Proof of Proposition 2 The density representation of the supergradient
follows from Lemma 3, with t = 0. Following the proof of Theorem 4.3
in Aliprantis (1997) and applying the concave alternative of Fan, Glicksberg,
and Hoffman (1957), we can show that the right- and left-hand derivatives
represent the superdifferential in terms of the order interval:
∂U(c) = {g ∈ (L2)∗ : ∇+U(c)(ω)t ≤ gt(ω) ≤ ∇−U(c)(ω)t P⊗ dt-a.e.}
An application of results on Backward-SDE’s depending on parameters (see
Proposition 2.4 El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997)), proofs that
lim
α↘0
U(c)− U(c− αh)
α
= 〈∇+U(c), h〉 = 〈ED+U f,D+Z f · ∂cf, h〉.
In this case, the closed formula of the adjoint process is given by ED+U f,D+Z f .
The superdifferential can be written as a specific order interval in L2, i.e.
∂U(c) = [ED+U f,D+Z f · ∂cf, ED−U f,D−Z f · ∂cf ] and the assertion follows. 
Lemma 3 Fix t ∈ [0, T ] and suppose the conditions of Proposition 2 hold,
then for any direction h ∈ L2 such that c+ h ∈ L2++ we have
Ut(c+ h)− Ut(c) ≤ E
[∫ T
t
Es
Et ∂cf(s, cs, Us, Zs)hsds|Ft
]
.
Proof of Lemma 3 Take a c and h as stated. The related utility processes
U and Uh are given by
dUt = −f(t, ct, Ut, Zt)dt+ ZtdBt and dUht = −f(t, ct + ht, Uht , Zht )dt+ Zht dBt,
with terminal conditions UT = 0 = U
h
T . We define Et := EDUf,DZft and prove
the following
claim: We have E[supt∈[0,T ] E2t ] <∞.
proof: The process E admits a decomposition Et = λt · Γt and hence by the
boundedness of the super-gradient w.r.t. the aggregator in utility
λt = exp(
∫ t
0
DUf(s, cs, Us, Zs)ds) ≤ exp(kt). (5)
Boundedness of the super-gradient w.r.t. aggregator in the intensity compo-
nent z implies
E
[
exp
(
1
2
∫ t
0
|DZf(s, cs, Us, Zs)|2ds
)]
≤ E
[
exp
(
1
2
∫ t
0
k2ds
)]
<∞,
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the Novikov criterion is satisfied, hence the process Γ, given by
Γt = exp
(
−1
2
∫ t
0
|DZf(s, cs, Us, Zs)|2ds+
∫ t
0
DZf(s, cs, Us, Zs)
′dBs
)
, (6)
is indeed a martingale. With regard to the local martingale
∫ ·
0
ΓsdΓs, we take
a localizing sequence of stopping times (τn)n∈N ⊆ [0, T ] such that τn n→∞−→ T
P-a.s., and we see that for each n,
(∫ t∧τn
0
ΓsdΓs
)
t∈[0,T ]
is a martingale.
By Itoˆ’s formula, the quadratic variation of Γ, the boundedness of the super-
gradient in the intensity component z and Fubini’s theorem, we get
E[Γ2t∧τn ] = E
[
1 + 2
∫ t∧τn
0
ΓsdΓs +
1
2
∫ t∧τn
0
2d〈Γ〉s
]
= E
[
1 +
∫ t∧τn
0
Γ2sDZf(s, cs, Us, Zs)
2ds
]
≤ 1 +
∫ t
0
E[Γ2s∧τn ]k
2ds.
Applying the Gronwall lemma with g(s) = E[Γ2s∧τn ], we conclude that g(T ) ≤
exp(Tk2) <∞ and by the dominated convergence, E[Γ2T ] ≤ exp(Tk2). Since
Γ is a martingale, Γ2 is a submartingale. By virtue of Doob’s maximal in-
equality, (6) and (7), we deduce
E
[
sup
t
E2t
]
≤ E
[
sup
t
λ2t sup
t
Γ2t
]
≤ e2kT4E [Γ2t ] <∞. 
To see that E∂cf ∈ L2, we argue that there is a constant C > 0 with c > C P⊗
dt-a.e. and, since f is a regular aggregator, the process t 7→ ∂cf(t, ct, Ut, Zt)
takes values in [0, K] P⊗ dt-a.e., where K = sup(t,u,z) ∂cf(t, C, u, z). Since c
is bounded away from zero, we have ∂cf ∈ L∞(P⊗ dt) and E∂cf ∈ L2 follows
by the previous claim.
The remaining part follows from Lemma A.5 in Schroder and Skiadas (2003).
We begin with the first order conditions of optimality for concave and not
necessarily Gateaux differentiable functionals. Define the set of feasible di-
rections at ci given by F (ci) =
{
h ∈ L2 : ∃µ > 0 ci + µh ∈ L2+
}
and the set
of feasible transfers H(c) =
{
h ∈ L2,m : ∑hi = 0, hi ∈ F (ci), 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
By ∂L2,mU we denote the super-differential of a functional U on L
2,m. We
write 〈DU(c), h〉 for DU(c)(h), where DU(c) ∈ ∂U(c) is a super-gradient.
Proof of Proposition 3 The properties of the aggregator imply the norm
continuity and concavity of the utility functionals. Alaouglu’s theorem implies
the weak compactness of Λ(e). Under concavity and upper semicontinuity,
weak upper semicontinuity of the utility functionals follows. α-efficient allo-
cation exists by an abstract Weierstrass argument. The equivalence between
α-efficiency and Pareto optimality is standard in economic theory.
1. Let (h1, . . . , hm) = h ∈ H(cˆ). By assuming there is a DU ∈ ⋂mi=1 ∂αiU i(cˆi),
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with Riesz representation pi. This means for each i, there is a DαiU
i(cˆi) ∈
∂αiU
i(cˆi) such that DαiU
i(cˆi) = 〈pi, ·〉 and therefore∑
〈DαiU i(cˆi), hi〉 =
∑
〈pi, hi〉 = 〈pi,
∑
hi〉 = 〈pi, 0〉 = 0.
Since each U i satisfies the conditions of Proposition 4, (cˆ1, . . . , cˆm) is an α-
efficient allocation.
2. For each i, the consumption process cˆi is bounded away from zero. This
implies L∞(P ⊗ dt) ⊆ F (cˆi). Suppose the converse, there are two agents i
and j such that ∂αiU
i(cˆi)∩∂αjU j(cˆj) = ∅. Then there is an hi ∈ F (cˆi)\{0},
an hj ∈ F (cˆj) \ {0} and an h ∈ H(cˆ) with hk = 0 if k /∈ {i, j} such that, for
all DαiU
i(ci) ∈ ∂αiU i(ci) and DαjU j(cˆj) ∈ ∂αjU j(cˆj), we have
0 < E
[∫ T
0
hitpi
i(cˆi)t − hitpij(cˆj)tdt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
hitpi
i(cˆi)t + h
j
tpi
j(cˆj)tdt
]
=
∑
〈DαiU i(cˆi), hi〉L2 ,
where pij(cˆj) is the Riesz representation of DαjU
j(cˆj), a contradiction to
Proposition 4. 
For the proof of Proposition 3 we applied the following result.
Proposition 4 Assume that for each i, the utility functional U i is upper
semicontinuous, strictly increasing, concave and let the aggregate endowment
e be bounded away from zero.
Then α-efficiency of cˆ ∈ Λ(e) is equivalent to the existence of a DU i(cˆi) ∈
∂U i(cˆi), for each i, such that 0 ≥∑〈DαiU i(cˆi), hi〉, h ∈ H(cˆ).
Proof of Proposition 4 Let g(c1, . . . , cm) =
∑
ci − e and gi(c1, . . . , cm) =
−ci. Then α-efficiency for cˆ = (cˆ1, . . . , cˆm) can be written as
Uα(cˆ) = max
c′∈Λ(e)
Uα(c′) = min
c′∈L2,m:gi(c′),g(c′)≤0
−Uα(c′).
Since e is bounded away from zero, the Slater condition holds. We apply the
Kuhn-Tucker theorem (see Theorem 3.1.4 in Barbu and Precupanu (1986)),
to −Uα. Hence, cˆ is α-efficient if and only if there are constants µi, µ ≥ 0
such that 0 ∈ (∂L2,m − Uα)(cˆ) + µ∇L2,mg(cˆ) +
∑
µi∇L2,mgi(cˆ) and µg(cˆ) = 0,
µigi(cˆ) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m. Taking the non-negativity constraints into account
and the existence of a −DL2,mUα(cˆ) ∈ (∂L2,m − Uα)(cˆ), this is equivalent to
0 ≤ −DL2,mUα(cˆ) + µ∇L2,mg(cˆ) and µg(cˆ) = 0.
Taking the feasible transfers h ∈ H(cˆ) into account, we have
0 ≤ 〈−DL2,mUα(cˆ), h〉L2,m + 〈µ · ∇L2,mg(cˆ), h〉L2,m
= −
∑
αiDU
i(cˆi)hi + µ
∑
hi.
Since the U i’s are strictly increasing, g(cˆ) = 0 follows. 
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The following two results are used in Lemma 1 and in the proof of the F-
properness in Section 3.3. The approach goes back to Duffie and Zame (1989).
The aggregator is not differentiable in u and z (but concave) and hence we
need a mean value theorem for convex functions, see Wegge (1974). Lemma
4 and Lemma 5 are formulated so that an application to the contradiction
argument in Lemma 1 fits the agent j.
Lemma 4 Assume that U is a generalized stochastic differential utility gen-
erated by an aggregator f that satisfies Assumption 1. Let A ∈ O and a > 0
be arbitrary. If y, x ∈ L2+ with y ≥ a on A, x = 0 on Ac and x ≤ a2 , then
U(y)− U(y − x) ≤ ekTE
[∫ T
0
δf (
a
2
)xt + k|Zs − Z¯s|dt
]
.
Proof of Lemma 4 Let (Ut, Zt)t∈[0,T ] = (U,Z) be the solution of the utility
process related to y and (U¯ , Z¯) the solution of the utility process related to
y−x where x is chosen as above. By assumption, f is differentiable in c. We
apply the classical mean value theorem to the consumption component. Since
f is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in u and z, upper semicontinuity follows,
we apply the mean value theorem for convex functions of Wegge (1974) to
−f(t, c, ·, ·). Hence, there is an R × R × Rn valued process (ξc, ξU , ξZ) such
that
Ut − U¯t = E
[∫ T
t
f(s, ys, Us, Zs)− f(s, ys − xs, U¯s, Z¯s)ds|Ft
]
= E
[ ∫ T
t
∂cf(s, ys + ξ
c
s, Us + ξ
U
s , Zs + ξ
Z
s )xs
+DUf(s, ys + ξ
c
s, Us + ξ
U
s , Zs + ξ
Z
s )(Us − U¯s)
+〈DZf(s, ys + ξcs, Us + ξUs , Zs + ξZs ), (Zs − Z¯s)〉ds|Ft
]
.
Observe Ut − U¯t ≥ 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ], by Proposition 1 since x ≥ 0 and f
is increasing in consumption. Combined with the boundedness of the super-
gradients, we derive:
Ut − U¯t ≤ E[
∫ T
t
∂cf(s, ys + ξ
c
s, Us + ξ
U
s , Zs + ξ
Z
s )xs + k(Us − U¯s)
+〈DZf(s, ys + ξcs, Us + ξUs , Zs + ξZs ), (Zs − Z¯s)〉ds|Ft]
≤ E[
∫ T
t
δf (
a
2
)xs + k(Us − U¯s) + k|Zs − Z¯s|ds|Ft]
The last inequality holds because x 7→ ∂cf(s, x, v, z) is decreasing and using
the estimate δf (
a
2
), since ys(ω)+ξ
c
s(ω) ≥ a2 on A. Finally, the first Stochastic
Gronwall inequality (see Corollary B in the Appendix of Duffie and Epstein
(1992)), evaluated at time zero yields
U(y)− U(y − x) = U0 − U¯0 ≤ ekTE
[∫ T
0
δf (
a
2
)xs + k|Zs − Z¯s|ds
]
. 
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Lemma 5 Assume that U is a generalized stochastic differential utility gen-
erated by an aggregator f that satisfies Assumption 1. Let H ∈ O, h > 0
and y ∈ L2+ with y ≤ h on H. Then for every λ ∈ [0, h]
U(y + λ1H)− U(y) ≥ e−kTE
[∫ T
0
δf (2h)λ1H(t)− k|Z¯s − Zs|dt
]
.
Proof of Lemma 5 Let (Ut, Zt)t∈[0,T ] = (U,Z) be the solution of the util-
ity process of the process y and (U¯ , Z¯) the solution of the utility process of
y+ λ1H . f is differentiable in consumption and concave in the other compo-
nents. Applying the mean value theorem for c, there is a R2+n valued process
(ξc, ξV , ξZ) and we have
U¯t − Ut ≥ E
[∫ T
t
δf (2h)λ1H(t)− k(U¯s − Us)− k|Z¯s − Zs|ds|Ft
]
.
The inequality follows from the application of the estimates δf (2h) (since
ys(ω) + ξ
c
s(ω) ≤ 2h on H) and arguments similar to Lemma 4. We have
Us−U¯s ≥ 0 since λ1H ≥ 0 and f is increasing. Finally, the second Stochastic
Gronwall inequality (see again Corollary B in the Appendix of Duffie and
Epstein (1992)), evaluated at time zero gives us
U(y)− U(y − x) = U0 − U¯0 ≥ e−kTE
[∫ T
0
δf (2h)λ1H(t)− k|Z¯s − Zs|ds
]
. 
Quasi-Equilibrium in Normed Lattices
Let (L, τ) be the commodity space, a vector lattice with a Hausdorff, locally
convex topology τ . We fix a pure exchange economy with m ∈ N agents
E = {L+, Pi, ei}1≤i≤m in L such that Pi : L+ → 2L+ are the preference
relations on the consumption set L+ and e
i ∈ L+ is the initial endowment of
each agent.
An allocation (x1, . . . , xm) is individually rational if ei /∈ Pi(xi) for every i.
A quasi-equilibrium for E consists of a feasible allocation (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Lm+ ,
i.e.
∑
xi = e, and a linear functional pi : L→ R with pi 6= 0 such that, for all
i pi(xi) ≤ pi(ei) and for any i, y ∈ K+ with y ∈ P (xi) implies pi(y) ≥ pi(xi).
The quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium if y ∈ P (xi) implies pi(y) > pi(xi).
Forward properness is a modification of a cone condition (see Yannelis and
Zame (1986)).
Definition 1 A preference relation P : L+ → 2L+ is F-proper at x ∈ L+ if:
There is a v ∈ L+, some constant ρ > 0 and a τ -neighborhood U satisfying,
with λ ∈ (0, ρ) :
If z ∈ U , then x+ λv − z ∈ L+ implies x+ λv − λz ∈ P (x)
The following standard assumptions are needed to establish the existence of
a quasi-equilibrium.
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Assumption 2 The economy satisfies the following conditions:
1. y /∈ Pi(y) and Pi(y) is for all y ∈ L+ and every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
2. There is a Hausdorff topology η on L such that [0, e] is η-compact and
for every i the graph gr(Pi) = {(x, y) ∈ L× L : x ∈ L+, y ∈ Pi(x)} is a
relatively open subset of L+ × L+ in the product topology η-τ .
3. Pi(y) ∩ L(e) 6= ∅ for all y ∈ [0, e] and every i.
4. L(e)11 is τ -dense in L and if (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Lm+ is an individually
rational and Pareto-optimal allocation, then, for every i, Pi is F-proper
at xi.
Theorem 2 Suppose the economy E satisfies Assumption 2. Then there is
an x ∈ Lm+ and a p ∈ L∗ such that (x, p) is a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium.
This result is proved in Podczeck (1996). If preferences are strictly monotone
and continuous and the total endowment is strictly positive, the notions of
equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium coincide, see Corollary 8.37 in Aliprantis
and Burkinshaw (2003), where it is requested that L∗ is a sublattice of the
order dual L?.
11L(e) denotes the order ideal L. Details can be found in Aliprantis and Burkinshaw
(2003).
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